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By the middle of the nineteenth century the science of thermodynamics had reached such 
a level of complexity and sophistication that it seemed all phenomena—from the activity of 
physical bodies to the intricacies of human psychology to the fate of the cosmos—could be 
explained through its laws.  While the law of conservation of energy, which proposes that energy 
can be transformed but neither created nor destroyed, seemed to indicate that nature was in a 
constant state of flux, the second law of thermodynamics revealed that these transformations will 
lead to the thermodynamic heat-death of the universe, where all potential energy has been 
actualized and all movement has ceased.  Thermodynamic thought at once suggested that the 
cosmos is a vibrant and vital system, and threatened to reduce nature to a dead system in which 
all difference is replaced by equivalence.  A tradition of philosophical and scientific thought, 
beginning with James Tyndall and Herbert Spencer, and continuing through Henri Bergson, 
Fredrick Nietzsche and Gilles Deleuze, draws from the terms of a debate between H.L. Mansel 
and J.S. Mill over the a priori structure of the mind in order to argue that while the forms 
imposed by the human intellect might condemn the universe to a heat-death, the true logic of 
nature, beyond knowledge and beyond the individual life of the human, is a perpetual movement 
of synthetic and creative forces.   
Following from the observation that the body and brain are composed of the same forces 
and elements that are found in the material world, these grand cosmological tendencies come to 
inform a technical description of the human psyche.  Beginning with his Project for a Scientific 
 
   
Psychology, which works to describe psychology as the effect of the flow of energy through the 
brain, Freud not only appeals to thermodynamic science to give a picture of how the mind works, 
but relies on the idea that there are distinct tendencies that inhere in these flows of energy to 
theorize the broad developmental structure of human life.  In his linguistic revision of Freud, 
Jacques Lacan takes aim at Freud’s reliance on energetics, arguing that within Freud’s discourse 
the scene of energetics functions as a fantasy that relates the subject to a locus of natural 
meaning.  Whether as an organic cause or as a privileged fantasy, the logic of energetics frames a 
central problematic of psychoanalytic thought.   
Within the literary tradition, the language of thermodynamics comes to situate 
discussions of psychology, ethics, and formal experimentation.  Through readings of Walter 
Pater, Henry James, Oscar Wilde, Gertrude Stein, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, I argue that the 
impasses and expressive possibilities of thermodynamic thought become a model for the 
aesthetic and formal concerns of a literature that works to articulate the natural logic that situates 
the human.   
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Introduction:  The Thermodynamic Body 
 
Over the course of the nineteenth century the science of thermodynamics evolved from a 
technical inquiry into the efficiency of steam engines, into a comprehensive and far reaching 
theory that explained everything from the logic of mechanical work and the physiology of the 
body, to the intricacies of the psyche, the movement of planets and stars, and the fate of the 
cosmos as a whole. Part of the vigor of the debates that respond to the innovations of 
thermodynamic thought comes from the fact that the discursive boundaries between these 
various fields are porous.  The question of whether the universe is in perpetual movement, 
expanding and changing as an ever greater number of phenomena arise at the intersection of 
forces, or rather slowing moving towards a “heat-death,” where all differences will cease to 
exist, is at once taken up by physicists and metaphysicians.  Since the body and mind are 
composed of the same forces and elements that are found in the material world, these grand 
cosmological tendencies come, in turn, to inform a technical description of the body and mind.  
The language of cosmology becomes the language of psychology. 
For Walter Pater difference between normal and pathological behavior corresponds to a 
debate over the structure and future of the universe.  For Pater, the fact that the cosmos is in 
“perpetual motion” suggests that “the very essence of thought [is] itself also such perpetual 
motion”(Plato, 13-15).  In contrast, the idea of a universal tendency towards the equilibrium of a 
thermodynamic heat-death becomes part of a project to efface the specificity of subjective 
experience.   A vision of the universe where all differences have vanished and all motion has 
stopped reduces the variety of phenomena into elements in a “long equation that had zero is 
equal to zero for its result” (Imaginary Portraits, 120).  Pater argues that this fantasy of a 
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universal equality that replaces subjective difference is motivated by a desire to restore “the calm 
surface of the absolute, untroubled mind, to tabula rasa, by the extinction in one’s self of all that 
is but correlative to the finite illusion (Imaginary Portraits, 132).  Whereas the “essence of 
thought” is perpetual motion, a belief in the heat death of the universe becomes a kind of 
psychological pathology.  For the more sober minded William James, “a mind is a system of 
ideas” that must be maintained in “a mechanical equilibrium” (Varieties, 197), in order to 
manage an inherent “instability” of the nervous system”(Principles, 139).  For James it is not 
equilibrium, but “idiosyncratic bursts of overflowing energy”(Franzese, 187), that constitute 
pathological behavior.  For Freud, likewise, psychic structure depends on how a quantity of 
energy is managed.  Freud argues that the infant is possessed by an undifferentiated libidinal 
energy.  As the child grows he or she must direct this energy into socially acceptable channels.  
If the energy of the drive is in excess of the socially acceptable forms of expression, it is like 
when “a stream of water which meets with an obstacle in the river-bed is dammed up and flows 
back into old channels”(Dora, 44).  Psychic structure depends upon how this excess energy is 
canalized:  the hysteric and neurotic form symptoms and fantasies in order to express this 
energy; in the case of perversions, which “are the negative”(Dora, 43) of the neuroses, the 
subject acts on these fantasies; for the artist this redirected force provides “the energy for a great 
number of cultural achievements”(Dora, 43).  The logic of the psyche is determined by the logic 
of a flow of energy.   
In what follows, I begin with a reading of Freud’s appeal to scientific energetics.  The 
language of energetics provides Freud both with a technical explanation for how the psyche 
functions, and with a broad theory of the developmental tendencies of the subject.  This scene of 
natural energies comes to provide the structure of Freud’s metapsychology.  In his linguistic 
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revision of Freud, Jacques Lacan takes aim at Freud’s reliance on energetics, arguing that within 
Freud’s discourse energetics functions as a fantasy that relates the subject to a locus of natural 
meaning.  For both Freud and Lacan, the question of natural energy is at the center of a 
psychoanalytic metapsychology.  I then turn to offer a brief history of how, within an influential 
tradition of nineteenth century philosophy, the science of energetics comes to be the language of 
nature, a language that, because it situates human activity and thought, is taken to exist beyond 
the limits of the intellect.  Finally, I suggest that a certain tradition of literary modernism—which 
passes through Walter Pater, Henry James, Oscar Wilde, D.H. Lawrence and Gertrude Stein—
derives its aesthetic and formal concerns from the impasses and expressive possibilities of 
thermodynamic thought.  
 
I. Freud’s Energetics 
 
Sigmund Freud begins his early Project for a Scientific Psychology by declaring that “the 
intention of this project is to furnish us with a psychology which shall be a natural science:  its 
aim, that is, is to represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable 
material particles and so to make them plain and void of contradiction” (355).  Freud continues 
that “the material particles in question are the neurons” (355), and that these neurons are invested 
with a quantity of energy.  The flow of energy through these neurons is guided by a principle of 
“neural inertia”—modeled after the thermodynamic principle of the conservation of energy—that 
dictates that each neuron divests itself of energy by passing the quantity of energy on to the next 
neuron, in order to return to a state of equilibrium.  The entire neural system, governed by this 
principle, works to maintain itself in a state of equilibrium.   
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When a simple organism perceives a stimulus it takes energy in from the environment 
through its sensory nervous system, and then expels it through its motor nervous system. The 
case changes slightly for complex organisms such as humans. “As the internal complexity of the 
organism increases, the neuronic system receives stimuli from the somatic element itself—
endogenous stimuli, which cause equally for discharge” (357). To satisfy these endogenous 
stimuli—such as “hunger, respiration and sexuality” (357)—the organism must “learn to tolerate 
a store of quantity [of energy] sufficient to meet the demands for specific action” (358). While 
some tension must be reserved within the “neuronic system,” in order to meet these endogenous 
needs, the system still works “to keep its level of tension constant” (358).  Freud argues that the 
phenomena of hysterical or neurotic symptoms, which present as eruptions of energy in excess of 
any environmental cause, come when this store of energy, within the neural system, cannot find 
its proper expression.  Freud thus gives the example of an hysterical woman who is “under a 
compulsion not to go into shops alone”(410).  This compulsion is caused by two repressed 
childhood memories.  In the first, two shop assistants, one of whom “attracted her 
sexually”(410), were “laughing at her clothes”(410); in the second, “she had gone into a shop to 
buy some sweets and the shopkeeper had grabbed her genitals through her clothes”(411). She has 
an unexplained fear because the idea of going into a shop alone “passes through a number of 
unconscious intermediate links”(413). Since the neural system works to keep the level of 
energetic tension constant, the quantity of energy, stored in response to these two events, exerts 
its presence through unconscious associations.  Because it has not been allowed any direct 
expression, a wholly appropriate reaction to two traumatic events troubles the hysteric every time 
she thinks of going into a shop alone.  The talking cure allows the direct expression of the energy 
stored in response to these experiences.  Once Freud’s hysteric uncovers the experiences she has 
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repressed she can distinguish between shopkeepers, who should not elicit an affective response, 
and the sexually charged situations to which she should, indeed, respond.   
It is in terms of this labor to explain psychic phenomena in terms of the equilibrium of an 
energetic system that Jacques Lacan writes of Freud’s debt to nineteenth century scientism.  For 
Lacan, it is Freud’s  
allegiance to the ideals of Brücke, themselves passed down from 
Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond’s pact to reduce physiology, and the 
mental functions considered to be included therein, to the mathematically 
determined terms of thermodynamics (the latter having attained virtual 
completion during their lifetimes)—that led Freud, as his writings show, 
to pave the way that shall forever bear his name. (Écrits, 728) 
 
For Lacan, in other words, it is only because of Freud’s adherence to the science of energetics 
that Freud is able to develop psychoanalysis.  The relationship of Freud’s unconscious to 
thermodynamics, as well as the importance of Freud’s scientism to Lacan’s reformulation of the 
Freudian unconscious, takes us to the scene of nineteenth century thermodynamics, where a 
rigorous rationalism, which reduces phenomena to mathematically determinable terms, is 
conjoined with an at times mystical speculation into the natural logic that governs these 
mathematical relationships.   
As Lacan suggests, the project to reduce physiology to the “mathematically determined 
terms of thermodynamics,” is often though to originate with Hermann von Helmholtz.  In his 
1862 public lecture, “The Application of the Law of the Conservation of Force to Organic 
Nature,” Helmholtz argues that the laws of thermodynamics show the path by which the 
fundamental problems of human life can be resolved through experimentation.  Rather than 
assume that a vital motive power separates living organisms from mechanical processes, 
Helmholtz argues that the science of energetics shows that human physiology is organized 
through the same processes, and is governed by the same laws, that describe mechanical work. 
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At the beginning of this century, physiologists believed that it was the vital 
principle which caused the processes of life, and that it detracted from the 
dignity and nature of life if anybody expressed his belief that the blood 
was driven through the vessels by the mechanical action of the heart, or 
that respiration took place according to the common laws of the diffusion 
of gasses.  The present generation, on the contrary, is hard at work to find 
out the real causes of the processes that go on in the living body.  They do 
not suppose that there is any other difference between the chemical and the 
mechanical actions in the living body and out of it than can be explained 
by the more complicated circumstances and conditions under which these 
actions take place, and we have seen that the law of the conservation of 
force legitimizes this supposition.  This law, moreover, shows the way in 
which this fundamental question, which has excited so many theoretical 
speculations, can be really and completely solved by experiment.  (121) 
 
It is in indeed in these programmatic terms that Freud takes up and extends the experimental plan 
that Helmholtz articulates, by explaining the intricacies of psychology through reference to the 
system of mathematically determined quantities of energy.  In his 1927 essay “The Question of a 
Weltanschauung,” written some fifty years after Helmholtz’s lecture, Freud suggests that the 
Weltanschauung of psychoanalysis is nothing other than this experimental program.  Freud 
writes that psychoanalysis “is quite unfit to construct a Weltanschauung of its own: it must 
accept the scientific one” (196), which “assumes the uniformity of the explanation of the 
universe […] as a programme, the fulfillment of which is relegated to the future” (196). What 
science asserts as a “programme” is “that there are no sources of knowledge of the universe other 
than the intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized observations—in other words, what 
we call research—and alongside of it no knowledge derived from revelation, intuition or 
divination”(196). The ethics of the Weltanschauung of science, as part of a psychoanalytic labor, 
thus involves a critique of any non-scientific Weltanschauung, and the imposition of “a 
dictatorship of reason” (198) in its place. It would be difficult to understate the importance of 
this thermodynamic project for Freud’s writings. The central structural elements in Freud’s 
metapsychology—the language of primary and secondary processes, the ego, id, and superego—
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all emerge out of the language of neural energetics that Freud first puts forth in the Project.  
Expanding on Hemlmoltz’s declaration that the circulation of the blood can be understood 
according to the “mechanical action of the heart”(121) or that respiration takes place “according 
to the common laws of the diffusion of gasses”(121), Freud argues that psychic as well as social 
structures exist in order to manage the energy of the drive.  As he writes in The Psychopathology 
of Everyday Life, “a large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way 
into most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the external world [...] One 
could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good 
and evil, of immortality, and so on, and to transform metaphysics into metapsychology” (SE 
6:256). Freud finds the real causes of hysteria and neurosis, as well as group psychology, myth, 
and religion, through a metapsychological model of flows of energy that pass through the 
structures of the brain.   
 And yet alongside Freud’s allegiance to Helmholtz’s scientific program, there is a second 
thermodynamic heritage in Freud’s thought.  In his description of a scientific Weltanschauung as 
a research program, Freud seems to embrace scientific discourse as an epistemological, rather 
than as an ontological, program.  J.S. Mill, whose logic was hugely important to the development 
of nineteenth century science, and whom Freud both referenced and translated, argues that in 
order for scientific thought to proceed, it does not need to make any assumptions about the 
universal structure of the natural world.  For Mill, the specific study of the relationships between 
particular observations is all that is required to investigate the world of phenomena.  As Richard 
Rorty writes, Mill’s argument that a study of particulars could lead to laws did “for science what 
the utilitarians had done for morality—making it something you could use instead of something 
you could merely respect”(308).  The utility of scientific thought does not require, for Mill, that 
  
 
8 
we assume that the laws inhere in the material structure of the natural world.  Yet at the same 
time that Freud, following from Helmholtz, seems to adhere to this purely critical notion of 
scientific thought, to the imposition of a “dictatorship of reason” through which laws can be 
constructed out of observations, Freud is equally influenced—through his collaboration with 
Wilhelm Fliess—by a tradition of thought that takes these exchanges of energy as an ontological 
fact.   
 Freud’s Project was first conceived of as a shared project with Fliess, whose 1897 study, 
The Relation Between the Nose and the Female Sex Organs, Presented in their Biological 
Significance moves from the visual resemblance between the structure of bone and tissue in the 
nose and female genitalia, to the seemingly functional resemblance (in that each involves a 
spontaneous flow of blood) between a nosebleed and a menstrual period, to a universal theory of 
flows of energy that periodically traverse the human body.  As Serge André writes, even more 
astonishing than the speculative fervor of Fliess’s theory is that “Freud, who in early 1896 was 
the first reader of this manuscript, had virtually no objections to this ‘nose-genital,’ as he called 
it. On the contrary, he sang its praises, extolling its brilliance and originality and finding nothing 
to amend” (29).  
Fliess argues, through an impressive series of tables that chart the dates of important 
incidents in patients’ lives—from menstrual flows and nosebleeds to migraines, anxiety attacks, 
and dates of birth and death—that these phenomena are the expression of periodic flows of a 
universal sexual energy.  These flows occur in two periods, and Fliess, as he writes, has “named 
the series of twenty eight days ‘feminine’ and the series of twenty three days ‘masculine’”.1 
                                                
1  Fliess’s study is unfortunately not translated into English. The translations are my own, from the French 
translation of Fliess's German. “Nous avons sans rien préjuger, nommé féminines les séries de vingt-huit 
jours et masculines les séries de vingt-trois jours”(254) 
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Anxiety “is produced at periodic days” if these flows are not allowed expression.  Aligning his 
theory with Freud's idea of repression, Fliess writes that anxiety occurs only when this flow is 
repressed. 
The sexually mature man, who is able to entirely satisfy his reproductive 
instinct, does not experience anxiety. The excitation finds its normal 
expression, and through this expression its balance. But in the 
circumstances defined by Freud, if this balance is imperfect, a part of this 
unspent substance accumulates and resurges, transformed into anxiety. It 
is a little like electrical force that, when resistance is opposed, accumulates 
and then finds its balance in periodic discharges that produce effects like 
light and heat, or even motor effects that would not have appeared if the 
current had not been restricted. (238)2  
 
Fliess's cure for a wide range of emotional as well as physical problems is thus to bring the 
patient into rhythm with these universal flows, by applying cocaine to the mucous membrane of 
the nose in order to encourage the correct discharge of energy. 
 For Fliess, as for Freud, hysterical or neurotic symptoms come when an excess of energy 
is stored and is unable to release its energy back into the environment. The problem of cathexis, 
for both Freud and Fliess, thus has to do with finding a way to release this reserve of energy and 
to thus reintegrate the energy that is stored up in the symptom into the flow of energy that passes 
into and out of the subject. Just as Fliess’s cocaine treatments allow the patient to express the 
periodic flow that traverses his body, for Freud, cathexis allows the patient to reintegrate the 
excess energy that is stored in the symptom back into the environment.  And yet, in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
2 “L’homme sexuellement mûr, que est en mesure de satisfaire entièrement à l’instinct de reproduction, 
n’a pas d’angoisse. L’excitation trouve son expression normale et par là son équilibre. Mais dans les 
conditions définies par Freud, si l'équilibre est imparfait, une partie de la substance non dépensée 
s’accumule et finit par resurgir sous la forme transformée de l’angoisse. Un peu comme la force 
électrique qui, lorsqu’une grand résistance lui est opposée, s’accumule et s’équilibre en décharges 
périodiques produissant des effects tels que la lumiére et la chaleur, ou encore des effets moteurs que 
n’apparaîtraient pas si le courant n’était pas entravé”(238). 
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Freud’s Project, whereas Fliess argues that each human's life is determined by the periodic 
expressions of this force, and that the fundamental reality of human life is determined by this 
flow of energy, Freud emphasizes the technical processes through which energy passes through 
neurons.  The true heritage of Fliess's theory emerges, however, when Freud moves to consider 
the psychic development of the human.   
In his 1905 Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, which describe the sexual 
development of the infant and child, Freud notes that, while “the germs of sexual impulses are 
already present in the new-born child and that these continue to develop for a time,” these 
impulses are occasionally “overtaken by a progressive process of suppression,” which is, in turn, 
interrupted by “periodical advanced in sexual development”(42).  As Freud continues, while ‘one 
gets the impression from civilized children that the construction of these dams is a product of 
education, and no doubt education has must do to with it […] in reality this development is 
organically determined and fixed by heredity”(43).  It is through Fliess’s notion of the periodic 
flows of sexual energy that Freud understands this organic determination.  As Freud writes, “it is 
from Fliess that I have borrowed the term ‘period of sexual latency’”(44).  When Freud writes of 
the advancement and suppression of the “sexual impulses” as the expression of “the regularity 
and periodicity of [an] oscillating course of development”(42), both his logic and language are 
borrowed from Fliess.  In other words, when Freud speaks of a “period” of latency, he is not 
merely speaking of a “period” as an interval of time, but rather a cycle of the oscillation of a 
periodic flow. The logic of the psychosexual development of the human emerges as the 
expression the logic of the Fliess's flow.  
 In the 1909 postscript to the section “The Scientific Literature on Dreams,” in The 
Interpretation of Dreams, Freud writes that Hermann Swoboda's “treatment of the problems of 
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dreams”(126), derived from Fliess’s theory, comes nearest to Freud's own theorization of 
dreams.  Swoboda, writes Freud, 
has undertaken the task of extending to psychical events the discovery of  
biological periodicity (in 23-day and 28-day periods) made by Wilhelm 
Fliess.  In the course of his highly imaginative work he has endeavored to 
use this key for the solution, among other problems, of the riddle of dreams.  
His findings would seem to under-estimate the significance of dreams; the 
subject-matter of a dream, on his view, is to be explained as an assemblage 
of all the memories which, on the night on which it is dreamt, complete one 
of the biological periods, whether for the first or for the nth time.  (126) 
 
Freud’s evocations of Fliess’s logic, throughout his work, are invariably accompanied by a 
critique of the rigor of Fliess’s formulas.  Whereas for Fliess the periods which inform human 
life are precise, Freud insists that “nothing is known for certain concerning [their] regularity and 
periodicity”(Three Essays, 42).  The mistake that Swoboda, and by extension Fliess, make, is to 
over-estimate the precision through which these periods can be known.  While Freud shifts the 
emphasis away from the decoding of biological periods in dreams, to an engagement with the 
specific material exposed in dreams, this specific material is, itself, organized by an organic 
logic.   
 This surprisingly slight difference between Freud and Fliess emerges again and again in 
Freud’s writings.  While psychoanalytic material corresponds to a natural logic of periodicity, 
Freud equally insists that it is a mistake to refer to the logic of this periodicity rather than to 
examine the actual material.  It is this emphasis on the biological determination of structure that 
it at stake when Freud considers the question of the reality of the primal scene, is his case study 
on the ‘Wolf-Man.’ 
I should myself be glad to know whether the primal scene in my present 
patient's case was a phantasy or a real experience; but, taking other similar 
cases into account, I must admit that the answer to this question is not in 
reality a matter of very great importance. These scenes of observing 
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parental intercourse, of being seduced in childhood, and of being 
threatened with castration are unquestionably an inherited endowment, a 
phylogenetic inheritance, but they may just as easily be acquired by 
personal experience. […] All that we find in the prehistory of neuroses is 
that a child catches hold of this phylogenetic experience where his own 
experience fails him. He fills in the gaps in individual truth with 
prehistoric truth; he replaces occurrences in his own life by occurrences in 
the life of his ancestors. I fully agree with Jung in recognizing the 
existence of this phylogenetic inheritance; but I regard it as a 
methodological error to seize upon a phylogenetic explanation before the 
ontogenetic possibilities have been exhausted. (Three Case Studies, 256-7) 
 
The fact that the primal scene could be a “phantasy,” rather than a “real experience,” does not 
mean, as in Lacanian theory, that the primal scene is a linguistic construction, sustained by its 
own logic.  Rather, Freud suggests that the primal scene either refers to the patient’s “own 
experience” or to the “phylogenetic inheritance” which makes up for the holes in the patients 
experience.  If the primal scene has no reality, then it is a fantasy, but the truth of the fantasy 
comes from the fact that the fantasy refers to a prehistoric, phylogenetic scene.  Jung, who Serge 
André suggests was fully under the thrall of Fliess’s theory of universal flows of energy, 
emphasizes the phylogenetic inheritance—the fantasy—as the cause of the patient’s 
development.  While Freud does not doubt that a phylogenetic prehistory determines the logic of 
the primal scene, he is interested in the specific manner in which the primal scene is experienced 
by the subject.   
The importance of Fliess’s oscillating energies, and Freud’s negotiation of the 
relationship between biological determination and personal experience, is perhaps nowhere as 
apparent as in Beyond the Pleasure Principle, where Freud argues that all organisms work to 
return to an original unperturbed state, before the integrity of the organism was violated by the 
intrusion of the external world. Whereas in the Project, the principle of inertia describes the 
tendency of neurons to divest themselves of quantities of energy, in Beyond the Pleasure 
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Principle, the notion of “an inherent inertia in organic life” comes to regulate the totality of 
organic life.   
It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore 
an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to 
abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind 
of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia 
inherent in organic life. (43, emphasis is Freud’s) 
 
While Freud appeals to a wide range of biological texts in order to argue that the reproductive 
impulses—the pleasure principle—serves not to perpetuate life, but rather to bring the organism 
back to its initial, inanimate, state, the notion that the entirety of organic life is determined by a 
principle of energetic equilibrium seems clearly indebted to Fliess.  In introducing this universal 
conception of organic life, Freud again appeals to Fliess.   
According to the large conception of Wilhelm Fliess, all the phenomena of 
life exhibited by organism—and also, no doubt, their death—are linked 
with the completion of fixed periods, which express the dependence of two 
kinds of living substance (one male and the other female) upon the solar 
year.  When we see, however, how easily and how extensively the 
influence of external forces is able to modify the date of the appearance of 
vital phenomena (especially in the plant world)—to precipitate them or 
hold them back—doubts must be cast upon the rigidity of Fliess's formulas 
or at least upon whether the laws laid down by him are the sole determining 
factors.  (54) 
 
As in his rejoinder to Jung, over the question of the reality of the primal scene, Freud suggests 
that the specific experience of the organism is able to modify the manner in which a natural logic 
determines the organism. As a plant might bloom sooner if there is an early spring, the specific 
experiences of the subject might affect how the principle of inertia—the death drive—influences 
his life.  It is, again, not the notion of a periodic oscillation of energy that Freud objects to, but to 
the notion that these periods are fixed and unmodifiable.  The logic of the death drive, like that of 
the fantasy in its reference to a phylogenetic truth, might be modified the specific experiences of 
an individual subject; the structure that is modified, however, emerges out of an ontology of the 
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flow of energies, out of the periodic eruptions of an oscillating scene of energy.  This scene of 
energies becomes the other scene of the unconscious.   
 Lacan agrees with Freud that the structure of the fantasy is the structure of 
thermodynamics, however he inverts the causal relationship between these terms.  For Lacan it is 
not the structure of energetics that provides the truth of the fantasy, but, rather, the structure of 
the fantasy that provides the truth of energetics.  Whereas for Freud the fantasy responds to the 
truth of periodic flows of energy, Lacan argues that the thermodynamic explanation of the 
human is itself a fantasy that responds to the fact that that the human body, as Serge Andre 
writes, is “affected by the structure of language in which the human being lives and in which he 
takes possession of (and also disowns), his body” (273).3  Lacan argues that human only takes 
possession of his or her body within language; in these terms the fantasy is the structure that 
organizes the body in a relationship to the Other.  The thermodynamic scene, as a theorization of 
the forces that hold and organize the body, is itself a fantasy.    
 Lacan will theorize the problem of the body through his mirror stage.  Lacan argues that 
the child, who is born helpless and “premature”(Écrits, 77) lacks the ability exert muscular 
control over his disorganized body.  The child first comes into possession of his body when he 
identifies not with the experience of this disorganized body, but with the unified image, in the 
mirror, that he sees his mother looking at.  The child who passes through the mirror stage 
exchanges the subjective experience of his disorganized body for the unified, organized, but 
ultimately alien image that he sees in the mirror.  It is only because of the mother, who appears 
as an “Other,” that the body takes on its coherence.  It is in these terms that, for Lacan, Freud’s 
                                                
3 « le corps de l'être humain est lui-même affecté par la structure, c'est-à-dire affecté par la structure de 
langage dans laquelle il habite et dans laquelle il prend possession (et dépossession) de son corps » 
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appeal to scene of energetics, as a natural organization and logic of the body, covers over the real 
experiences of the fragmented body.   
Whereas Freud bases his metapsychology on the logic of flows of energy, and describes 
the labor of psychoanalysis as the investigation into how it is that this metapsychological 
structure insists within the specific experience of the subject, for Lacan metapsychology begins 
with the experience of the body fragmented by the signifier.  Elevating the problem of linguistic 
structure over the natural structure of energy, Lacan thus insists that energy is not natural, but 
rather “a numerical constant”(Television, 18), produced within a network of mathematical 
signifiers.  As Lacan writes, “without this constant, which is merely a combination of 
calculations […] you have no more physics.  It’s generally thought that that’s the physicists’ 
business and that they adjust the equivalences between masses, fields, and impulses so that a 
number gets pulled out that complies with the principle of the conservation of energy”(18).  
Energy is not the natural logic of the material world, but a system of order imposed by the 
signifier.  This shift constitutes an essential difference between Freud’s metapsychology and 
Lacan’s metapsychology. Whereas Freud’s appeal to the science of thermodynamics establishes 
the scene and logic of these flowing energies as the structural cause of the human, for Lacan the 
scene of energetics is the fantasy of another scene that explains all that is at stake for the human.  
Energy is a fantasy, but a privileged fantasy, for it is through an engagement with the problems 
of thermodynamic thought that, within a certain philosophical tradition to which both Freud and 
Lacan are indebted, the language of being is revealed.   
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II. The Other Scene of Thermodynamics 
 
 On the one hand, the discovery of the thermodynamic processes that govern both organic 
and inorganic nature seems to further a disenchantment of the natural world that began with the 
theoretical and technical achievements of the scientific revolution.  Carolyn Merchant, the 
feminist ecologist and historian of science, argues that over the course of the scientific revolution 
the vision of nature as an organic system was carved up by the mechanizing discourse of science. 
“In 1500 the parts of the cosmos were bound together as a living organism; by 1700 the 
dominant metaphor had become the machine”(288).  As Merchant continues, “the changes in 
imagery and attitudes relating to the earth were of enormous significance as the mechanization of 
nature preceded.  The nurturing earth would lose its function as a normative restraint as it 
changed to an inanimate dead physical system”(22).  In Merchant’s narrative, the organic body 
of nature is subjected to a will to power and administration that puts nature to work for man.  Yet 
at the same time, within the nineteenth century philosophical tradition that negotiates the 
thermodynamic discovery that the human can be integrated into a fully mechanized nature, the 
logic of this mechanized nature reveals what the English scientist and author James Tyndall calls 
the “miracle of vitality”(Tyndall, 465).  
In his Heat as a Mode of Motion, published in the same year as, and drawing from, 
Helmholtz’s lecture on thermodynamics and organic nature, Tyndall writes that “the engine and 
the animal derive, or may derive, these powers from the self-same source”(463).   
We can work an engine by the direct combustion of the substance which we 
employ as food; and, if our stomachs were so constituted as to digest coal, 
we should, as Helmholtz has remarked, be able to derive our energy from 
this substance.  The grand point permanent through all these considerations 
is, that nothing is created. (463)   
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Yet whereas for Helmholtz the “fundamental question” of life, which was described as a “vital 
principle” (Helmholtz, 121) by pre-thermodynamic physiologists can be demystified through 
rigorous scientific experimentation, for Tyndall the experimentally verified fact that the same 
forces constitute the organic and the inorganic constitutes a mystery. 
 The matter of our bodies is that of inorganic Nature.  There is no substance 
in the animal tissues which is not primarily derived from the rocks, the 
water, and the air.  Are the forces or organic matter, then, different in kind 
from those of inorganic?  All the philosophy of the present day tends to 
negative the question; and to show that it is the directing and the 
compounding, in the organic world, of forces belonging equally to the 
inorganic, that constitute the mystery and the miracle of vitality.  (Tyndall, 
465) 
 
The law of conservation of energy—the perpetual transformations of energy and heat—becomes 
the principle of a pantheistic religion of nature.  At the same time that living body becomes part 
of the material world, the logic of the material world, governed by “the law of the conservation 
of force” comes, itself, to take the place of the “vital principle.”  The unity of the vital body, first 
decomposed into the network of forces that link the body to the natural world, reemerges as the 
vital system of fluid exchanges of energy within the universe.   
The shift in emphasis between Helmholtz’s appeal to a scientific Weltanschauung 
through which the fundamental problems of the human can be solved, and Tyndall’s 
mystification of the totality of processes of thermodynamic exchange as constituting the 
“mystery and the miracle of vitality”(465) was a central preoccupation of nineteenth century 
English philosophy of science.  This tradition, however, did not merely appropriate the logic of 
thermodynamic exchanges, for the articulation of a vital thermodynamic nature required that the 
logic of thermodynamics be reconfigured.  In the terms of this philosophical tradition, while the 
principle of conservation of energy suggested that the universe was itself vital, the second law of 
thermodynamics, which predicted the heat-death of the universe, seemed to once again reduce 
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the universe to a sterile machine.  As Sergio Franzese writes, in his concise articulation of the 
problematic, while the law of conservation of energy seemed to offer an appealing logic of 
transformation, it was “haunted” by the problem of the dispersion of energy.   
Starting from the technological problems posed by the improvements of 
steam engines, physicists discovered the fundamental laws governing the 
transformation, conservation, and dissipation of energy, the second law of 
thermodynamics, or entropy, and posited the heat death of the universe.  
These concepts became the driving force behind a major philosophical 
debate.  It is important to note that the theory of energy, or “force”, was 
haunted from the very beginning by the question of the dispersion of 
energy; that is, since Sadi Carnot's studies on the ideal engine in 1824.  
(Ethics of Energy, 148-9) 
 
What Carnot's studies revealed, which would be formalized by William Thomson in his in his 
1852 paper, “On a Universal Tendency in Nature to the Dissipation of Mechanical Energy,” was 
that while heat could be used to produce motion, a certain amount of energy dissipates through 
friction, and thus cannot serve to produce further motion.  As potential energy is actualized, the 
amount of potential energy in the universe tends towards a state of exhaustion.  The sun will 
extinguish, motion will cease, and the universe will rest in a state of unperturbed equilibrium.  
As Thomson writes: 
I believe the tendency in the material world is for motion to become 
diffused, and that as a whole the reverse of concentration is gradually going 
on—I believe that no physical action can ever restore the heat emitted from 
the sun, and that this source is not inexhaustible; also that the motions of 
the earth and other planets are losing vis viva which is converted into heat; 
and that although some vis viva may be restored for instance on the earth by 
heat received from the sun, or by other means, that the loss cannot be 
precisely compensated and I think it probably that it is undercompensated.   
(quoted in Sharlin, 112) 
 
The universe itself is a “less-than-perfect” engine, exhausting a limited supply of vis viva.  To 
nineteenth century thinkers, the metaphysical consequences of this heat-death were immediately 
apparent.   
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 Thomson was both the foremost English physicist of the mid-century, and a staunch 
Scottish Presbyterian.  The heat-death of the universe allowed him to reconcile these two 
discourses, for Thomson saw the heat-death of the universe as scientific proof of a biblical 
cosmology.  Since the universe has an end, he argued, the universe must have had a beginning; 
since the universe had a beginning, it must have had a creator.   As Crosbie Smith writes, for 
Thomson this thermodynamic proof of Christian cosmology became the basis for a religious 
ethics. 
The directional flow of energy through space offered human beings the 
opportunity of directing, though not restoring, those mighty gifts of the 
Creator, the energies of nature.  But such an irreversible tendency was not 
‘loss’ of energy in the material world.  Human beings had a duty to employ 
engines for the benefit of mankind and in aid of its commercial and moral 
‘progress.’  Failure to properly direct and harness those gifts of energy was 
therefore only a waste, and in that sense a sin of ‘dissipation,’ with respect 
to human beings rather than in nature.  (Smith, 101) 
 
Not only did the heat death of the universe seem to prove that the universe had a beginning and 
an end, and therefore a creator, but it allowed Thomson to define the field of ethical action in 
terms of a utilization of the gifts of energy.   
 Whereas for Thomson the science of thermodynamics was evidence of a Christian 
cosmology and ethics, the transformative logic of thermodynamic thought equally seemed a 
powerful tool, along with Darwinian evolution, in the articulation of a secular materialism.  As 
Smith writes, James Tyndall “was quick to perceive the value of conservation of energy in the 
armoury of scientific naturalism” (183).  However, “in order to appropriate the doctrine for these 
ends, he needed to break any perceived North British monopoly on physical truth” (Smith, 182). 
In order to claim the science of thermodynamics for a secular scientific naturalism, Tyndall 
appealed to the work of the German physicist Julius Robert von Mayer to articulate a 
thermodynamics of perpetual motion that severs the transformative logic of the first law of 
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thermodynamics from the theological consequences of the heat-death of the universe.   
 Tyndall’s Heat as a Mode of Motion must thus be read as a rhetorical intervention in the 
quasi-philosophical, quasi-theological, field of cosmological questions raised by the dominant 
science of thermodynamics.  Throughout the book, Tyndall argues, against a notion of entropic 
decline, that conversion of heat into motion is fully reversible, and that useful heat can be 
produced by friction.  As he writes:  “All the force of our locomotives is derived from heat, and 
all of it eventually becomes heat” (8).   
The energy of heat in the furnace passes into the mechanical motion of the 
train, and this motion reappears as heat in the wheels, axles, and rails.  
When a station is approached, say at the rate of thirty miles an hour, a brake 
is applied, and smoke and sparks issue from the wheel on which it presses.  
The train is brought to rest—How?  Simply by converting the entire 
moving force which it possessed at the moment the brake was applied, into 
heat.  (9) 
 
While for Thomson the fact that the locomotive is, itself, an imperfect heat engine, means that 
the heat that results from friction is “lost” to humans, Tyndall argues that friction, when 
examined at a macroscopic level, allows the full retransformation of mechanical energy into 
useful motive force.   
 To combat a notion of friction as the loss of heat, Tyndall proposes “another theory” that 
“deserves our serious attention—the Meteoric Theory of the Sun” (445), by which he argues that 
the energy expended by the sun is restored to the sun by the heat generated through friction when 
meteors collide with it. 
 In the fall of asteroids we find the means of producing the solar light and 
heat.  It may be contended that this showering down of matter necessitates 
the growth of the sun; it does so; but the quantity necessary to maintain the 
observed calorific emission for 4,000 years would defeat the scrutiny of our 
best instruments.  If the earth struck the sun, it would utterly vanish from 
perception; but the heat developed by its sock would cover the expenditure 
of a century.  (447) 
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First proposed by Mayer in 1848, the “Meteoric Theory” was one of a series of theoretical 
endeavours to explain the continuing heat of the sun, for if the sun was considered merely as a 
burning mass of coal—as Tyndall writes, the temperature of the sun “transcends all terrestrial 
combustion”(447)—then the diminution of heat coming from the sun would be observable over 
the course of a single lifetime.  While for Mayer the frictional heat generated by asteroids 
colliding with the sun merely slows the inevitable heat death of the universe, for Tyndall it 
becomes the mechanism through which the universe is transformed into a perpetual motion 
machine.  Since in the heat death of the universe, it is heat lost to friction that is responsible for 
the dissipation of energy, by finding, in friction, a replenishment of the “vis viva” of the universe, 
the problem of dissipation is solved.  The “Meteoric Theory” secularizes the universe by 
effectively deanthropomorphizing the universe.  Not only does the meteoric  theory turn the 
universe into a system in perpetual motion, but the possible extinction of humanity, in the chance 
that the earth would be pulled into the sun, becomes the mechanism through which the universe 
continues to exist as a system of active energies. 
 At the same time that Tyndall was working to sever the law of conservation of energy 
from the eschatological and religious consequences of the second law of thermodynamics, 
Herbert Spencer, as part of the same broad project, took a distinct approach.  In his First 
Principles Spencer appeals to the quasi-Kantian distinction, developed by Sir William Hamilton 
and Henry Longview Mansel, between nature as it is known through law, and nature as it 
operates outside of law.  As Bernard Lightman writes, with distinctly mixed praise, “Mansel may 
have been the closest equivalent to Kant which Victorian England could produce” (32).  While 
Mansel carried the mantle of Kant’s critical philosophy in England, his appropriation and 
extension of Kant’s logic results in a profound alteration of Kant’s thought. Mansel follows Kant 
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in arguing that there are a priori laws that govern or “condition,” thought.  However, he 
preserves the existence of an “unconditioned” reality beyond these laws.  As Lightman writes, 
Mansel's “main assumption was that the mind is compelled to think under certain laws that it 
cannot transgress”(59).  Because the mind is compelled to think in accord with certain laws, the 
possible objects of thought must correspond to those laws.  As Mansel writes, “if our whole 
thinking is subject to certain laws, if follows that we cannot think of any object, not even of 
Omnipotence itself, except as those laws compel us”(PL, 72).   Yet at the same time that we must 
acknowledge that thought is limited by the a priori logic that conditions the objects of thought, 
Mansel insists that philosophy must assume a position with respect to the unconditioned reality 
that lies beyond thought.  Where Kant goes wrong, according to Mansel, is in assuming that 
there is no relationship between reality as it is conditioned by thought, and the unconditioned 
beyond.   
When Kant declares that the objects of our intuitions are not in themselves 
as they appear to us, he falls into the opposite extreme to that which he is 
combating:  the Critic becomes a dogmatist in negation.  To warrant this 
conclusion, we must previously have compared things as they are with 
things as they seem; a comparison which is, ex hypothesi, impossible.  We 
can only say, that we have no means of determining whether they agree or 
not.  (PL, 74).   
 
This “dogmatic” overstepping of the boundaries of thought can only be overcome by assuming 
the existence of an “unconditioned Absolute” as the beyond of human thought, an “Absolute” 
that may be—for who is to say it is not—in some relationship to our intuitions of reality.   
  Rigorously following Mansel's quasi-Kantian distinction between reality as it is 
“conditioned” by the a priori laws of mind, and the “unconditioned” reality that exists outside of 
these laws, Spencer distinguishes between the “Known”—a scene of force ruled by the laws of 
thermodynamics and tending towards a heat death—and the “Unknowable”—the scene of an 
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“Absolute” and “Unlimited” force. The first section of Spencer's book, entitled “The 
Unknowable,” attempts to reconcile science and religion by showing that each discourse, taken 
to its limit, leads us to the problem of the first cause.  As Spencer writes, “In our search after 
causes, we discover no resting place until we arrive at a First cause; and we have no alternative 
but to regard this First Cause as Infinite and Absolute.  These are inferences forced on us by 
arguments from which there appears no escape” (28-29).  Both religion and science, because they 
are conditioned by a priori laws, can only articulate the manner in which phenomena are 
organized within thought, they cannot say anything about the cause of these phenomena.   
 Spencer concludes, following Mansel, that thought cannot rest with the limits of the 
“Known.” Spencer writes that 
 the error, (naturally fallen into by philosophers intent on demonstrating the 
limits and conditions of consciousness,) consists in assuming that 
consciousness contains nothing but limits and conditions; to the entire 
neglect of that which is limited and conditioned.  It is forgotten that there is 
something which alike forms the raw material of definite thought and 
remains after the definiteness which thinking gave it has been destroyed.  
(67) 
 
Just as we must respect the limits of conditioned reality, we must avoid the dogmatic belief that 
there is nothing but the limits of consciousness.  Both Hamilton and Mansel, as Spencer notes, 
write of the Absolute as a belief. 
If the Non-relative or Absolute is present in thought only as a mere 
negation, then the relation between it and the Relative becomes 
unthinkable, because one of the terms of the relation is absent from 
consciousness.  And if this relation is unthinkable, then is the Relative itself 
unthinkable, for want of its antithesis:  whence results the disappearance of 
all thought whatever.  (68)   
 
The only way that thought can be preserved, the only way to maintain the relative and limited 
nature of all thought, is through the postulation of an “Absolute.”  If we assume that 
unconditional reality has no relation to the laws of thought, then, as Mansel suggests, there is an 
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overreaching of thought, for one must assume that the world of thought is in a relation (of 
negation) to that which is unthinkable (noumenal reality).   
 Unless a real Non-relative or Absolute be postulated, the Relative itself 
becomes absolute, and so brings the argument to a contradiction.  And on 
watching our thoughts we have seen how impossible it is to get rid of the 
consciousness of an Actuality lying behind Appearances; and how, from 
this impossibility, results our indestructible belief in that Actuality.  (72) 
 
Therefore, Spencer concludes, “we are obliged to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation 
of some Power by which we are acted upon; though Omnipresence is unthinkable, yet, as 
experience discloses no bounds to the diffusion of phenomena, we are unable to think of limits to 
the presence of this Power; while the criticism of Science teach us that this Power is 
Incomprehensible” (73).   
 In “The Knowable,” Spencer argues that the shared tasks of both philosophy and science 
is to articulate a “completely-unified knowledge” (104), and that the limit of what can be known 
by science and philosophy can be described in the language of the first and second laws of 
thermodynamics.  Spencer's analysis of philosophy and science leads him to propose that the 
ultimate term of knowledge is “force,” where “evolution” is the study of the transformations of 
force. Spencer is thus able to propose an ultimate law, as the limit of what can be known about 
reality: 
Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of 
motion; during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent 
homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the 
retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.  (321, emphasis is 
Spencer’s) 
 
The consequence of this law is indeed that the universe is progressing towards an entropic heat-
death.  “There is a progress towards equilibrium,” and, Spencer writes, the transformation of 
forces will eventually “result in the cessation of motion” (392).  Yet, because of his distinction 
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between the “Known” and the “Unknowable,” the fact of this law does not, itself, suggest that he 
universe is proceeding towards a heat death.  “Force, as we know it, can be regarded only as a 
conditioned effect of the Unconditioned Cause—as the relative reality indicating to us an 
Absolute Reality by which it is immediately produced” (133).  Therefore, our knowledge of 
force—as ruled by the laws of thermodynamics and tending towards heat-death—is merely a 
symbol of  “the persistence of some Cause which transcends our knowledge and conception [...] 
without beginning or end”(154-5).  Thus, while as far as we know, the universe is going to end, it 
may be the case that an unknown source of energy will provide a continual motive force.  As 
Spencer writes, “we cannot draw such a conclusion without tacitly assuming something beyond 
the limits of possible knowledge, namely, that the energy contained in our Sidereal System 
remains undiminished”(431).  It is possible that, beyond the limits of our solar system, there 
exists an inexhaustible source of energy.  Spencer thus concludes that “it is not inferable from 
the general progress towards equilibrium that a state of universal quiescence or death will be 
reached; but that if a process of reasoning ends in that conclusion, a further process of reasoning 
points to renewals of activity and life”  (431).  The Unknowable becomes the scene of an infinite 
and absolute energy, an energy ruled by neither a law of equilibrium nor entropy.  The scene of 
perpetual motion that Tyndall articulates becomes, for Spencer, the continual presence of an 
unknowable and absolute force.   
 In the opening pages of Creative Evolution, Henri Bergson extends this line of thought.  
Bergson criticizes Spencer for failing to enter into the logic of the “Unknown,” and thus of 
excluding a true study of life from the domain of philosophy. Quoting Spencer's declaration that 
“the Absolute is not in our province; we are brought to stand before the Unknowable” (Bergson, 
xxi), Bergson argues that “for the human intellect, after too much pride, this is really an excess of 
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humility” (Bergson, xxi). 
If the intellectual form of the living being has been gradually modeled on 
the reciprocal actions and reactions of certain bodies and their material 
environment, how should it not reveal to us something of the very essence 
of which these bodies are made? Action cannot move in the unreal [...]. 
Intellectual activity, in so far as it relates to a certain aspect of inert matter, 
ought, on the contrary, to give us a faithful imprint of it, having been 
stereotyped on this particular object. (Bergson, xxi). 
 
Since the body is situated by the “Unknowable” forces that insist within the material world, 
Bergson argues that intellectual activity, itself dependent upon the logic of its material support, 
must carry within it the logic of these forms.  Rather than rest mute before the “Unknowable,” 
the scene of the “Unknowable,” of the perpetual movement of force, becomes itself the logic of 
the material world.  By distinguishing between intellectual and intuitive thought, as modes that 
respond, respectively, to the “Known” and the “Unknowable,” the task of philosophy involves 
entering into, and delineating, the logic of the “Unknowable.”  Gilles Deleuze, following in this 
tradition, offers the useful terminology of “primary nature” and “secondary nature” to distinguish 
between force as it is governed by law, and as it persists in excess of law.  While “secondary 
nature is bound by its own rules and its own laws”(Coldness and Cruelty 27), primary nature  
“overrides all reigns and all laws”; it “needs no foundation and is beyond all 
foundation”(Coldness and Cruelty, 27).   
In his reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze’s distinction between these two scenes of nature 
becomes, once again, the tension between a law governed thermodynamics and the perpetual 
motion of forces.  Deleuze argues that Nietzsche works to expose the logic of nature in perpetual 
motion, in contradistinction to thermodynamic thought:  while “Nietzsche understood physical 
science, the energetics and thermodynamics of his time [...] it is now clear that he dreamt of a 
fire machine completely different from the steam engine”(30).  Whereas the steam engine is 
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governed by the laws of thermodynamics, the “Fire Machine,” is an inexhaustible engine 
ungoverned by, and always in excess of, the laws of thermodynamics.  Deleuze’s reading of 
Nietzsche’s “eternal return of the same,” likewise distinguishes between these two scenes of 
force.  The eternal return of the same, Deleuze writes, “must not be interpreted as the return of 
something that is, that is “one” or the “same”(48).  Rather, it must “be thought of as a synthesis; 
a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis of diversity and its reproduction, a synthesis 
of becoming and the being which is affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double 
affirmation”(48).  In contrast to this synthesis and reproduction, the “mechanistic” notion of 
eternal return, in which is the “same” that returns, is “a part of the more general enterprise of 
denying life, depreciating existence and promising it a death (“heat” or otherwise) where the 
universe sinks into the undifferentiated. Nietzsche accuses the physical concepts of matter, 
weight and heat of being, in the final analysis, agents of an equalisation of quantities”(45).  It is 
only by separating energy from balance and equilibrium, that the truth of nature can be revealed.   
As Elizabeth Grosz writes, for Bergson, Nietzsche and Deleuze, “life is that which 
accumulates force, attracts other wills, augments itself”(Nick of Time, 133). 
It refuses or surpasses, at least temporarily, the first law of 
thermodynamics (the principle of the conservation of energy), for life is 
that which always functions in excess of need, survival, stability, and 
pleasure.  It sustains itself as a living being by ensuring that the 
expenditure of energy that life entails is matched by the accumulation of 
energy in consumption.  Yet life is not balance and equilibrium but 
accumulation or expenditure to excess, the production of the unnecessary, 
invention and art as well as brutality and cruelty, for its own sake.  Life is 
the supreme value, above identity, above being, above the human, and 
above knowledge.  (Nick of Time¸133) 
 
Primary nature becomes a scene of energies that operate without limit and beyond knowledge, 
while secondary nature constrains these energies to what can be known through the 
thermodynamic laws of conservation and decline.  Through Spencer's appeal to Mansel's 
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transcendental realist appropriation of a Kantian vocabulary, the natural world appears as the 
logic of the “Unknowable.”  As Tyndall writes, the “mystery and the miracle of vitality”(465) 
appears beyond the identity of the single body, beyond the human itself, and beyond knowledge.   
 
III.   Thermodynamics and Literary Form 
 
In the “Conclusion” to The Renaissance Walter Pater writes, following in the tradition of 
Helmholtz, Tyndall, and Spencer, that the same forces and elements compose the organic and 
inorganic world. 
What is the whole physical life in that moment but a combination of natural 
elements to which science gives their names?  But those elements, 
phosphorus and lime and delicate fibres, are present not in the human body 
alone:  we detect them in places most remote from it.  Our physical life is a 
perpetual motion of them—the passage of the blood, the waste and 
repairing of the lenses of the eye, the modification of the tissues of the brain 
under every ray of light and sound—processes which science reduces to 
simpler and more elementary forces.  Like the elements of which we are 
composed, the action of these forces extends beyond us:  it rusts iron and 
ripens corn.  (150) 
 
Not only do the same forces move through all bodies, but the truth of the human body is only 
revealed through the forces that both compose and decompose the human body.  
As Pater continues, “that clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours, under 
which we group them—a design in a web, the actual threads pass beyond it”(The Renaissance, 
150).  The body ceases exist as a coherent object, and its truth appears as a design within a web 
of energies.  The integration of the body into a system of transformative energies takes Pater to a 
consideration of the logic of the material world.  Pater argues that the logic of these forces is not 
“a chaotic mutation,” but rather that there is “an antiphonal rhythm, or logic, which, proceeding 
uniformly from movement to movement, as in some intricate musical theme” that links together 
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the “infinitely diverse impulses”(Plato, 17) that compose the material world.   
 As in the philosophical tradition that I have outlined above, Pater insists that the “logic” 
that organizes these natural forces is not a “mechanic law”(Plato, 32) that mutes the specificity 
of phenomenal experience by reducing the world to a state of “equilibrium”(Plato, 32).  Nature 
is, rather, the perpetual movement of forces within which there is a continual increase of possible 
phenomena, of forms that arise at the “concurrence, renewed from moment to moment, of forces 
parting sooner or later on their ways”(Renaissance, 150).  For Pater, the challenge of literary 
style is to account for the experience of this logic as the cause of subjective experience.   
 D.H. Lawrence, likewise, argues that there exists a natural, immanent logic of the 
material world, and opposes this logic to the existence of a equation that would relate these 
forces.  In his Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence offers the following brief analysis of 
Einstein's theory of relativity: 
As far as I can see, Relativity means, for the common amateur mind, that 
there is no one single absolute central principle governing the world. The 
great cosmic forces or mechanical principles can only be known in their 
relation to one another, and can only exist in their relation to one another. 
But, says Einstein, this relation between the mechanical forces is constant, 
and may be expressed by a mathematical formula: which mathematical 
formula may be used to equate all mechanical forces of the universe […]. 
What I doubt is the equation formula. It seems to me, also, that the 
velocity of light through space is the deus ex machina in Einstein’s 
physics. Somebody will put salt on the tail of light as it travels through 
space, and then its simple velocity will split up into something complex, 
and the Relativity formula will fall to bits. (190) 
 
Lawrence does not mistrust the notion of a hidden ontology that resides in the movements of 
forces, but rather the idea that there is a law, articulated in mathematical language, and invented 
by the intellect, which governs the purely imminent relationships between these forces.  The 
universe is purely relational and in no need of a transcendental term—the “equation formula”—
that will organize these forces. 
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 Through a baroque theory of the flow of these immanent forces both within the human 
body and connecting men and women in ecstatic sexual union, Lawrence argues that one can 
come to participate in these flows of energy only by surrendering the possibility of understanding 
the logic of nature.  Rather than subject this flow of energy to the laws of the intellect, the ethical 
subject must give him or herself over to the logic of nature, becoming a node through which the 
flow of energy passes.  In his poem, “The Universe Flows,” Lawrence rewrites Walt Whitman's 
lines that “To me the converging objects of the universe perpetually flow, / All are written to me, 
and I must get what the writing means” (Song of Myself, 403-405).  
The universe flows in infinite wild streams, related 
in rhythms too big and too small for us to know, 
since man is just middling, and his comprehension just middling. 
If once, for a second, the universe ceased to flow 
of course it would cease to exist. 
The thought is unthinkable, anyhow. 
 
Only man tries not to flow, 
repeats himself over and over in mechanical monotony of conceit  
and hence is a mess.  (Poems, 479) 
 
 Whereas Whitman “must get what the writing means” for Lawrence “man in just middling, and 
his comprehension just middling.”  Not only is it unthinkable that the universe would cease to 
flow, but it is unthinkable that there would be a position from which this flow could be 
deciphered.  The problem that Lawrence sets to solve in his novels and poetry is the question of 
how to articulate this scene of natural flows of energy, while, at the same time, imposing an 
epistemological limit that will overcome a fetishization of “merging” and “myself.”   
 For Lawerence, as for Pater, the immanent logic of this flow exists beyond the identity of 
the individual subject.  Both argue that the universe, in Pater's words, is neither a “a chaotic 
mutation,”(Plato, 17) nor a system of mathematically governed equivalencies, but rather an 
immanently ordered and continually transforming system.  A constellation of texts by William 
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James, Henry James, Oscar Wilde, and Gerturde Stein, call into question the idea of an 
immanent ordering of this system of energies.  For William James, the human brain is an 
unstable system of energy, of diverse impulses and wandering attention, that must be brought 
into a hierarchical order through the imposition of equilibrium and balance by a “a spiritual 
force” (Briefer Course, 104). While Henry James suggests that a dispassionate locus of 
consciousness can manage the body, for both Wilde and Stein this attempt to control the excesses 
of the body, to bring the energies and impulses that move through the body into a calm 
equilibrium, is both undesirable and impossible.  In Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
Dorian’s attempt to dispassionately master the desires that emerge out of an electrical circuit that 
passes from “cell to cell” of his brain, results in the hideous decomposition of his body.  
Likewise, in Stein’s “Melanctha,” Stein opposes a heroic mastery of experience to the chaos of 
impulses that inhabit the body. While for Pater and Lawrence the unity of the body is replaced by 
the immanent field of relations that compose the material world, for Wilde and Stein the 
excitements and impulses that traverse the body reveal only a chaos of energies.  What is, for 
both Pater and Lawrence, an ecstatic mode of experience, becomes, for Dorian and Melanctha, a 
limitless suffering.  
Pater and Lawrence suggest that the only sin, the only failure in life, is the imposition of a 
mathematical order on the scene of immanently organized natural energies.  While for Pater, the 
work of style is to inscribe something of this scene of natural energies into the law governed 
field of literature, Lawrence dreams that the natural flows of sexual energy, brought into 
visibility through literature, might reveal a scene of truth excluded from the mechanism of the 
social world.  For both William and Henry James, it is the moralist who is able to bring 
equilibrium to the instability of the nervous system, while Wilde and Stein suggest that the brain 
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is an ungovernable chaos of energies and excitements, which cannot be mastered, but which can 
perhaps be written.  For Lacan it will become “simply a moral failing [...] a sin”(Television, 23) 
to understand the human as an energetic system, rather than to work to recover the reality of the 
fragmented body at work beyond the fantasy of the Other.  Thermodynamic discourse—as the 
language of nature—becomes the scene of morality, and the style of one’s engagement with this 
scene of force becomes the mark of sin or sainthood.   
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Walter Pater and the Style of Thermodynamics 
 
A central concern of Walter Pater’s aesthetic is the relationship between a qualitative and 
subjective dimension of experience, and the objective discursive language through which this 
experience might be transmitted.  While Pater at once wants to rigorously distinguish between 
subjective experience and objective discourse, he equally wants to insist that it is the special 
province of the artist to inscribe something of his subjective experience within the impersonal 
field of discourse, both making use of, and transforming, the linguistic conventions and historical 
materials that the artist has available to him.  In distinguishing between the specificity of 
subjective experience and objective discourse, Pater appeals to contemporary debates over the 
structure and cosmological implications of thermodynamic thought.   
Pater argues that the fact that cosmos is in “perpetual motion” suggests that “the very 
essence of thought [is] itself also such perpetual motion”(Plato, 13-15).  The truth of though, and 
of experience, is revealed by the logic of this perpetual motion.  For Pater, in contrast, an 
understanding of the universe as proceeding towards a thermodynamic heat-death constitutes a 
turn away from the specificity of experience.  In a universe governed by the second law of 
thermodynamics and moving towards a state of undifferentiated equilibrium, the specificity of 
phenomena and experience is muted, as all phenomena are governed by a mathematical formula 
that ultimately makes them equivalent.  The seeming variety and specificity of phenomenal 
experience is reduced to an equation “which had zero is equal to zero for its result”(Imaginary 
Portraits, 120).  Pater appeals to both James Tyndall’s and Herbert Spencer’s revisions of 
thermodynamic thought in order to theorize a universe that sustains the reality of subjective 
experience.  Both Tyndall and Spencer argue, in their respective treatments of thermodynamic 
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theory, that it is a mistake to understand the universe as tending towards an entropic heat-death.  
For both, the universe is in a state of perpetual motion, regulated only by the principle of 
conservation of energy, where the forces that compose any object or structure pass into new 
objects, and new structures, in an infinite process of decomposition and recomposition.  Whereas 
if the universe is tending towards equilibrium, and the truth of phenomena is the mathematical 
discourse within which they are made equivalent, then there is no truth in the particularity of 
subjective experience, in a universe in a state of perpetual flux, the only truth is the particularity 
of experience.   
In both his fiction and his literary criticism, Pater understands the tension between the 
objective world of discourse, governed by equivalences, and the specificity of experience, as a 
metapsychological terrain.  In his Imaginary Portraits, “Sebastian von Stork” and “Apollo of 
Picardy,” Pater describes two kinds of madness—one which tries to extinguish subjective 
experience by returning the world to a state of equilibrium, the other which is the effect of an 
over-exposure to the transitory flow of phenomena.  Through these portraits, Pater links a 
problem of style to the negotiation of this metapsychological terrain:  Sebastian writes a logical 
treatise that works to extinguish subjectivity and restore equilibrium, while the Prior Saint-Jean, 
in “Apollo of Picardy,” is driven mad by the impossibility that he could ever transmit the 
particularity of his experience.  While both Sebastian von Stork and the Prior Saint-Jean fail in 
their attempts at writing, the labor of style becomes, for Pater, an alternative to both Sebastian 
von Stork’s, and the Prior Saint-Jeans, madness.  The problem of style, of the search for “ that 
finest and most intimate form of truth, the vraie vérité” (22-23), becomes the search for the word, 
drawn from objective discourse, that will give form to subjective experience becomes. The 
difficulty of writing offers a third option, between the extinction of the subject within objective 
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discourse, and a paralysis before the impossibility of giving form to subjective experience, by 
finding a quality of experience—the wrestling with language—that occurs at the intersection of 
the subject and discourse.   
 
I.  Pater and the Cosmological Question 
 
 In Plato and Platonism Walter Pater reads the cosmological implications of nineteenth 
century thermodynamic theory as the repetition of trends in Greek metaphysics.  Pater begins by 
considering Heraclitus's influence on Plato. While “Plato […] thought himself a Heraclitean in 
early life,” this influence “was by way of antagonism or reaction; Plato’s stand against any 
philosophy of motion becoming, as we say, something of a 'fixed idea' with him”(Plato, 13).   
Surface, we say; but was there really anything beneath it?  That was what to 
the majority of his hearers, his readers, Heraclitus, with an eye perhaps to 
practice, seemed to deny.  Perpetual motion, alike in things and in men’s 
thoughts about them,—the sad, self-conscious, philosophy of Heraclitus, 
like one, knowing beyond his years, in this barely adolescent world which 
he is so eager to instruct, makes no pretense to be able to restrain that.  Was 
not the very essence of thought itself also such perpetual motion?  A 
baffling transition from the dead past, alive one moment since, to a present, 
itself deceased in turn ere we can say, Is it here?  A keen analyst of the facts 
of nature and mind, a master presumably of all the knowledge that there 
was, a vigorous definer of thoughts, he does but refer the superficial 
movement of all persons and things around him to deeper and still more 
masterful currents of universal change, stealthily withdrawing the 
apparently solid earth itself from beneath one’s feet.  (Plato, 13-15) 
 
This passage resonates with Pater’s famous “Conclusion” to The Renaissance, from some 
twenty-five years earlier, where Pater writes that “birth and gesture and death and the springing 
of violets from the grave are but a few out of ten thousand resultant combinations”(Renaissance, 
150) appearing within the transformative systems of energy that form both the human and 
physical world.  As Pater continues, “that clear, perpetual outline of face and limb”—the 
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seeming unified vital human body—“is but an image of ours, under which we group them—a 
design in a web, the actual threads pass beyond it”(Renaissance, 150).   In both this passage on 
Heraclitus, and the “Conclusion,” solid bodies are a mere semblance, an imaginary unity 
projected onto a scene of energies and forces. 
   While Heraclitus registers this fact of fluid energies, he does not offer a philosophical 
system, but, rather, a series of “harsh, protesting cries” (14), arguing that a “principle of 
disintegration, the incoherence of fire or flood [...] are inherent in the primary elements alike of 
matter and of the soul” (15).   
Legei pou Herakleitos, says Socrates in the Cratylus, hoti panta chorei kai 
ouden menei. [Herikleitos says somewhere that all things give way; nothing 
remains.]  But the principle of lapse, of waste, was, in fact, in one's self.  
'No one has ever passed twice over the same stream.'  Nay, the passenger 
himself is without identity.  Upon the same stream at the same moment we 
do, and do not, embark:  for we are, and are not.  (Plato, 15) 
 
Yet besides this theory of “disintegration,” of “chaos,” itself the product of “undisciplined 
youth,” there is, for Pater, another side to Heraclitus's thought, “an attempt on his part, after all to 
reduce that world of chaotic mutation to cosmos, to the unity of a reasonable order, by the search 
for and the notation, if there be such, of an antiphonal rhythm, or logic, which, proceeding 
uniformly from movement to movement, as in some intricate musical theme, might link together 
in one of those contending, infinitely diverse impulses”( Plato, 17).  For Pater, in other words, 
the idea that a natural logic inheres within the structure of the material world is the implicit, if 
undeveloped, truth of Heraclitus's thought.   
 It is, however, only with nineteenth century science that the “full scope” (Plato, 17) of 
Heraclitus's thought could be realized.  As Pater writes, “the entire modern theory of 
'development,' in all its various phases, proved or unprovable” is “but old Heracliteanism  awake 
once more in a new world, and grown to full proportions”( Plato, 17). 
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To the 'observation and experiment' of the physical enquirer of to-day, the 
eye and the sun it lives by reveal themselves, after all, as Heraclitus had 
declared (scarcely serious, he seemed to those around him) as literally in 
constant extinction and renewal; the sun only going out more gradually than 
the human eye; the system meanwhile, of which it is the center, in ceaseless 
movement nowhither.  Our terrestrial planet is in constant increase by 
meteoric dust, moving to it through endless time out of infinite space.  
(Plato, 18) 
 
Pater thus distinguishes between an impetuous, immature Heraclitean flux, a lawless chaos of 
“contending, infinitely diverse impulses” (Plato, 17), and a mature theory of the flux, where 
“change is the irresistible law of our being” (Plato, 21).  In the mature theory of the flux, 
revealed by contemporary physics, the Earth drifts through endless time and infinite space; the 
order and logic of this space and the bodies within it does not come from the stability of objects 
and forms, nor it is a chaos of impulses, for the laws of thermodynamics regulate the constant 
cycles of extinction and renewal. 
   Whereas the modern philosophy of development finds law within motion, Pater argues 
that Plato, reacting against the lawlessness of a purely destructive theory of the flux, establishes a 
scene of law by rejecting motion.  Plato's denial of the reality of motion comes from the fact that 
Plato, who himself lived in the “barely adolescent world” of ancient Greece, responded to the 
lawless chaos of the “immature' theory of the flux.  For Plato, the only valid knowledge is that 
“which corresponds to the ‘Pure Being,” that after all is only definable as “Pure Nothing,” that 
colourless, formless, impalpable existence […] for whom Parmenides became a sort of inspired 
voice”(Plato, 27).  For Plato, “motion becomes the token of unreality in things, of falsity in our 
thoughts about them” (Plato, 19).  These two responses to the Heraclitean “protest”—a mature 
Heraclitean philosophy and Platonic appropriation of a Parmenidean being to deny motion—
persist as distinct tendencies in modern scientific thought.   
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And in the nineteenth century, as on the one hand the philosophy of motion, 
of the “perpetual flux,” receives its share of verification from that theory of 
development with which in various forms all modern science is 
prepossessed; so, on the other hand, the philosophy of rest also, of the 
perpetual lethargy, the Parmenidean assertion of the exclusive reign of “The 
One,” receives an unlooked-for testimony from the modern physical 
philosopher, hinting that the phenomena he deals with—matter, organism, 
consciousness—begin in a state of indeterminate, abstract indifference, with 
a single uneasy start in a sort of eternal sleep, a ripple on the dead, level 
surface.  Increasing indeed for a while in radius and depth, under the force 
of mechanic law, the world of motion and life is however destined, by force 
of its own friction, to be restored sooner or later to equilibrium; nay, it 
already gone back some noticeable degrees (how desirably!) to the primeval 
indifference, as may be understood by those who can recount the time it 
will take for our worn-out planet, surviving all the fret of the humanity it 
housed for a while, to be drawn into the sun.   (Plato, 31-33) 
 
Pater, that is, in negotiating the relationship between Heraclitus and Plato, draws a philosophical 
distinction between two interpretations of the critique of unified physical bodies that is offered 
by the nineteenth century science of energy.  In both the “Heraclitean” and “Parmenidean” 
versions of energetics, the stability of forms is only apparent.  Within the Heraclitean version, the 
forces that exist beyond the stability of forms are in a state of continual flux, moving “through 
endless time” and “infinite space”; in the Parmenidean version, this flux of forces is constrained 
by the logics of equilibrium and entropy:  while movement and increase proceed through “the 
force of mechanical law” (Plato, 33), this movement slowly diminishes under the “force of its 
own friction” (Plato, 33).  In distinguishing between these two scenes of energetics, equating 
entropic decline with a transcendental religious perspective—the desire for a return to the 
“One”—and perpetual motion with secular “modern theories of development” Pater describes 
the terrain of a debate, in the second half of the nineteenth century, over the metaphysical 
implications of thermodynamic theory.   
 In his 1852 paper, “On a Universal Tendency in Nature to the Dissipation of Mechanical 
Energy,” William Thompson notes that while heat can be used to produce motion, a certain 
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amount of energy will always dissipate through friction.  Once this heat has dissipated, it cannot 
serve to produce further motion. As Thomson writes, “the conversion of heat into mechanical 
effect could be admitted for heat engines operating with a fall from high to low temperatures, 
while the reconversion or recovery of mechanical effect 'lost' as the heat of conduction or friction 
in less-than-perfect engines could not”(101).  As potential energy is actualized, the amount of 
potential energy in the universe tends towards a state of exhaustion. The sun will extinguish, 
motion will cease, and the universe will rest in a state of unperturbed equilibrium.  For Thomson, 
like Pater, the heat death of the universe has clear metaphysical consequences: for Pater the 
notion that the universe will return to a state of equilibrium is in line with the formless, 
impalpable Parmenidean “Pure Being”; for Thomson the heat death of the universe becomes the 
proof of a biblical literalism. As Crosbie Smith writes, for Thomson this thermodynamic proof of 
Christian cosmology became the basis for a religious ethics. 
The directional flow of energy through space offered human beings the 
opportunity of directing, though not restoring, those mighty gifts of the 
Creator, the energies of nature.  But such an irreversible tendency was not 
‘loss’ of energy in the material world.  Human beings had a duty to employ 
engines for the benefit of mankind and in aid of its commercial and moral 
‘progress.’  Failure properly to direct and harness those gifts of energy was 
therefore only a waste, and in that sense a sin of ‘dissipation,’ with respect 
to human beings rather than in nature.  (Smith, 101) 
 
Not only did the heat death of the universe seem to prove that the universe had a beginning and 
an end, and therefore a creator, but it allowed Thomson to define the field of ethical action in 
terms of a utilization of the gifts of energy.  For both Pater and Thomson, the second law of 
thermodynamics is a theological orientation that constitutes a turn away from the reality and 
specificity of phenomenal experience, towards a scene of divine causality.   
 Whereas for Thomson the science of thermodynamics was evidence of a Christian 
cosmology and ethics, the transformative logic of thermodynamic thought equally seemed a 
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powerful tool, along with Darwinian evolution, in the articulation of a secular materialism.  As 
Smith writes, James Tyndall “was quick to perceive the value of conservation of energy in the 
armoury of scientific naturalism” (183).  However, as Smith continues, “in order to appropriate 
the doctrine for these ends, he needed to break any perceived North British monopoly on 
physical truth” (182).  In order to claim the science of thermodynamics for a secular scientific 
naturalism, Tyndall appeals, in his 1863 Heat as a Mode of Motion, to the work of the German 
physicist Julius Robert von Mayer in order to articulate a thermodynamics of perpetual motion 
that severs the transformative logic of the first law of thermodynamics from the theological 
consequences of the heat death of the universe.   
 In Heat as a Mode of Motion Tyndall argues, against a notion of entropic decline, that 
conversion of heat into motion is fully reversible, and that useful heat can be produced by 
friction.  As he writes:  “All the force of our locomotives is derived from heat, and all of it 
eventually becomes heat” (8). While for Thomson the fact that the locomotive is, itself, an 
imperfect heat engine, means that the heat that results from friction is “lost” to humans, Tyndall 
argues that friction, when examined at a macroscopic level, allows the full retransformation of 
mechanical energy into useful motive force.  “The train is brought to rest—How?  Simply by 
converting the entire moving force which it possessed at the moment the brake was applied, into 
heat”(9). Tyndall argues that the disperse heat, created through friction, continues to function as 
a motive force.   
 To combat a notion of friction as the loss of heat, Tyndall proposes “another theory” that 
“deserves our serious attention—the Meteoric Theory of the Sun” (445).  According to the 
Meteoric Theory, the energy expended by the sun is restored to the sun by the heat generated 
through friction when meteors collide with it.  As Tyndall writes of the “meteor theory”: 
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 Here we have an agency competent to restore his lost energy to the sun, and 
to maintain a temperature at his surface which transcends all terrestrial 
combustion.  In the fall of asteroids we find the means of producing the 
solar light and heat.  It may be contended that this showering down of 
matter necessitates the growth of the sun; it does so; but the quantity 
necessary to maintain the observed calorific emission for 4,000 years would 
defeat the scrutiny of our best instruments.  If the earth struck the sun, it 
would utterly vanish from perception; but the heat developed by its shock 
would cover the expenditure of a century.  (447) 
 
First proposed by Mayer in 1848, the “Meteoric Theory” was one of a series of theoretical 
endeavours to explain the continuing heat of the sun, for if the sun was considered merely as a 
burning mass of coal—as Tyndall writes, the temperature of the sun “transcends all terrestrial 
combustion”—then the diminution of heat coming from the sun would be observable over the 
course of a single lifetime.  The meteor theory secularizes the universe by effectively 
deanthropomorphizing the universe.  Not only does the meteor theory turn the universe into a 
system of perpetual motion, but the possible extinction of humanity, in the chance that the earth 
would be pulled into the sun, becomes the mechanism through which the universe continues to 
exist as a system of active energies. 
 In the “Conclusion” to The Renaissance, Pater’s metaphor for experience is a “flame.”  
As Pater writes, “To burn always with this hard, gem-like flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is 
success in life” (152).  As Billy Inman has noted, Pater seem to draw his metaphor of a “gem-
like flame” from Heat as a Mode of Motion.  Tyndall writes of an experiment where a heated 
diamond is placed in a jar of oxygen.   
Most of you know the scientific history of the diamond—that Newton, 
antedating intellectually the discoveries of modern chemistry, pronounced it 
to be an unctuous or combustible substance.  Everybody now knows that 
this brilliant gem is composed of the same substance as common charcoal, 
graphite, of plumbago.  A diamond is pure carbon, and carbon burns in 
oxygen.  Here is a diamond, held fast in a loop of platinum-wire; heating 
the gem to redness in this flame, I plunge it into this jar, which contains 
oxygen gas.  See how it brightens on entering the jar of oxygen, and now it 
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glows, like a little star, with a pure white light.  How are we to figure the 
action s here going on?  Exactly as you would present to your minds the 
idea of meteorites showering down on the sun.  The conceptions are, in 
quality, the same, and to the intellect the one is not more difficult than the 
other.  You are to figure the atoms of oxygen showering against this 
diamond on all sides.  They are urged toward it by what is called chemical 
affinity; but this force, made clear, presents itself to the mind as pure 
attraction, of the same mechanical quality, if I may use the term, as gravity.  
Every oxygen atom as it strikes the surface, and has its motion of 
translation destroyed by its collision with the carbon, assumes the motion 
which we call heat; and this heat is so intense, the attractions exerted at 
these molecular distances are so mighty, that the crystal is kept white-hot, 
and the compound, formed by the union of its atoms with those of the 
oxygen, flies away as with carbonic-acid gas.  (43) 
 
Tyndall's “scientific history of the diamond,” comes early in Heat as a Mode of Motion, as a first 
example of Mayer's “meteor theory.”  The diamond burns white-hot as the “atoms of oxygen,” 
which Tyndall imagines as attracted by a “pure attraction” akin to gravity, transfer their energy, 
as heat, through the friction of their collision.  In identifying subjective experience as a “gem-
like flame” Pater turns the scene of Heraclitean physics, of the perpetual flux of phenomena, into 
a metaphor for aesthetic experience.  Whereas the Parmenidean fantasy of a return to the “One” 
imagines that “the world of motion and life is however destined, by force of its own friction, to 
be restored sooner or later to equilibrium…to the primeval indifference”(Plato, 31-33), by taking 
the jem-like flame of the white-hot diamond, which for Tyndall is proof of the perpetual flux in 
that friction generates motive force, rather than dissipates is, as a symbol for “success in life,” 
Pater identifies aesthetic experience with the continual transformations of a phenomenal world 
governed only by the law of conservation of force.   
 
II.  A Thermodynamics of Experience 
 
  Hermann von Helmholtz's 1861 public lecture, “The Application of the Law of the 
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Conservation of Force to Organic Nature,” is generally taken as the first text explicitly applying 
thermodynamic theory to life.   
 At the beginning of this century, physiologists believed that it was the vital 
principle which caused the processes of life, and that it detracted from the 
dignity and nature of life if anybody expressed his belief that the blood was 
driven through the vessels by the mechanical action of the heart, or that 
respiration took place according to the common laws of the diffusion of 
gases.  The present generation, on the contrary, is hard at work to find out 
the real causes of the processes which go on in the living body.  They do 
not suppose that there is any other difference between the chemical and the 
mechanical actions in the living body and out of it than can be explained by 
the more complicated circumstances and conditions under which these 
actions take place, and we have seen that the law of the conservation of 
force legitimizes this supposition.  This law, moreover, shows the way in 
which this fundamental question, which has excited so many theoretical 
speculations, can be really and completely solved by experiment.  
(Helmholtz, 121) 
 
Until it was understood that food was a source of energy, Helmholtz notes, it was assumed that 
there was some sort of infinite source of force within the animal—food and water served as 
something like grease on an axle, to keep the parts of the animal lubricated.  Once the principle 
of the conservation of energy—that shows that energy is not created or destroyed, but rather 
transformed—is established, the body becomes a mechanism for the transformation of energy:  
whereas a steam engine uses coal as a source of energy, the human uses the heat, or calories, in 
food.     
 When, in Heat as a Mode of Motion, Tyndall comments on this section of Helmholtz's 
essay, he begins by noting, following Helmholtz, that the human functions according to 
thermodynamic principles. 
 We see, however, that the engine and the animal derive, or may derive, 
these powers form the self-same source.  We can work an engine by the 
direct combustion of the substance which we employ as food; and, if our 
stomachs were so constituted as to digest coal, we should, as Helmholtz has 
remarked, be able to derive our energy from this substance.  The grand  
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point permanent through all these considerations is, that nothing is created.  
(463) 
 
Yet whereas for Helmholtz the “vital principle” (Helmholtz, 121) “can be really and completely 
solved by experiment” (Helmholtz, 121), for Tyndall the experimentally verified fact that the 
same forces constitute the organic and the inorganic constitutes a mystery. 
 The matter of our bodies is that of inorganic Nature.  There is no substance 
in the animal tissues which is not primarily derived from the rocks, the 
water, and the air.  Are the forces or organic matter, then, different in kind 
from those of inorganic?  All the philosophy of the present day tends to 
negative the question; and to show that it is the directing and the 
compounding, in the organic world, of forces belonging equally to the 
inorganic, that constitute the mystery and the miracle of vitality.  (Tyndall, 
465) 
 
 The law of conservation of energy—the perpetual transformations of energy and heat—becomes 
the principle of a pantheistic religion of nature.   
 In the “Conclusion” to The Renaissance, Pater takes, from Tyndall, the notion of the 
transformations of energy as mysterious and vital.  However, whereas for both Tyndall and 
Helmholtz the chief piece of evidence that the organic and inorganic participate in the same 
thermodynamic logic, in the same network of forces and elements, is that the human digestive 
system is a kind of heat engine where chemical combustion transforms food into the form of 
energy accessible to the human, Pater displaces the moment of heat as cause from “combustion” 
of fuel in the stomach, to the experience of heat transfer—the experience of plunging into cool 
water on a hot summer day.   
To regard all things and principles as inconstant modes or fashions has 
more and more become the tendency of modern thought.  Let us begin with 
that which is without—our physical life.  Fix upon it in one of its more 
exquisite intervals, the moment, for instance, of delicious recoil from the 
flood of water in the summer heat.  What is the whole physical life in that 
moment but a combination of natural elements to which science gives their 
names?  But those elements, phosphorus and lime and delicate fibres, are 
present not in the human body alone:  we detect them in places most remote 
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from it.  Our physical life is a perpetual motion of them—the passage of the 
blood, the waste and repairing of the lenses of the eye, the modification of 
the tissues of the brain under every ray of light and sound—processes 
which science reduces to simpler and more elementary forces.  Like the 
elements of which we are composed, the action of these forces extends 
beyond us:  it rusts iron and ripens corn.  (150) 
 
As in Helmholtz's and Tyndall's poetic evocations of the forces that pass through both organic 
and inorganic bodies, the notion of the human body as unified and solid is replaced by the notion 
of the human body as a momentary confluence of diverse forces and elements.  Yet in Pater's 
passage, the transformation of heat into motion—in the experience of the “exquisite interval” of 
a hot body coming into contact with a cold body—does not involve digestion.  Rather, this 
moment of thermodynamic exchange becomes the base unit of experience.  In these terms, it is 
the energy generated from this experience—the energy of the “delicious recoil” where a noun of 
mechanical reaction is modified by an aesthetic adjective—that Pater then traces through the 
physical world, as the passage follows the dispersal of this energy through the body—through 
delicate fibers of phosphorous and lime—as well as into the physical world beyond the body.  
Aesthetic experience takes the place of the mechanical process in both Helmholtz's and Tyndall's 
poetic evocations of the networks of thermodynamic forces, becoming itself a motive force, the 
origin of an energy that, stretching out through the paragraph, conveys sensations through the 
body, and that, moving beyond the body, can “rust iron, and ripen corn” (Renaissance, 150). 
 The passage, however, does not end with the dissipation of this energy, but rather with 
the recuperation of this energy by the human life that exists at the intersection of these forces. 
Far out on every side of us those elements are broadcast, driven in many 
currents; and birth and gesture and death and the springing of violets from 
the grave are but a few out of ten thousand resultant combinations. That 
clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours, under 
which we group them—a design in a web, the actual threads pass beyond it.  
This at least of flame-like our life has, that it is but the concurrence,  
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renewed from moment to moment, of forces parting sooner or later on their 
ways.  (150) 
 
Lines of force are “broadcast” out from the human body, yet the human body itself appears as the 
“concurrence” of these natural forces.  It is because experience is the intersection of these forces 
that human life is “flame-like.”  In other words, within Pater's thermodynamics of experience, 
heat is not just cause, not just something that is “spent,” that causes motion and then disperses 
into the world.  The initial thermodynamic exchange—the hot body coming into contact with 
cold water—does not result in a tepid body, but rather produces a “flame-like” quality of 
experience, a flame that is generated at “the concurrence [...] of forces parting sooner or later on 
their ways”(150).  A heat exchange functions rhetorically as both cause and effect of the passage, 
as the various elements and energies that Pater maps, extending from the initial experience of the 
hot body coming into contact with cool water, are recollected in a “flame like” experience that is 
generated precisely by the intersection of these forces.  As in Tyndall’s notion of perpetual 
motion, where friction generates motive force, the forces liberated by aesthetic experience 
themselves produce a flame.  Aesthetic experience is a perfect heat engine—the flame of 
experience does not burn out.  Like Tyndall’s diamond, like the sun in Mayer’s “Meteoric 
Theory,” the expenditure of heat only causes the flame to burn brighter.    
 The “Conclusion” is often read as consisting of two distinct parts.  As Kanarakis Yannis 
writes, “The first part employs a discourse that invokes the findings of contemporary science so 
as to discuss the recognition of fluidity in the physical world, where the second part employs the 
discourses of associationism, modern psychology, and empirical skepticism” (89).  Indeed, 
critics occasionally note that the first two paragraphs are in a state of conflict.  Whereas in the 
first paragraph—where Pater outlines the discourses of physical science—Pater seems to depend 
upon the existence of the external world as a place where forces governed by laws pass through 
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seemingly stable phenomena, in the following paragraph Pater evokes a sceptical tradition of 
empirical philosophy and associationist psychology that would seem to call the existence of the 
external world into question.   
At first sight experience seems to bury us under a flood of external objects, 
pressing upon us with a sharp and importunate reality, calling us out of 
ourselves in a thousand forms of action.  But when reflection begins to play 
upon those objects they are dissipated under its influence; the cohesive 
force seems suspended like some trick of magic; each object is loosed into a 
group of impressions—colour, odour, texture—in the mind of the observer.  
And if we continue to dwell in thought on this world, not of objects but of 
impressions, unstable, flickering, inconsistent, which burn are extinguished 
with our consciousness of them:  the whole scope of observation is dwarfed 
into the narrow chamber of the individual mind.  (151) 
 
Pater continues, first noting that “every one of those impressions is the impression of the 
individual in his isolation, each mind keeping as a solitary prisoner its own dream of a world” 
(151), before noting that each mind is, itself, continually formed and reformed by this “passage 
and dissolution of impressions, images, sensations, that analysis leaves off—that continual 
vanishing away, that strange, perpetual, weaving and unweaving of ourselves” (152).  The 
subject, the world, are reduced to the disorganized particularity of discrete impression, out of 
which it seems one could neither construct a subject nor a world.   
 Jesse Matz reads this passage as evidence of Pater's debt to the problematic status of the 
impression within British empirical philosophy.  The impression, taken as a base unit of 
experience, introduced a problem into British thought, from Hume on, of how it is that these 
impressions “clump together.”  And yet Pater's notion of the impression is itself erected on a 
certain thermodynamic logic.  Rather than read Pater's turn to the impression as the basic unit of 
consciousness as a departure from his appeal to the forces and energies that compose both the 
organic and inorganic world, I want to suggest that Pater's impression, far from existing as a term 
of ultimate analysis, is figured as the epiphenomenon of a scene of energy transfers.  On the one 
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hand, Pater's notion of the impression as “flickering,” seems to register the transience of the 
impression in empiricist philosophy, yet on the other, the human is “flame-like” insofar as he is 
located at the intersection of forces.  As Pater writes, “To burn always with this hard, gem-like 
flame, to maintain this ecstasy, is success in life” (152).  To burn with this “gem-like flame” 
means to “be present always at the focus where the greatest number of vital forces unite in their 
purest energy” (152).  In other words, Pater's famous “flame” of experience exists only with 
respect to the scene of vital forces, united in purest “energy.” 
Whereas for Tyndall, the “mystery and the miracle of vitality” comes at the intersection 
of forces that rule both the organic and inorganic world, Pater describes the aesthetic as the 
experience of this scene of perpetual forces.  While Pater insists that “the theory or idea or 
system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in consideration of some 
interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not identified with 
ourselves, or of what is only conventional, has no claim on us” (153), I want to continue to 
suggest that a specific theoretical scene—the perpetual motion of a “Heraclitean” energetics, 
articulated by Tyndall—is the precondition of the Paternian impression.  In other words, Pater 
finds, in the Heraclitean flux of forces, a system that does not require the sacrifice of experience.   
 
III.   The Heat Engine in the Critic's Laboratory 
 
 The distinction that Helmholtz draws between the human as caused by a vital force and 
the human as caused by thermodynamic transformations of energy, registers a shift that is often 
seen as constitutive of scientific discourse.   Alexandre Koyré, the early twentieth-century 
philosopher of science, describes the scientific revolution as a metaphysical shift in how nature is 
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conceived.  Koyré argues that in scientific discourse nature is no longer understood as operating 
through internal causes—what the Aristotelians called “qualities”—but rather through external 
forces that can only be apprehended as mathematically quantifiable relationships.  As the 
historian of science Peter Dear writes, “Aristotelian physics (also called 'natural philosophy') was 
the qualitative science of the natural world that explained why things happen in terms of the 
essential natures of bodies” (3).  Aristotelians thus argued that the program of modern science 
was doomed because its mathematical language was unable to describe qualities.  As Koyré 
writes “[t]he Aristotelian was perfectly right” (Metaphysics and Measurement, 28).     
It is impossible to furnish a mathematical deduction of quality.  And well 
we know that Galileo, like Descartes somewhat later, and for just the same 
reason, was forced to drop the notion of quality, to declare it subjective, to 
ban it from the realm of nature.  This at the same time implies that he was 
obliged to drop sense-perception as the source of knowledge and to 
proclaim that intellectual, and even a priori knowledge, is our sole and 
only means of apprehending the essence of the real.  (28) 
 
While the Aristotelian program assumed “the reality of universals as entities existing above and 
beyond their individual instances” (Dear, 26), modern science follows a inductive logic, 
beginning from quantifiable data and working to construct laws that are continually subject to 
revision.    
 While Helmholtz follows the shift from quality to quantity, from “vital forces” to the 
science of energy, and while Tyndall mystifies the totality of energetic forces as a kind of 
pantheistic vital spirit, for Pater aesthetic experience is the exposure to this vital scene of 
transformative energies. Whereas, in Koyré’s reading, scientific discourse is forced to “drop 
sense perception as a source of knowledge,” it is, for Pater, only by figuring sense perception as 
the primary data of a quasi-scientific critical discourse that a space can be made for what we 
might call a quantitative science of qualitative experience.  Pater thus begins the “Preface” by 
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situating the critic at the juncture of two competing discourses of nature, such that the critic has 
one foot in the world of Aristotelian causes, the other in the quantifiable language of scientific 
verification.  As Pater writes, using the Aristotelian language of qualities as internal causes, “The 
objects with which aesthetic criticism deals—music, poetry, artistic and accomplished forms of 
human life—are indeed receptacle of so many powers or forces:  they possess, like the products 
of nature, so many virtues or qualities”(xxix).  Yet at the same time, Pater's famous revision of 
Arnold's claim that the function of the critic is “to see the object as in itself it really is” (xxix) 
functions to establish a quantitative, experiential science of the artwork.  In emphasizing the 
importance of the critic's knowledge of his own “impression” of the art object, as the only means 
to approach what is at stake in the art object, Pater reimagines the critic as split between the 
function of a finely tuned laboratory apparatus, that can experience (as in the French for 
“experiment”—“faire une experience”) various subtle aesthetic phenomena, and the disinterested 
researcher capable of recording this primary data.  As in the “Conclusion,” where the impression 
occurs at the intersection of forces and energies, the critic’s impression registers an activity in the 
artwork. 
What is this song or picture, this engaging personality presented in life or in 
a book, to me?  What effect does it really produce on me?  Does it give me 
pleasure?  And if so, what sort or degree of pleasure?  How is my nature 
modified by its presence, and under its influence?  The answers to these 
questions are the original facts with which the aesthetic critic has to do; 
and, as in the study of light, or morals, or number, one must realise such 
primary data for one's self, or not at all. (xxix) 
 
The data that emerges as a response to these questions—questions that might govern the record 
keeping of a chemist in a lab, who monitors the changes in an experimental equipment as it is 
exposed to various stimuli—becomes the primary data. 
And the function of the aesthetic critic is to distinguish, to analyse, and 
separate from its adjuncts, the virtue by which a picture, a landscape, a fair 
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personality in life or in a book, produces this special impression of beauty 
or pleasure, to indicate what the source of that impression is, and under 
what conditions it is experienced.  His end is reached when he has 
disengaged that virtue, and noted it, as a chemist notes some natural 
element, for himself and others.  (xxx) 
 
The language of virtues and qualities comes to signify subjective aesthetic experience, while the 
language of scientific experimentation comes to signify the social transmission of this aesthetic 
experience.  In splitting the critic, by imagining him as functioning both as an experimental 
apparatus—capable of experiencing the subtle effects of aesthetic phenomenon—and as a 
scientist capable of noting the results obtained by this experimental apparatus, Pater at once 
inscribes his critical project within the scene of scientific discourse, and opens a space, within 
scientific discourse, for subjective experience.   
Pater thus preserves two distinct scenes of energetics, the qualitative, subjective 
Heraclitean flux and the quantitative Parmenidean equilibrium, as the critical and creative 
tension that the field of aesthetic phenomena negotiates.  While Pater understands aesthetic 
experience as an exposure to the particularity of phenomena as they are continually transformed 
by the perpetual motion of the forces that pass through them, he models the structural stability of 
impersonal discourse on the equilibrium of an entropic model.  By understanding the artist and 
critic as split between these two scenes, at once deriving knowledge from subjective qualitative 
experience, and transmitting this knowledge through the formal objective discourse, Pater 
proposes that the aesthetic critic is able to develop a quantitative science of qualitative 
experience. 
 In the “Preface,” the “quality” or “virtue” that the aesthetic critic is receptive to is 
continually compared to a kind of heat.  Linguistic and historical material, which Pater speaks of 
as a limiting and limited structure, is transformed, taken into a state of flux, by the addition of the 
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“heat” of subjective experience.  “Take, for instance, the writings of Wordsworth.  The heat of 
his genius, entering into the substance of his work, has crystallised a part, but only a part of it; 
and in that great mass of verse there is much which might well be forgotten”(xxxi).  Whereas in 
thermodynamic thought heat is the “vis viva,” the “heat” of Wordsworth's genius becomes the 
“virtue, the active principle” (xxxi) in his poetry.  In the work of “Goethe or Byron” this “virtue” 
is mixed with common elements, and to read them one must  cast off “all débris” to reveal “only 
what the heat of their imagination has wholly fused and transformed”(xxxi).  It is thus the work 
of the artist and critic to translate between these two scenes, between the vital scene of perpetual 
movement, qualitative and subjective experience, and the quantitative scene of structure and 
transmission.  While the “flame of experience” is the effect of a scene of vital forces, the 
experience of motion can be inscribed within a structure that is itself permanent: the flux of 
experience can be “crystallised,” and perpetual motion can be represented by rigid structure.  It is 
thus Leonardo Da Vinci's desire, “by a strange variation of the alchemist's dream, to discover the 
secret, not of an elixir to make man's natural life immortal, but of giving immortality to the 
subtlest and most delicate effects of painting”(68).  The problem of transmission, in other words, 
requires that a scene of experience—which Pater understands as an exposure to the 
transformative flow of energies—be inscribed within the stable—which is to say immortal—
structure of the artwork.   
 
IV. Two Portraits 
 
 In The Renaissance, both critic and artist negotiate between a scene of experience—
understood as a receptivity to the perpetual movement of forces and energies—and the scene of 
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scientific transmission.  While the successful artist is able to negotiate between these scenes, in 
two of the Imaginary Portraits—“Sebastian von Stork” and “Apollo in Picardy”—Pater 
understands the failure to negotiate between these scenes as a kind of madness.  Each of these 
portraits describe a different kind of madness:  Sebastian works to eliminate a scene of 
subjectivity, and to return the world to a state of equilibrium, while the Prior Saint-Jean is 
excluded from human society by his experience of unformalizable nature.  In these portraits, in 
other words, the tension between a Heraclitean and Parmenidean energetics becomes a kind of 
metapsychology, and the portraits case studies that find the origin of psychological dysfunction 
in the impasse between two styles of energetics.   
 Pater begins “Sebastian von Stork,” which tells the story of life and death of a sixteenth 
century Dutch man, by proposing that Holland, where lively industry and art are carved out of 
the indifference and uniformity of the ocean, is a symbol for the human, split between the color 
of sensuous experience and the cold indifference of metaphysical abstraction.   
So genially attempered, so warm, was life become, in the land of which 
Pliny had spoken as scarcely dry land at all.  And, in truth, the sea which 
Sebastian so much loved, and with so great a satisfaction and sense of well 
being in every hint of its nearness, is never far from distant in Holland.  
Invading all places, stealing under one's feet, insinuating itself everywhere 
along an endless network of canals [...].  In the very conditions of life in 
such a country there was a standing force of pathos.  The country itself 
shared the uncertainty of the individual human life; and there was pathos 
also in the constantly renewed, heavily-taxed labour, necessary to keep the 
native soil, fought for so unselfishly, there at all, with a warfare that must 
still be maintained when the other struggle with the Spaniard was over.  
(122) 
 
Sebastian, who is born into a wealthy family and exposed to the best of Dutch art and culture, is 
“so fortunately endowed for the reception of the sensible world” (135).  He nevertheless turns 
away from art and sensuous experience, toward the ocean and metaphysical speculation.   
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From the midst of the busy and busy-looking house, crowded with the 
furniture and the pretty little toys of many generations, a long passage led 
the rare visitor up a winding staircase, and (again at the end of a long 
passage) he found himself as if shut off from the whole talkative Dutch 
world, and in the embrace of that wonderful quiet which is also possible in 
Holland at its height all around him.  It was here that Sebastian could yield 
himself, with the only sort of love he had ever felt, to the supremacy of his 
difficult thoughts.—A kind of empty place!  Here, you felt, all had been 
mentally put to rights by the working-out of a long equation, which had 
zero is equal to zero for its result.  Here one did, and perhaps felt, nothing; 
one only thought.  (120) 
 
Captivated by his “difficult thoughts,” Sebastian devotes his life to a “neat and elaborate 
manuscript”(129), that begins with his “boyish enthusiasm for a strange, fine saying of Doctor 
Baruch de Spinosa, concerning the Divine Love—That who so loveth God truly must not expect 
to be loved by him in return”(130).  The indifference of this “Divine Love” demands an 
“intellectual disinterestedness” in Sebastian, through which he must put the “subjective side out 
of the way, and let pure reason speak” (130).  Sebastian produces a series of theorems and 
corollaries that constitute his ethical system.   
There can be only one substance: (corollary) it is the greatest or errors to 
think that the non-existent, the world of finite things seen and felt, really is: 
(theorem):  for, whatever is, is but in that: (practical corollary):  one’s 
wisdom, therefore, consists in hastening, so far as may be, the action of 
those forces which tend to the restoration of equilibrium, the calm surface 
of the absolute, untroubled mind, to tabula rasa, by the extinction in one’s 
self of all that is but correlative to the finite illusion—by the suppression of 
ourselves. (132) 
 
Sebastian—like Pater—understands subjective experience as precisely that which is excluded 
from the entropic progress of forces towards a state of equilibrium.  Rather than take the side of 
subjective experience against uniformity and equilibrium, Sebastian, finding himself divided 
between the fact of his subjective experience and a mathematical logic, comes to see subjective 
experience as a stain, as an eddy, within a universal tendency towards equilibrium.  Seduced by a 
“Parmenidean” thermodynamics, Sebastian turns away from subjective experience, and works to 
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restore the “absolute mind” to this state.  Whereas for William Thomson “the directional flow of 
energy through space offered human beings the opportunity of directing, though not restoring, 
those mighty gifts of the Creator, the energies of nature” (Smith, 101), for Sebastian, the goal of 
the human is to aid this directional flow of energy, and thus to ensure that the dissipation of 
energy, and the extinction of the “finite illusion,” happens as quickly as possible.   
 When a girl, Mademoiselle van Westrheene, falls in love with Sebastian, all her “little 
arts of love” (128) seem opposed to the “absolute nature we suppose in love” (128).  Sebastian 
responds to her advances by writing her a “cruel letter” in which he accuses her, “so natural, and 
simply loyal! of a vulgar coarseness of character” (129).   This letter is such a shock to Mlle van 
Westrheene that she wastes away, and soon dies, from “wounded pride” (129).  While this “cruel 
letter” is addressed to Mlle van Westrheene, Sebastian attaches a copy of the letter as the final 
page of his philosophical manuscript.  The letter completes the manuscript, demonstrating, as an 
ethic, the “practical corollary” of Sebastian’s theory, by putting into motion “the extinction” of 
that which is “correlative to the finite illusion” and mortifying the flesh to prove that there exists 
a scene—of the absolute mind—beyond human experience.   
 Sebastian, his manuscript completed, flees the city to live as a recluse by the ocean. 
As he stayed in this place, with one or two silent serving people, a sudden 
rising of the wind altered, as it might seem, in a few dark, tempestuous 
hours, the entire world around him.  The strong wing changed not again for 
fourteen days, and its effect was a permanent one; so that people might 
have fancied that an enemy had indeed cut the dykes somewhere—a pin-
hole enough to wreck the ship of Holland, or at least this portion of it, 
which underwent an inundation of the sea the like of which had not 
occurred in that province for half a century.  Only, when the body of 
Sebastian was found, apparently not long after death, a child lay asleep, 
swaddled warmly in his heavy furs, in an upper room of the old tower, to 
which the tide was almost risen; though the building still stood firmly, and 
still with the means of life in plenty.  And it was in the saving of this child, 
with a great effort, as certain circumstances seemed to indicate, that 
Sebastian had lost his life.  (137) 
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In his death, that is, Sebastian turns away from his desire to extinguish subjectivity, sacrificing 
himself in order to perpetuate the “finite illusion” of subjective existence.  Sebastian's life and 
death thus proceeds as the failed negotiation between a conception of force as constrained by 
equations and equilibrium, and force tending towards activity and life, between Parmenidean 
heat death, and the endless phenomena of Heraclitean energetics.  Despite the fact that Sebastian 
redeems himself by taking the side of the particularity of subjective experience, it is his failure to 
find a balance between these two scenes that leads to his death.   
 Not only does the tension between these two systems allow Pater to theorize subjective 
experience as opposed to mathematical equilibrium, but the tension between these two positions 
becomes a metapsychological terrain that Sebastian must negotiate.  The question of whether 
Sebastian will work to extinguish the “finite illusion,” and thus help the universe return to the 
undifferentiated equilibrium of Parmenidean “Pure Being,” or whether Sebastian will preserve 
the particularity of subjective experience—as he does when he ultimately sacrifies himself in 
order to save the young child, becomes the ethical terrain that Sebastian negotiates.   
 In that it understands both ethics and style as the negotiation of the tension between a 
physics of perpetual motion and entropic decline, “Sebastian von Stork” asks to be read against 
“Apollo in Picardy,” where there is an equivalent failure of mediation between subjective 
experience and formal scientific discourse.  Whereas Sebastian's pathology involves being 
seduced by an impersonal scene of the equilibrium of forces, the protagonist of “Apollo in 
Picardy,” Prior Saint-Jean, is driven mad by his exposure to something for which he can find no 
place in discourse, by his attachment to the irreducible quality of his experience.   
 “Apollo in Picardy” begins when the Prior Saint-Jean is sent “to the Grange or Obedience 
of Notre-Dame De-Pratis” (188).  Upon his arrival, he discovers that he is in the presence of 
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Apollo, who appears as one of Heine’s pagan Gods in exile, in the guise of a “servant of the 
house, or farm labourer,” who has an “unserflike ease,”  “godly […] posture,” harp and bow.  
Apollyon begins to have a series of effects on various “structures.”  As his first task, Prior Saint-
Jean sets to supervise the construction of a monastic barn.  As they begin building, the 
mysterious harper sat there always, at the topmost point achieved; played, 
idly enough it might seem, on his precious instrument, but kept in fact the 
hard taxed workmen literally in tune, working for once with a ready will, 
and, so to speak, with really inventive hands—working expeditiously, in 
this favourable weather, till far into the night, as they joined unbidden in a 
chorus, which hushed, or rather turned to music, the noise of their chipping. 
(193) 
 
The music works a change in the manner of building, “not so much of style as of temper, or 
management, in the application of acknowledged rules,” which strips away ornamentation, and 
“turns the heavy manner of using stones, light” (193).  Apollyon has the same positive effect on 
Prior Saint-Jean’s body that he has on the building.  As Pater writes, “is not the human body, too, 
a building, with architectural laws, a structure, tending by the very forces which primarily held it 
together to drop asunder in time?” (194).  In other words, whereas Sebastian identifies with the 
temporal limit where structures “drop asunder in time,” in “Apollo” the emphasis is on the 
interrelation between the possibility of structure, and the fact of dissolution.  Form and 
dissolution are not here opposed, for the same forces that are the precondition of structure are the 
forces of dissolution.   
 Robert Keefe offers that “Apollo served as the foremost mythical representative of Greek 
sanity” as a “sort of tutelary deity, imparting to ancient Greece and, potentially, to a harried 
Victorian England, the virtues necessary for true greatness” (159-160). Thus, for Keefe, Pater’s 
evocation of Venus in The Renaissance constitutes an “anti-Apollonian campaign,” that works to 
overcome the limits of Victorian virtue.  The Renaissance is followed by Pater’s “Study of 
  58 
Dionysus,” which Keefe characterizes, again, as a “conscious attempt to undercut the Victorian 
cult of Apollo” (161).  Yet the Apollo of “Apollo of Picardy” is not the ascendance of an 
imaginary unity over the flux of forces that are responsible for “that continual vanishing away, 
that strange, perpetual, weaving and unweaving of ourselves” (Renaissance, 152).  The fact that 
the representative of Apollo in “Apollo of Picardy” is Apollyon—Greek for “the destroyer” and 
the name, in Revelations 9:11 for “the angel of the bottomless pit”— serves to underscore that 
Apollo is the god of death and pestilence as well as of music and medicine.  While Apollyon 
brings a life to the laws that structure the world, his presence has an equally destructive effect. 
 [O]nce, on his annual return from southern or eastern lands, he had been 
observed on his way along the streets of the great won literally scattering 
the seeds of disease till his serpent-skin bag was empty.  And within seven 
days the ‘black death’ was there, reaping its thousands.  As a wise man 
declared, he who can best cure disease can also most cunningly engender it.  
(195) 
 
Rather than a figure of Victorian morality, who would oppose himself to an unlawful field of 
desire, Apollyon is the violence in form, the death that works within the medicine that keeps 
death at bay.  As Pater explains, “[i]n short, these creatures of rule, these ‘regulars,’ the Prior and 
his companion, were come in contact for the first time in their lives with the power of untutored 
natural impulse, of natural inspiration”(195).  Between “Sebastian” and “Apollo” the notion of a 
rule, of a structure, is displaced.  “Structure,” as in the thermodynamics of equilibrium and 
entropy, is no longer the name for the transformations of energy, the structuring and 
destructuring impulses taken as a whole, but is rather that which appears as the momentary 
stability of these impulses and forces.  The scene of “natural impulse” and “natural inspiration” 
becomes another version of the continual transformation and flux of force within the 
thermodynamics of perpetual motion. 
 Through Apollyon, the Prior comes under the spell of an enjoyment that is a kind of 
  59 
madness—an experience for which he can find no expression.  This enrapture begins as the 
Prior, a scholar of language, “can but wonder as this strange scholar’s knowledge of a distant 
past, evidenced in his familiarity (it was as if he might once have spoken them) with the dead 
language in which their text-books are written” (200).  Eventually, it is as if the Prior had 
passed unwittingly through some river or rivulet of Lethe, that had carried 
away from him all his so carefully accumulated intellectual baggage of fact 
and theory.  […] The hard and abstract laws, or theory of the laws, of 
music, of the stars, of mechanical structure, in hard and abstract formulae, 
adding to the abstract austerity of the man, seemed to have deserted him; to 
be revived in him again however, at the very contact of this extraordinary 
pupil or fellow-inquirer, though in a very different guise or attitude towards 
himself, as matters no longer to be reasoned upon and understood, but to be 
seen rather, to be looked at and heard.  Did not he see the angle of the 
earth’s axis with the ecliptic, the deflections of the stars from their proper 
orbits with fatal results here below, and the earth—wicked, unscriptural 
truth!—moving round the sun, and those flashes of the eternal and unorbed 
light such as bring water, flowers, living things, out of the rocks, the dust?  
The singing of the planets:  he could hear it, and might in time effect its 
notation.  Having seen and heard, he might ere-long speak also, truly and 
with authority, on such matters.  Could one but arrest it for one’s sake, for 
final transference to others, on the written or printed page—this beam of 
insight, or of inspiration! (201) 
 
Whereas the Prior speaks a dead language, one governed by rules, he hears in Apollyon’s voice 
the possibility of a living relationship to a dead language.  This relationship of dead language to 
living speech is then figured as the relationship between knowledge and experience—between 
the “hard and abstract laws, or theory of the laws” which can be expressed in “formulae,” and the 
experience through which the Prior can “see the angle of the earth’s axis with the ecliptic […] 
moving round the sun.”  As in the “Conclusion,” the play of vital forces, within which fixed 
forms appear as moment of stability, is made equivalent to immediate experience.   
 In the Portrait, the Prior is driven mad by the tension between the qualitative world of 
subjective experience, and the formulaic and rule governed, mathematically quantifiable, scene 
of social transmission.  The Prior has an experience, a “beam of insight” but is unable to “arrest 
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it,” to “effect its notation” for “final transference to others” (201).  In other words, Pater seems to 
here understand the social world—ruled by equations and rules and inhabited by “regulars”—as 
excluding the Prior's subjective and qualitative experience of a version of the Heraclitean flux, 
where structures appear as a moment in chaos of impulses.  When Apollyon introduces a 
dimension of qualitative experience that drops out of formulaic knowledge, the Prior becomes 
paralyzed by the impossibility that he will express himself, that he will ever effect the alchemical 
transformation of experience into form.    
 
V.  Mind and Soul 
 
The distinction between the perpetual Heraclitean flux and the entropic Parmenidean 
search for equilibrium allows Pater to distinguish between a scene of subjective qualitative 
experience and a scene of social transmission.  In the proceeding Imaginary Portraits this 
distinction becomes the psychological terrain that both Sebastian and the Prior Saint-Jean must 
negotiate. Both Sebastian and the Prior ultimately fail to make a space within objective discourse 
for subjective experience: Sebastian moves from devoting himself to a purely objective treatise 
modeled on a mathematical logic to sacrificing himself to save a child; the Prior is driven mad by 
his inability to transmit something of his subjective experience.  In these terms, Sebastian is 
killed, and the Prior Saint-Jean is driven mad, by their failures of style, by their failures to find a 
style that will negotiate between these two scenes.   
  David Delaura has shown that Pater’s essay “Style” is a point by point reworking of 
Cardinal Newman’s chapter on literature from Idea of a University.  Newman begins the chapter 
by distinguishing between literature, the Bible, and science, and proceeds to argue that the Bible 
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should be thought of as a scientific work, rather than as a work of literature.   
I have said that Literature is one thing, and that Science is another; that 
Literature has to do with ideas, and Science with realities; that Literature is 
of a personal character, that Science treats of what is universal and eternal.  
In proportion, then, as Scripture excludes the personal colouring of its 
writers, and rises into the region of pure and mere inspiration, when it 
ceases in any sense to be the writing of man, of St. Paul or St. John, of 
Moses or Isaiah, then it comes to belong to Science, not Literature. Then it 
conveys the things of heaven, unseen verities, divine manifestations, and 
them alone—not the ideas, the feelings, the aspirations, of its human 
instruments, who, for all that they were inspired and infallible, did not cease 
to be men.  (252) 
 
While, because of its subjective content, literature is untranslatable, the Bible, speaking, through 
scientific objectivity of “unseen verities,” is fully transparent and fully translatable.  Newman 
continues that 
the words, then, in which they are set forth are not language, speech, 
literature, but rather, as I have said, symbols. And, as a proof of it, you will 
recollect that it is possible, nay usual, to set forth the propositions of Euclid 
in algebraical notation, which, as all would admit, has nothing to do with 
literature.  What is true of mathematics is true also of every study, so far 
forth as it is scientific; it makes use of words as the mere vehicle of things, 
and is thereby withdrawn from the province of literature.  Thus 
metaphysics, ethics, law, political economy, chemistry, theology, cease to 
be literature in the same degree as they are capable of a severe scientific 
treatment. (239) 
 
Within an objective, scientific text, the relationship of language to truth is mediated by the 
impersonal mathematical signifier.  Language, like the algebraic sign, is a symbol for truth.  
Style, for its own sake, is “a trick and a trade […] on a par with the gold plate and the flowers 
and the music of a banquet, which do not make the viands better, but the entertainment more 
pleasurable; as if language were the hired servant, the mere mistress of the reason, and not the 
lawful wife in her own house” (243).  The style through which truth expresses itself in language 
is “an extra.”  “It is a mere artifice, and that hence it cannot be translated; now we come to their 
fact, viz., that Scripture has no such artificial style, and that Scripture can easily be 
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translated”(251).  The truth of language thus depends upon the existence of an ideal 
metalanguage—modeled upon mathematics.  While “thought and speech are inseparable” and 
“style is a thinking out into language,” words are a “mere vehicle for things” (Newman, 239).   
While Pater maintains, from Newman, a notion of language as symbol, the “thing” that is 
symbolized is not the same.  For Pater it is precisely the “personal colouring” of experience—
that which algebraic notation excludes for both Cardinal Newman and for Sebastian von Stork—
that language symbolizes.  Whereas for Newman, Scripture can be “easily” translated because it 
refers to an objective, “universal” and “eternal” truth, for Pater, the problem of style is the 
difficulty of “translation from inward to outward” (22).  The writer is not merely transcribing 
thought into language, but must work to find an “adaptation, between a relative, somewhere in 
the world of thought, and correlative, somewhere in the world of language” (19).  As Pater 
writes, “The one word for the one thing, the one thought, amid the multitude of words, terms, 
that might just do:  the problem of style was there!—the unique word, phrase, sentence, 
paragraph, essay, or song, absolutely proper to the single mental presentation of vision within” 
(19).  He continues, “In the highest as in the lowliest literature, then, the one indispensable 
beauty is, after all, truth:—truth to bare fact in the latter, as to some personal sense of fact, 
diverted somewhat from men’s ordinary sense of it, in the former:  truth there as accuracy, truth 
here as expression, that finest and most intimate form of truth, the vraie vérité” (22-23).  For 
Pater, “any writer worth translating at all has winnowed and searched through his vocabulary, is 
conscious of the words he would select” (8).  A writer is worth translating only because he has 
already labored with the translation of personal experience into language.   
 Yet it is not merely the case that Pater reverses the conditions of truth that Newman puts 
forward, by suggesting that literature, because it negotiates the relationship of personality and 
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style, has a claim to universality.  Pater does not merely elevate “personality” over objective 
discourse. Pater’s theory of style is not a turn away from science, but rather the internalization of 
the vocabulary and subject matter of scientific discourse.   “The coming task of English literary 
style,” he writes, “may well lie in the naturalisation of the vocabulary of science” and in “a 
liberal naturalisation of the ideas of science too, for after all the chief stimulus of good style is to 
possess a full, rich complex matter to grapple with” (9).  He then introduces the terms “mind” 
and “soul,” as the key theoretical distinction.  Whereas “mind” is the correlate of an objective 
discourse governed by equilibrium—by the equivalence of the mathematical style—soul is the 
correlate of subjective experience.  In these terms, Sebastian von Stork’s treatise is an attempt to 
extinguish subjectivity in favour of the objective mind, while the Prior Saint-Jean suffers from an 
inability to negotiate the problem of soul.  As Pater writes, this distinction finds its origin in H.L. 
Mansel.  
An acute philosophical writer, the late Dean Mansel [...] wrote a book, of 
fascinating precision in a very obscure subject, to show that all the technical 
laws of logic are but the means of securing, in each and all of its 
apprehensions, the strict identity with itself, of the apprehending mind.  All 
the laws of good writing aim at a similar unity or identity of the mind in all 
the processes by which the word is associated to its import.  The term is 
right, and has its essential unity beauty, when it becomes, in a manner, what 
it signifies, as with the names of simple sensations.  To give the phrase, the 
sentence, the structural member, the entire composition, song, or essay, a 
similar unity with its subject and with itself:—style is in the right way when 
it tends towards that. (13) 
 
Mind, as Pater writes, is the architectural element of a literary work, the mark of its formal unity 
and “logical coherence” (14).  Where mind is in indication of conscious design, and “one of the 
greatest pleasures of really good prose literature is in the critical tracing out of that conscious 
artistic structure, and the pervading sense of it as we read” (24-25), soul moves beyond 
conscious design.   
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As a quality of style, at all events, soul is a fact, in certain writers—the way 
they have of absorbing language, of attracting it into the peculiar spirit they 
are of, with a subtlety which makes the actual result seem like some 
inexplicable inspiration.  By mind, the literary artist reaches us, through 
static and objective indications of design in his work, legible to all.  By 
soul, he reaches us, somewhat capriciously perhaps, one and not another, 
through vagrant sympathy and a kind of immediate contact.  Mind we 
cannot choose but approve where we recognize it; soul may repel us, not 
because we misunderstand it.  (25) 
 
Mind, that is, is the shared structure of human thought, objective and impersonal, while “soul” is 
a mark of difference that has to do with the “personality” of the artist.  As in The Renaissance, 
where Pater distinguishes between form and the “heat” of genius, “soul” is a force and a fire.   
The way in which theological interests sometimes avail themselves of 
language is perhaps the best illustration of the force I mean to indicate 
generally in literature, by the word soul.  Ardent religious persuasion may 
exist, may make its way, without finding any equivalent heat in language; 
or, again, it may enkindle words to various degrees, and when it really takes 
hold of them doubles its force.  [...] ‘The altar-fire,’ people say, ‘has 
touched those lips.’  (16) 
 
“Soul” is beyond “mind”—a quality that can only be symbolized within transmissible discourse.  
As Pater writes, “soul” “does but suggest what can never be uttered, not as being different from, 
or more obscure than, what actually gets said, but as containing that plenary substance of which 
there is only one phase or facet in what is there expressed”(17). 
 Not only does the opposition between “mind” and “soul” map onto the opposition that 
Pater draws between a Parmenidean physics and a Heraclitean physics, between Thomson’s 
entropic theology and Tyndall’s vitalistic perpetual motion, but the problem of “mind,” as 
articulated by Mansel, is intimately related to nineteenth century discussions of energetics, and to 
the division between an energetics of equilibrium and an energetics of perpetual motion.  
Rigorously following Mansel's quasi-Kantian distinction between reality as it is “conditioned” by 
the a priori laws of mind, and the “unconditioned” reality that exists outside of these laws, 
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Herbert Spencer, in his First Principles, distinguishes between the “Known”—a scene of force 
ruled by the laws of thermodynamics—and the “Unknowable”—the scene of an “Absolute” and 
“Unlimited” force.  It will be through Mansel’s distinction between the “conditioned” and the 
“unconditioned,” which allows Spencer to articulate the “Known” as a symbol of the 
“Unknown”, that Pater understands “soul” as the symbol of the “plenary substance” of subjective 
experience.   
 As I have argued above, Mansel’s quasi-Kantian distinction between reality as it is 
conditioned by the laws of thought, and the Unknowable Absolute that lies beyond these laws, 
structures Spencer’s philosophy of thermodynamics.  While it may be true according to the laws 
of thermodynamics that the universe is proceeding towards a heat death, the scene of the 
Absolute suggests that, beyond these laws, there is a scene of perpetual force.  As Spencer 
writes, our knowledge of force—as ruled by the laws of thermodynamics and tending towards 
heat-death—is merely a symbol of  “the persistence of some Cause which transcends our 
knowledge and conception [...] without beginning or end”(154-5).  As Spencer continues,“it is 
not inferable from the general progress towards equilibrium that a state of universal quiescence 
or death will be reached; but that if a process of reasoning ends in that conclusion, a further 
process of reasoning points to renewals of activity and life”  (431).  The Unknowable becomes 
the scene of an infinite and absolute energy, an energy ruled by neither a law of equilibrium nor 
entropy.     
 Pater’s appeal to Mansel's structure of “mind”—to which Pater opposes “soul” as that 
“plenary substance of which there is only one phase or facet in what is there expressed” (17)—is 
analogous to Spencer’s distinction between the “Known” and the “Unconditioned Cause” (133) 
of an Unknowable “Absolute.”  Just as the Prior Saint-Jean is torn between a formulaic 
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knowledge of reality and the direct experience of an unconditioned world, the problem of style is 
the negotiation of the Known and the Unknowable.  While Flaubert is Pater's “martyr to style,” 
passing beyond “mind” to the elusive quality of “soul,” it is through Prosper Mérimée—who 
Pater understands, in Mansel's terms, as a dogmatic Kantian—that Pater offers an analysis of a 
literature of “mind.”  Mérimée, Pater writes, “this creature of disillusion who had no care for 
half-lights, and, like his creations, had no atmosphere about him, gifted as he was with pure 
mind, with the quality which secures flawless literary structure, had, on the other hand, nothing 
of what we call soul in literature” (37). 
Pater begins his essay on Mérimée with a brief narrative of the historical conditions of 
Mérimée’s life.   
Napoleon, sealing the tomb of the Revolution, had foreclosed many a 
problem, extinguished many a hope, in the sphere of practice.  And the 
mental parallel was drawn by Heine.  In the mental world too a great 
outlook had lately been cut off.  After Kant’s criticism of the mind, its 
pretensions to pass beyond the limits of individual experience seemed as 
dead as those of old French royalty. […] A time of disillusion followed. 
(11) 
 
Since Pater, following Mansel’s and Spencer’s thought, understands that “individual experience” 
is caused by the forces at play in unconditioned reality, it makes sense that he, again following 
Mansel, understands Kant as imposing dogmatic limitations on the human.  Since language, 
knowledge, and etc, deals only with “conditioned thought,” and since experience is 
“unconditioned,” in this Kantian world of disillusionment, each mind is cut off from the next.   
 For Pater, the defining psychological event for Mérimée comes from a story that 
Hippolyte Taine describes in his introductory essay to Mérimée’s Lettres à une Inconnue.  Pater 
writes that, in Mérimée 
a passive ennui […] became a satiric, aggressive, almost angry conviction 
of the littleness of the world around; it was as if man’s fatal limitations 
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constituted a kind of stupidity in him, what the French call bêtise.  
Gossiping friends, indeed, linked what was constitutional in him and in the 
age with an incident of his earliest years.  Corrected for some childish fault, 
in passionate distress, he overhears a half-pitying laugh at his expense, and 
has determined, in a moment, never to again give credit—to be forever on 
his guard, especially against his own instinctive movements. (13-14)   
 
To protect himself from this exposure, he must be, as Taine writes, be “en garde against an 
expansion of feeling, against passion, and enthusiasm, to never deliver himself entirely, but to 
reserve a part of himself as a spectator” (iii).4  Rather than working against “man’s fatal 
limitations,” Mérimée takes advantage of Kant's “criticism of the mind” in order to shelter his 
“instinctive movements” from the world of convention and discourse.  In other words, Mérimée 
works to preserve systems of thought, so sacrifice a dimension of experience to this system.  
What Pater calls Mérimée’s “impersonal” style allows him to retreat from the risk of exposed 
subjectivity to ensure his place within the social world.   
In Colomba, which Pater takes as Mérimée’s exemplary work, a Corsican man, Orso, 
returns to Corsica after having served in the French army.  In his absence, his father has been 
killed by a rival.  Colomba, Orso’s sister, has been waiting for Orso’s return, so that he can 
avenge his father’s murderer, and save the honor of the family.  Yet, after so many years in 
France, he no longer feels bonded to the Corsican codes of honor.  Moreover, he has begun to 
fall in love with an English traveler, who would consider his cold-blooded revenge to be murder.  
He thus has to find a solution that will allow him to navigate these two sets of social codes.  His 
inaction resolves itself when his Corsican enemies, who assume (mistakenly) that he is on route 
to find and kill them, try to ambush him.  They shoot first, wounding him, but he manages to kill 
them both.  According to Corsican code of the blood feud, he has avenged his father’s murder.  
                                                
4  The several translations in the text are my own.  Whenever there is a translation in the text, I cite the 
original in a footnote.  “Être en garde contre l’expansion, l’entraînement et l’enthousiasme, ne jamais se 
livrer tout entier, réserver toujours une part de soi-même comme spectateur.” 
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Yet, according to the ideals of French and English law, he is not guilty of murder, but of self-
defense.  Orso suffers because he is uncertain of his relationship to these various social codes, 
because he exists in excess these laws.  This suffering—a suffering not unlike Prior Saint-Jean’s 
inability to speak the truth of his experience—is, however, not resolved through a grappling with 
the material of language, but through the affirmation of a life of convention. As Pater writes, 
“Colomba, that strange, fanatic being, who has a code of action, of self-respect, a conscience, all 
to herself […] is, in truth, the type of a sort of humanity Mérimée found it pleasant to dream 
of”(28).  Mérimée dreams of a world in which laws of convention can be negotiated, in which 
there is no chance of being duped, of falling victim to a desire, to a scene of experience, that has 
been excluded from the social scene.  Pater continues that Mérimée’s style is “strictly 
conformable—impersonal in its beauty, the perfection of nobody’s style” (37).   The stability of 
social codes, the stability of what Pater calls, in The Renaissance “mere comely form,” allows 
Mérimée to preserve and protect an element of himself, outside of the domain of this strictly 
impersonal style.  In Mansel’s language, and in terms of Pater’s critique of Mérimée’s Kantian 
disillusionment, Mérimée experiences the world only as it is conditioned by the laws of thought.  
He closes himself off, in the novel, from a grappling with the unconditioned quality of subjective 
experience.   
If Mérimée’s prose is impersonal, his letters have an excess of “personality.”  These 
letters “reveal that reserved, sensitive, self-centered nature, a little pusillanimously in the power, 
at the disposition of another” (34).  Pater continues that 
just there lies the interest, the psychological interest, of those letters.  An 
amateur of power, of the spectacle of power and force, followed minutely 
but without sensibility on his part, with a kind of cynic pride rather for the 
mainspring of his method, both of thought and expression, you find him 
here taken by surprise at last, and somewhat humbled, by an unexpected 
force of affection in himself.  His correspondent, unknown but for these 
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letters except just by name, figures in them as, in truth, a being only too 
much like himself, seen from one side; reflects his taciturnity, his 
touchiness, his incredulity except for self-torment.  Agitated, dissatisfied, he 
is wrestling in her with himself, his own difficult qualities.  He demands 
both from her a freedom, a frankness, he would have been the last to grant.  
It is by first thoughts, of course, that what is forcible and effective in human 
nature, the force, therefore, of carnal love, discovers itself; and for her first 
thoughts Mérimée is always pleading, but always complaining that he gets 
only her second thoughts; the thoughts, that is, of a reserved, self-limiting 
nature, well under the yoke of convention, like his own.  (34) 
 
Mérimée’s egotism, protected by the impersonal style of his prose, is exposed in these letters.  
As a “reserved, self-limiting nature, well under the yoke of convention” (34), who has worked to 
protect himself from discourse, he is, here, exposed.  In his letters he is overcome by “an 
unexpected force of affection in himself.”  The “instinctive movements” which Pater argues that 
Mérimée works to repress, take over in the letters, as he is subjected to the element of experience 
excludes from his impersonal style.  A need for love seduces from his position as spectator, 
protected from the vagaries of experience, that he assumes in his prose.  Mérimée is never forced 
to wrestle with the inexpressible, with the “thing too many” which is subjective experience, 
about which, in his impersonal prose, he wants to know nothing.   
 Mérimée's failure, in other words, is that he does not manage to mediate between a scene 
of convention and form, and a scene of experience.  The excess of “personality” in Mérimée's 
letters is the effect of his success in producing a flawless literary style.  In other words, 
Mérimée's perfection of “mind” is his failure to fully commit to style.  The rigor of “mind” 
serves to exclude an element of his experience, and thus allows him to withhold something from 
his literary production, to protect himself against the difficult task of inscribing something of his 
subjective experience, the unknown cause within him, into his art.   
 Pater ends his essay on Mérimée with a gesture towards his reading of Flaubert in 
“Style.”   
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“It has always been my rule to put nothing of myself into my works,” says 
another great master of French prose, Gustave Flaubert; but, luckily as we 
may think, he often failed in thus effacing himself, as he was too was 
aware.  “It has always been my rule to put nothing of myself into my 
works” (to be disinterested in his literary creations, so to speak), “yet I have 
put much of myself into them”:  and where he failed Mérimée succeeded.  
(36) 
 
It is through the conditions of Mérimée’s success in developing an impersonal style that the 
terms of Flaubert’s happy failure become clear.  As it is in Mérimée's letters that Pater reads an 
excess of personality that Mérimée does not work to inscribe in objective discourse, Pater reads 
Flaubert’s love letters as exemplary of this struggle with the material of language. Whereas 
Mérimée letters are “personal,” Flaubert’s letters are “impersonal”; in them he does not demand 
to be loved, but, rather, writes of his “love of form,” of a desire for “a book without external 
attachment, that would support itself through the internal force of its style” (156).5  As Pater 
writes in his review “Correspondance de Gustave Flaubert,” “in contrast with the majority of 
writers” who are “apt to make a false pretense of facility, it is of the labor that Flaubert boasts” 
(78).  As Pater writes, loosely quoting from Flaubert, “We might be all of us, since Sophocles—
well, “tattooed savages!” but still, there was “something else in art beside rectitude of line and 
the well-polished surface” (81).  Pater continues that “we have too many things, too few words.  
’Tis from that comes the torture of the fine literary conscience. […]  The difficulty lay in the 
limitations of language, which it would be the literary artist’s true contention to enlarge”(81).  
Yet if this labor occurs at the limitations of language, these limitations are not overcome, but 
“enlarged.”  Something new is inscribed within a limited system, which is to say that while the 
labor of writing does not aim at the limitless impersonal language of Sebastian von Stork’s 
manuscript, it equally works to overcome the fantasy of a limitless subject, inexpressible, on the 
                                                
5  Flaubert writes of  “…un livre sans attache extérieure, qui se tiendrait de lui-même par la force interne 
de son style.”  
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other side of a limited language.   
If Mérimée’s love letters reveal the degree that Mérimée withholds himself from 
discourse, Pater’s reads the “curious set of letters” (27) that Flaubert writes to “Madame X”—
Louise Colet—while he composes Madame Bovary, as a mark of Flaubert’s commitment to 
discourse.  These are love letters, yet Flaubert writes not of his desire for Colet, but of the labor 
of artistic production.  As Pater writes, 
In his love-letters it is the pains and pleasures of art he insists on, its solaces:  he 
communicates secrets, reproves, encourages, with a view to that.  Whether the 
lady was dissatisfied with such divided or indirect service, the reader is not 
enabled to see; but sees that, on Flaubert’s part at least, a living person could be 
no rival of what was, from first to last, his leading passion, a somewhat solitary 
and exclusive one.  (17-18) 
 
In his letters to Colet, Flaubert describes himself as existing within a field of language. “I am a 
man-quill (un homme-plume).  I feel through it, because of it, with respect to it, and much more 
with it” (161-2).6   As an “homme-plume,” language is both medium and dwelling. As Flaubert 
writes, “ink is my natural element” (248).7  Within this field of language Flaubert is tortured by 
the difficulty of writing, by the labor of choosing the correct words.  This work of writing is 
humiliating and mortifying:  “To discover with every sentence words to change, consonances to 
take out, etc! is an arid labor, fundamentally long and very humiliating.  It’s in doing this that 
those good little interior mortifications happen to you” (191-2).8  In the search for the right word, 
Flaubert writes that, “I obey a higher fate” (172).9 The exigencies of style, the demand for 
                                                
6  Je suis un homme-plume.  Je sens par elle, à cause d’elle, par rapport à elle et beaucoup plus avec elle. 
 
7  l’encre est mon élément naturel 
 
8  Découvrir à toutes les phrases de mots à changer, des consonances à enlever, etc.! est un travail aride, 
long et très humiliant au fond.  C’est là que les bonnes petites mortifications intérieures vous arrivent 
 
9  j’obéis à une fatalité supérieure 
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perfection, arrive from without, from the impersonal, inhuman field of language within which he 
is inscribed.   
 The demands of the field of language paralyze Flaubert.  As Jan Goldstein writes, 
Flaubert, himself, identified his own difficulties as a form of hysteria.  As the hysteric cannot 
speak, Flaubert cannot find the right words and is tortured by the impossibility of expressing that 
which language demands.  Paralyzed within the field of language, Flaubert theorizes the desire 
that sustains his endeavor.  As he writes, to Colet, 
It is to you that my thoughts return when I am lost in my musings; I lay 
there like a tired traveler on the prairie grass that boarders my route.  When 
I wake up, I think of you and, throughout the day, your image appears from 
time to time between the sentences I seek. O my pour sad love, stay with 
me!  I am so empty!  (207) 10 
 
Colet’s image draws him forward through his labor.  As Flaubert writes, “our love is a kind of 
bookmark that I place in advance between the pages, and I dream of arriving there in many 
various ways” (210).11  Colet becomes both the possibility of arriving at an end, and sustenance 
for the labor of writing, a figure of formal completion against which the labor of writing unfolds.  
Colet’s image becomes coincident with a “love of form,” without which he “might have been a 
great mystic” (217).12 
 The mysticism of Flaubert’s “hysteria” becomes an analogue to Prior Saint-Jean’s 
paralysis.  Prior Saint-Jean, tormented by the possibility of arriving at an expression of his 
                                                
10  C’est sur toi que ma pensée revient quand j’ai fait le cercle de mes songeries; je m’étends dessus 
comme un voyageur fatigué sur l’herbe de la prairie que borde sa route.  Quand je m’éveile, je pense à toi 
et ton image, dans le jour, apparît de temps à autre entre les phrases que je cherche.  O mon pauvre amour 
triste, reste-moi!  Je suis si vide! 
 
11  Notre amour, par là, est une espèce de signet que je place d’avance entre les pages, et je rêve d’y être 
arrivé de toutes façons. 
 
12  Sans l’amour de la forme, j’eusse été peut-être un grand mystique. 
 
  73 
experience, is unable to overcome the temptation of mysticism.  Unable to overcome his 
attachment to the possibility of a language in which his experience would be named, he is driven 
mad by an ideal of form.  Flaubert’s “love of form,” an engagement with the limitations of 
language, transforms this ideal into a practice, as, in taking up a pen, he gives up a mystical 
ideal, and turns to the labor of writing.     
  It is worth noting a subtle, but important difference between Pater's reading of Flaubert, 
and Derrida's reading of Flaubert in Force and Signification.   
“Not enough forms…,” said Flaubert.  How is he to be understood?  Does 
he wish to celebrate the other of form?  The “too many things” which 
exceed and resist form?  In praise of Dionysus?  One is certain that this is 
not so.  Flaubert, on the contrary, is sighing, “Alas! not enough forms.”  A 
religion of the work as form. (29) 
 
Whereas the notion of “force” that Derrida locates is generated by the texture of differences 
within language itself, the problem of “not enough forms” in Pater's historical context, returns us 
to the problem of energetics.  The tension, for Pater, is not quite an opposition between form and 
that which resists and exceeds form, a figure of Dionysian excess.  It is rather, for Pater, the 
distinction between two scenes of force, one governed by the mathematical signifier, by logic 
and coherence, the other an experience of nature that is not mediated by the signifier, and where 
a perpetual motion of forces, uniting in zones of intensity, produce, in their friction, a flame of 
experience.   
 Pater's solution, which he hints at in the odd logic of his description of Leonardo Da 
Vinci's “strange variation of the alchemist's dream, to discover the secret, not of an elixir to make 
man's natural life immortal, but of giving immortality to the subtlest and most delicate effects of 
painting” (68), is that the process of artistic production is, itself, the exposure to this scene of 
forces, a commitment to “untutored experience.”  If Pater understands the “fatal limitation” of 
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man as fact of a division between the communicative language of the social scene, and a mode of 
qualitative intransmissible experience, that it is only be emigrating, as it were, to the world of 
letters that this problem can be resolved.  For it is only when experience becomes an experience 
in language—when language becomes the scene of “vital forces unite in their purest energy” 
(152)—that a trace of this experience might be inscribed in language.  If Mérimée, as a master of 
“mind” holds something in reserve in his articulation of a flawless structure, then Flaubert, who 
is a “martyr to style” commits to a confrontation with the impossibility of integral transmission.  
“Soul may repel us”(Style, 25) not just because one might be repelled by the specific “plenary 
substance” that soul symbolizes, but because, in the quality of “soul” one encounters the problem 
of subjective experience, and the difficulty of translation.  Whereas a literature of mind makes 
this impasse disappear, a literature of soul frames this impasse, foregrounding the experience of a 
struggle with language.  The fact of the authors struggle with the task of translating experience 
becomes a motive force—a heat—within the literary object, a heat that has effects within the 
reader’s body, throwing the reader into contact with the problem of his or her own subjective 
experience.    
The scene of thermodynamics, in which Pater finds a tension between a Heraclitean flux 
and the Parmenidean “One,” between the infinite and unknowable movement of forces and 
phenomena and the entropic return to a state of mathematical equilibrium, allows Pater to 
theorize the problem of aesthetic experience.  The science of energy is, for Pater, not only an 
investigation of the logic of the material world, but the scene of the experience and of ethics, the 
metapsychological terrain that the author and aesthetic critic must negotiate.  
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   The Moralist’s Brain:  James, Wilde, and Stein 
 
 For Pater, the structure of energetics, and the tension between a thermodynamics of 
perpetual motion and a thermodynamics governed by principles of equilibrium and entropy, is 
primarily an affair of metaphysics. While the potential of literary style is that one could make a 
space for subjective experience within objective discourse, the Paternian subject is continually 
tempted to enforce the division between experience and discourse.  Whereas Sebastian von 
Stork, like Prosper Mérimée, works to produce a literary world in which there is no room for 
subjectivity, the Prior Saint-Jean finds himself in a mystical isolation, unable to communicate his 
experience.  While the failure to negotiate this divide results in madness and death, this unhappy 
ending is brought about by a theoretical position, by a philosophical inflexibility that cuts off the 
subject from discourse.   
 In turning to readings of William and Henry James, Oscar Wilde, and Gertrude Stein, I 
argue that this same formal division, between subjective excess and discursive control, comes to 
inhabit the material body.  In these texts, the problem of energetics, which is for Pater a 
description of two metaphysical positions, gears into the body, as the nervous system is either 
considered as a disorganized chaos of impulses, or as a well ordered system in a state of 
equilibrium.  William James understands the nervous system as undergoing constant shifts of 
energetic equilibrium, as it produces new ideas, desires, and ambitions.  While the nervous 
system begins in a state of relative chaos, the moral subject is able to bring this chaos into 
control, and to impose order on the disorder of the brain.  The “sensualist,” in contrast, is at the 
mercy of his nervous system.  
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Both Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, and Gertrude Stein’s “Melanctha” 
respond to this understanding of the brain as a system of energies and energies.  In his The 
Tragic Muse, Henry James offers an ethics of a disinterested aestheticist mastery of experience, 
which largely agrees with William James’s notion of the disinterested moral subject.  In 
parodying certain aspects of The Tragic Muse, Wilde offers a response to William James’s 
notion of mastery.  While James argues that the moralist is able to bring the his habits and 
impulses under his control, in Dorian Gray’s failure to master his desires, Wilde suggests that it 
is impossible to identify a locus of consciousness outside of experience—which is an central 
elements of William James’s ethics.  The tragedy of Dorian’s transformed visage becomes a kind 
of reductio ad absurdum argument against James position:  whereas James assumes that the 
moralist can preserve a position of consciousness outside of experience, Dorian ascribes to this 
position, and gives himself entirely to a search for new sensations.  Yet rather than remain 
unaffected by his experiences, Dorian is horribly transformed.  
Stein’s “Melanctha” does not merely critique James’s position, but rather reverses 
James’s valorizations of the moralist and the sensualist.  Stein argues that the moralist, who 
works to impose equilibrium on the energetic excess of the brain, falsifies the truth of the 
desiring body.  By elevating the disorganized and excessive body into an aesthetic object, 
“Melanctha” fully inverts the terms of James’s psychology.   
 
I. William James and the Psychology of Energy 
  
The great innovation of William James’s psychology comes in his position that there is 
no distinction between the impression, as a discrete base unit of experience, and habit.   James 
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argues that the a central problem that empiricist thought has faced is that of how to build general 
concepts up out of the particular units of experience.  
[O]rdinary empiricism […] has always shown a tendency to do away with 
the connections of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions.  Berkeley’s 
nominalism, Hume’s statement that whatever things we distinguish are as 
“loose and separate’ as if they had ‘no manner of connection,’ James Mill’s 
denial that similars have anything ‘really’ in common, the resolution of the 
causal tie into habitual sequence, John Mill’s account of both physical 
things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities, and the 
general pulverization of all experience by association and the mind-dust 
theory, are examples of what I mean. (Essays in Radical Empiricism, 43) 
 
The skeptical threat that inheres in empiricism, in the “bewildering accidents of so much finite 
experience” (Pragmatism, 292) has, James proposes, driven thought to the comfort of a dogmatic 
rationalism that proposes “a universe where we can just give up, fall on our father’s neck, and be 
absorbed into the absolute life as a drop of water melts into the river or the sea” (Pragmatism, 
292).  I have argued that Pater understands the impression as an epiphenomenon of a scene of 
unknown natural forces.  James takes aim at this tradition, coming from Mansel and Spenser, 
writing that “celebrating the mystery of the Unknowable and the 'awe' which we should feel at 
having such a principle to take final charge of our perplexities” is “but spiritual chloroform” 
(Principles, 179).  In other words, for James, empirical thought is at an impasse.  Either the 
impression is elevated as a discrete unit of experience, and it becomes impossible to imagine 
how one can build a world of experience, or experience is, itself, referred to the scene of the 
“Unknowable.” 
James offers his “radical empiricism” as a solution to this impasse by declaring that “any 
kind of relation experienced must be accounted as ‘real’ as anything else in the system” (Essays 
in Radical Empiricism, 42).  Whereas empiricism has tended to find an opposition between habit 
and the impression, taken as a base unit of experience, James takes habit as internal to the 
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impression.  Impressions, as the base unit of empiricism, are no longer conceived as separate, 
disjunct, quanta of experience, but, rather, as habitually experienced relationships.   
Yet James’s ‘radical’ solution introduces a second problem.  If skepticism can be avoided 
by making habit the base unit of experience, then it seems that all human activity, based on habit, 
would be reduced to the automatic repetition of habitual associations. However, James argues 
that, rather than confine us to repetition and reduce us to automatons, it is through habit that 
voluntary action becomes possible. As Liesl Olson writes, glossing James’s position, “according 
to James, habits are ways in which individuals make choices based on their own practical 
experience, not on some higher ideology or abstract design” (330).  The question, however, of 
how an individual can be capable of making a choice, rather than always being determined, is a 
central concern of James’s ethics.  On the one hand, James’s notion habit allows him to articulate 
a philosophy of immanence, where knowledge occurs within the tissue of experience.  Yet on the 
other, in the problem of decision, where, as Olson puts it, “individuals make choices,” James 
introduces a principle that is, itself, irreducible to habitual association.  
I have spoken as if our attention were wholly determined by neural 
conditions.  I believe that the array of things we can attend to is so 
determined.  No object can catch our attention except by the neural 
machinery.  But the amount of the attention which an object receives after it 
has caught our mental eye is another question.  (Briefer Course, 104) 
 
While the range of possible objects is determined by neural conditions—by habitual webs of 
association—the drama of voluntary life depends upon a free quality, “a spiritual force” (Briefer 
Course 104) that allows the subject to direct his attention between the various possibilities that 
appear within the “neural machinery.”  
James understands both the structure of the “neural machinery” that presents objects to 
attention, and the function of the “spiritual force” that controls attention, in terms of the 
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equilibrium of an energetic system.  The relation expressed through habit, as James's base unit of 
experience—the associative pattern within which experience appears—is understood as a 
relation within circuits of energy.  Energy, that is, becomes the immanent term, for James, 
through which these relationships are understood. As James writes, “the term energy doesn't 
even pretend to stand for anything 'objective'.  It is only a way of measuring the surface of 
phenomena so as to string their changes on a simple formula” (Principles, 103).  Energetics 
becomes, for James, the privileged metaphor for understanding both neurophysiology and the 
relationship of this physiological system to the conscious subject.  As Sergio Franzese writes, of 
James's use of the language of energy, 
“In the psychological use we find a nervous (neural) energy and a spiritual 
energy, referring both to the inner core of the self and to the intensity of 
muscular or mental action:  the problematic phenomenon of effort of 
attention, as well as any overcoming of difficulties, obstacles, or 
hindrances, physical or moral, is an expression of energy.  Habit and self-
control are regarded as potential, or stored, or saved energy” (164). 
 
James thus understands the problem of human perception, emotion, through the model of 
habitual circuits of energy inscribed within the neural apparatus.  For James, human psychology 
can be understood as a problem of energy precisely because the human brain is a system 
governed by laws of energetic equilibrium.   
The human, for James, differs from animals in that multiple associative patterns—or said 
differently, multiple habitual tendencies—exist within the human brain.  As James writes, the 
fact of these competing tendencies introduces instability into the human.   
But what are now the defects of the nervous system in those animals whose 
consciousness seems most highly developed?  Chief among them must be 
instability.  The cerebral hemispheres are the characteristically 'high' nerve-
centres, and we saw how indeterminate and unforeseeable their 
performances were in comparison with those of the basal ganglia and the 
cord.  But this very vagueness constitutes their advantage.  They allow their 
possessor to adapt his conduct to the minutest alterations in the environing 
  80 
circumstances, any one of which may be for him a sign, suggesting distant 
motives more powerful than any present solicitations of sense.  (Principles, 
139) 
 
For a lower animal, the brain is a stable structure:  both the animal’s attention and activity are 
determined by a simple neurological representation of the environment.  The human, however, is 
attuned to subtle signs, which may refer him to other situations, to other complexes of memories, 
habits and desires that do not immediately appear in the environment, but which are symbolically 
represented in the environment.  The human thus experiences a wandering state of attention; the 
environment does not suggest a single mode of action, a single object of attention, but rather a 
myriad of unstable alternatives, of possible habitual responses, each vying for the subject’s 
attention.   
When James speaks of what it means to occupy a specific habit, he again uses the 
language of energetics. 
My soul stands now planted in what once was for it a practically unreal 
object, and speaks from it as from its proper habitat and centre [...].  What 
brings such changes about is the way in which emotional excitement alters.  
Things hot and vital to us to-day are cold to-morrow.  It is as if seen from 
the hot parts of the field that the other parts appear to us, and from these hot 
parts personal desire and volition make their sallies.  They are in short the 
centres of our dynamic energy, whereas the cold parts leave us indifferent 
and passive in proportion to their coldness. 
  Whether such language be rigorously exact is for the present of no 
importance.  It is exact enough, if you recognize from your own experience 
the facts which I seek to designate by it. Now there may be a great 
oscillation in the emotional interest, and the hot places may shift before one 
almost as rapidly as the sparks that run through burnt-up paper.  (Varieties, 
196) 
 
In other words, within the unstable neural system, multiple centers of energy compete for 
dominance.  James proposes to call “the group of ideas to which he devotes himself, and from 
which he works, […] the habitual centre of his personal energy” (196).  If two potential centers 
compete to be the “habitual centre” of energy, then the self becomes “wavering and divided” 
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(196).  Consciousness has the goal both of bringing equilibrium to the instability of the neural 
system, and of motivating shifts in equilibrium that allow for the adoption of new ideas.  It is 
consciousness, in other words, that is responsible for managing instability in order to bring about 
shifts in equilibrium.   
In the end we fall back on the hackneyed symbolism of a mechanical 
equilibrium. A mind is a system of ideas, each with the excitement it 
arouses, and with tendencies impulsive and inhibitive, which mutually 
check or reinforce one another.  The collection of ideas alters by subtraction 
or by addition in the course of experience, and the tendencies alter as the 
organism gets more aged.  A mental system may be undermined or 
weakened by this interstitial alteration just as a building is, and yet for a 
time keep upright by dead habit.  But a new perception, a sudden emotional 
shock, or an occasion which lays bare the organic alteration, will make the 
whole fabric fall together; and then the centre of gravity sinks into an 
attitude more stable, for the new ideas that reach the centre in the 
rearrangement seem now to be locked there, and the new structure remains 
permanent. 
Formed associations of ideas and habits are usually factors of 
retardation in such changes of equilibrium.  (Varieties, 197) 
 
It is in choosing between these various habits, these competing centers of dynamical energy, that 
the problem of consciousness arises.  As James writes, “the mind is at every stage a theater of 
simultaneous possibilities.  Consciousness consists in the comparison of these with each other, 
the selection of some, and the suppression of the rest by the reinforcing and inhibiting agency of 
Attention” (Essays on Psychology, 51).   
 In suggesting that we understand the instability of the energetic system which is the 
human mind as a “theatre of possibilities,” before which a disinterested consciousness can exert 
a spiritual force, William James appeals to the terms of a then current debate over whether an 
actor should remain cold, and detached from, the emotions he portrays—a position advocated by 
the French actor Constant Coquelin—or whether he should give himself over to the emotions of 
the role—a position advocated by the Scottish author William Archer.  The question of the actor 
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will become important for James as he works to understand how it is that consciousness might 
choose between the various responses represented in the “theatre of possibilities.”  Coquelin’s 
position, which is derived from Denis Diderot’s The Paradox of Acting, suggests that there in 
another factor, beyond affective response, involved in consciousness.  
In Coquelin’s 1880 treatise on acting (the translation of which begins with an 
introduction written by Henry James), Coquelin writes that  
The theatrical world is divided into two opposing camps in regard to the 
question whether the actor should partake of the passions of his part,—
weep himself in order to draw tears,—or whether he should remain master 
of himself through the most impassioned and violent action on the part of 
the character which he represents; in a word, remain unmoved himself, the 
more surely to move others, which forms the famous paradox of Diderot.  
(55-56) 
 
Diderot’s paradox proposes that the actor “must have in himself an unmoved and disinterested 
onlooker” (Diderot, 14).  This unmoved onlooker is the constant observer of the actor’s own 
voice.  “At the moment that he touches your heart he is listening to his own voice; his talent 
depends not, as you think, upon feeling, but upon rendering so exactly the outward signs of 
feeling, that you fall into the trap”(Diderot, 19).  Coquelin writes that “I hold this paradox to be 
the literal truth” (57).  The emotions are, for Coquelin, nothing but “material to be utilized” (61), 
and the relationship between an actor and his emotions are “as separate a thing as the painter and 
his canvas” (56). Diderot’s paradox holds that the actor possesses a “dual consciousness.”  The 
actor must at once act as poet, as the unmoved mover who pulls the strings, and as the puppet 
who gives the outward show of emotions.  Coquelin continues that “it is from within that he 
moves the springs which make his character express the whole gamut of human consciousness; 
and all these springs, which are his nerves, he must hold in hand, and play on as best as he can” 
(57).  
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In his arching history of acting theory, at the center of which is Diderot’s Paradox, 
Joseph Roach writes that  
it is helpful to note that Diderot’s formulation of dual consciousness 
demonstrates the inappropriateness of attempts to identify his psychology of 
the actor with William James’s theory of emotion.  James, it will be 
recalled, rejected the separation of the mental experience of an emotion 
from its physiological symptoms, while advancing the related proposition 
that “any voluntary arousal of the so-called manifestations of a special 
emotion ought to give us the emotion itself.”  By contrast, Diderot identified 
the separation of manifestation from the mental experience as the measure 
of an actor’s art […].  This freedom of mind, a calm at the center that 
persists despite whatever paroxysms the body suffers outwardly, constitutes, 
in the argument of the Paradoxe, the sine qua non of great acting.  (148) 
 
As Roach argues, James’ description of the emotions seems to be at odds with Diderot’s 
paradox.  And yet William James’s ethics, as much as Diderot’s paradox, depends upon a 
mastery of the emotions.  If for James, as Roach suggests, the experience of an emotion follows 
from the physiological manifestation of an emotion, then James’s ethical stance depends upon 
locating a moment of consciousness, however brief, outside of the rule of emotions.  
However, when James considers Diderot’s Paradox as potential evidence against his 
theory of the emotions, he does not oppose himself to Diderot, but rather uses Diderot's Paradox 
to articulate the existence of a “spiritual force” that will allow one to choose between possible 
centers of “personal energy.” 
If our theory be true, a necessary corollary of it ought to be this:  that any 
voluntary and cold-blooded arousal of the so-called manifestations of a 
special emotion ought to give us the emotion itself.  Now this (the objection 
says) is not found to be the case.  An actor can perfectly simulate an 
emotion and yet be inwardly cold; and we can all pretend to cry and not feel 
grief; and feign laughter without being amused.  (113) 
 
 To orient himself within this ‘objection,’ James places himself between Coquelin, as 
representative of Diderot’s paradox, and William Archer’s Masks or Faces, which relies upon a 
statistical survey of actors to demonstrate that, contra Diderot, actors do, indeed, feel the 
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emotions they represent.   James explains this “discrepancy amongst actors” by supposing that 
“The visceral and organic part of the expression can be suppressed in some men, but not in 
others, and on this it is probably that the chief part of the felt emotion depends.  Coquelin and the 
other actors who are inwardly cold are probably able to effect the dissociation in a complete 
way” (116).  James suggests that certain physiological changes are more important for the 
experience of an emotion than are others.  Some actors—like Coquelin—can suppress the 
visceral component of an emotion, while embodying the superficial form of an emotion.   
 For both Coquelin and Archer, James suggests, there is a divide between a subject 
capable of willing an emotion, and a subject who experiences the emotion.  Archer, that is, 
suggest that there exists a temporal split between the subject who wills the emotion, and the 
subject who experiences the emotion, between the emotionally unaffected subject who wills a 
change in his physiognomy, and the subject who experiences the change in physiognomy.  
Coquelin, in contrast, suggests a logical split between the willing subject and the emotional 
subject, where the willing subject is the unmoved mover, the emotional subject, that which is 
moved.  James collapses the difference between Archer and Coquelin, to propose that it does not 
matter whether one is, or is not, affected by the change in physiognomy, but rather whether one 
is “at home” in the moment of willing, or, rather, in the moment of emotion.  
Coquelin writes that “the artist’s brain must remain free, and all emotions, even his own, 
must expire on the threshold of his thought” (58).  The result is that the actor evidences a 
“mutual independence of head and heart” (59).  Offering an example of this ‘professional’ 
attitude towards experience Coquelin writes, of the actor Talma, that 
It is said that when he learned of the death of his father, he uttered a 
piercing cry; so piercing, so heartfelt, that the artist always on the alert in 
the man, instantly took note of it, and decided to make use of it upon the 
stage, later on.  This characteristic trait shows us the artist looking down 
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upon his own emotions and studying them, as it were from a superior plane, 
yielding to them that he might store them up for future use and reference.  
(59) 
 
From this “superior plane,” the actor is able to experience emotions, and then use them to attain 
certain effects.  The actor, who is able to observe and use emotional responses without being 
filled with passion—for “the natural effect of passion is to destroy all self-government” (61)—
acts as “master and monarch of all of humanity within him” (60).  He “needs not to be actually 
moved.”  He is, rather, the unmoved mover, a divine king, who, as exception to the law of 
emotion, is able to reign over emotion.  In James’s terminology, Coquelin is able to effortlessly 
control shifts in the equilibrium of his mind.   
James begins the chapter “The Divided Self, and the Process of its Unification” from The 
Varieties of Religious Experience with a version of the same story. 
“Homo duplex, homo duplex!” writes Alphonse Daudet.  “The first 
time that I perceived that I was two was at the death of my brother Henri, 
when my father cried out so dramatically, ‘He is dead, he is dead!”  While 
my first self wept, my second self thought, ‘How truly given was that cry, 
how fine it would be at the theatre.”  I was then fourteen years old.   
“This horrible duality has often given me matter for reflection.  Oh, 
this terrible second me, always seated whilst the other is on foot, acting, 
living, suffering, bestirring itself.  This second me that I have never been 
able to intoxicate, to make shed tears, or put to sleep.  And how it sees into 
things, and how it mocks.” (141) 
 
This “horrible duality” must be unified, yet it is important, James suggests, that the unity be the 
unity of a hierarchically ordered system, not a unity that resolves the impasse between these two 
selves.  As James continues, “[t]he higher and the lower feelings, the useful and the erring 
impulses, begin by being a comparative chaos within us—they must end by forming a stable 
system of functions in right subordination”(143).   For James, that is, the dysfunctional subject, 
the subject haunted by mocking voices, who gives into impulses, resembles nothing so much as a 
bad actor.  In his chapter on the will, James gives the example of an incarcerated alcoholic who 
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cuts off his own hand, knowing that the warden will give him a drink to stop the pain.  This is a 
man ruled by emotion, who is unable to assume a disinterested position.  Likewise, in Alphonse 
Daudet’s story, the problem is not the fact that the self is divided, but that Daudet identifies with 
the emotion, rather than with the disinterested voice of the second self.  The subject is divided, in 
other words, because within the unstable neural system of the human, different centers compete 
for attention.  While Coquelin is able to effortlessly manage shifts in equilibrium, identifying 
with a disinterested voice, Daudet, like the immoral and weak alcoholic, identifies with an 
emotional response, even as he continues to hear the mocking, disinterested voice of the second 
self.  Rather than identify with the cold, super-egoic voice, the voice becomes a mark of division, 
as the sensualist’s attention continues to be directed by his affective response.   
Following his discussion of the role of emotion in actors, James turns to consider the role 
of the emotions in aesthetic appreciation.  He wonders, following Ruskin, why it often seems that 
the people most unsuited to true religious feeling often seem to have an emotional response to 
works of art, while people of religious feeling often have no emotional response.  James writes 
that  
in every art, in every science, there is the keen perception of certain 
relations being right or not, and there is the emotional flush and thrill 
consequent thereupon.  And these are two things, not one.  In the former of 
them it is that experts and masters are at home.  The latter accompaniments 
are bodily commotions that they may hardly feel, but that may be 
experienced in their fullness by cretins and philistines in whom the critical 
judgment is at its lowest ebb.  (122) 
 
The notion that one could either be “at home” in judgment, or in the emotional flush, again, 
effectively effaces the distinction between Archer and Coquelin. Even though some actors, we 
might say, are unable to fully disassociate the capacity for judgment from an emotional response, 
the master locates himself—is “at home”—in the judgment of correct relationships, rather than in 
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the emotional response that may arise, as a secondary reaction.  It is only, in other words, 
“cretins and philistines” who are limited to an emotional response.  The threat of an emotion that 
cannot be understood, of an experience that that is outside of the subject’s understanding, is kept 
at bay in this discourse of mastery.  
Within this theatre, the subject can either be guided by an ideal, or by propensities. James 
writes that if “we class all springs of action as propensities on the one hand and ideals on the 
other” it becomes clear that “the sensualist never says of his behavior that it results from a 
victory over his ideals, but the moralist always speaks of his as a victory over his propensities” 
(549).  
The sensualist uses terms of inactivity, says he forgets his ideals, is deaf to 
duty, and so forth; which terms seem to imply that the ideal motives per se 
can be annulled without energy or effort, and that the strongest mere 
traction lies in the line of the propensities.  The ideal impulse appears, in 
comparison with this, a still small voice which must be artificially 
reinforced to prevail […].The [ideal impulse] is made great by the presence 
of a great antagonist to overcome.  And if a brief definition of ideal or 
moral action were required, none could be given which would better fit the 
appearances than this:  It is action in the line of the greatest resistance.   
(Principles, 549) 
 
As Carlson writes, for James “moral action requires the subordination of certain sensual desires 
to the demands of a higher ideal and entails effort to overcome the motives provided by ordinary 
pleasures and pains” (376).  
When a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole turns up its 
dark abysses to our view, then the worthless ones among us lose their hold 
on the situation altogether, and either escape from its difficulties by 
averting their attention, or if they cannot do that, collapse into yielding 
masses of plaintiveness and fear.  The effort required for facing and 
consenting to such objects is beyond their power to make.  But the heroic 
mind does differently.  (Briefer Course, 326) 
 
While to be ruled by ordinary pleasures and pains is to attend to the easiest object, the ethical 
choice is to oppose the habitual—automatic—determination of action by attending to difficult 
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object.  For James, freedom of will depends upon a formal distinction:  the subject who is ruled 
by habits chooses based upon his interests while the ethical subject chooses in opposition to his 
emotional interests.  Where the sensualist, who forgets his ideals, identifies with the “heat” of an 
emotional response, the moralist, touched by the “corpse-like finger of “Reason” and inspired by  
“still small voice” remains cold, dispassionately removed from the various centers of habitual 
energy that he takes as possible objects.  
 
II. Heroic Saints and Disgusting Bodies 
 
While the sensualist, like an animal, responds to his environment, it is the saint who is 
able to respond to things that are “unseen.”  James writes that “the saintly character is the 
character for which spiritual emotions are the center of the personal energy” (VRE, 204), and that 
“the most inimical critic of the saintly impulses whom I know is Nietzsche.  He contrasts them 
with the worldly passions as we find these embodied in the predaceous military character, 
altogether to the advantage of the latter” (VRE, 272).    
Dislike of the saintly nature seems to be a negative result of the biologically 
useful instinct of welcoming leadership, and glorifying the chief of the tribe.  
The chief is the potential, if not the actual tyrant, the masterful, 
overpowering man of prey.  We confess our inferiority and grovel before 
him.  We quail under his glance, and are at the same time proud of owning 
so dangerous a lord.  Such instinctive and submissive hero-worship must 
have been indispensable in primeval life.  In the endless wars of those 
times, leaders were absolutely needed for the tribe's survival.  If there were 
any tribes who owned no leaders, they can have left no issue to narrate their 
doom.  The leaders always had good consciences, for conscience in them 
coalesced with will, and those who looked on their face were as much 
smitten with wonder at their freedom from inner restraint as with awe at the 
energy of their outward performances.  
Compared with these beaked and taloned graspers of the world, 
saints are herbivorous animals, tame and harmless barn-yard poultry.  They 
are saints whose beard you may, if you ever care to, pull with impunity.  
  89 
(VRE, 272) 
 
James’s genealogy serves two distinct purposes.  On the one hand, James suggests that the 
Nietzchean “beaked and taloned graspers” served a purpose in the days of tribal warfare, but 
perhaps no longer.  As James writes, “From the biological point of view, St. Paul was a failure, 
because he was beheaded.  Yet he was magnificently adapted to the larger environment of 
history” (Varieties, 367), a larger environment in which, as Franzese writes, “the Nietzschean 
“strong man” would be harmful and dangerous” (196).  While James gives an evolutionary 
critique of the Nietzschean “hero,” he equally offers a new interpretation of heroic life.  
James’s view instead is that all excesses tend to be vicious and, according to 
the layman's ethical perspective, a healthier energetic equilibrium is more 
advantageous and ethically correct for our ordinary life.  The well-balanced 
distribution of one's own interests, leading to a proportionate development 
of the self, is more advantageous for most lives than a life full of 
idiosyncratic bursts of overflowing energy.  (Franzese, 187) 
 
While Nietzsche's “hero” acts on these “bursts of overflowing energy,” James’s “hero” has 
something more of the saint in him.  The Nietzschean hero, given to “idiosyncratic bursts of 
overflowing energy” might have been an important type in the tribal history of humanity, but is 
now the disorganized tyrant, or sensualist.  For James, the “heroic” mind is precisely the mind 
that is able to establish an equilibrium of energies.     
While Gilles Deleuze does not understand Nietzsche as framing an argument between a 
“strong man” and a “saint,” he does, like James, understand him as opposing “well-balanced” 
“energetic equilibrium” to “bursts of overflowing energy.”  In his reading of Nietzsche, Deleuze 
writes that while “Nietzsche understood physical science, the energetics and thermodynamics of 
his time [...] it is now clear that he dreamt of a fire machine completely different from the steam 
engine”(30).  Whereas the steam engine is governed by the laws of thermodynamics, the “Fire 
Machine,” would seem to be a kind of inexhaustible engine ungoverned by, and always in excess 
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of, the laws of thermodynamics.  The terms of the disagreement between James and Nietzsche 
are clear:  whereas James takes the side of an intellectual equilibrium against the excesses of the 
body, Nietzsche takes the side of the body against an intellectual equilibrium.   
In 1910 Henry Adams, who had taught medieval history at Harvard, published a book 
entitled A Letter to Teachers of History, in which he argued that history should be understood in 
terms of the second law of thermodynamics.  “In 1852, Thomson contented himself by saying 
that a restoration of energy is ‘probably’ never effected by organized matter. In 1910, there is 
nothing ‘probable’ about it; the fact has become an axiom of biology”(201).  While “In 1852, 
any University professor would have answered” the proposal that society functions according to 
the laws of thermodynamics with the “dry remark that society was not an organism and that 
history was not a science, since it could not be treated mathematically”(201).  However, he 
proposes, for the modern university professor, “if the entire universe, in every variety of active 
energy organic and inorganic, human or divine, is to be treated as clock-work that is running 
down, society can hardly go on ignoring the fact forever”(203).  
 In a letter to Adams, in June of 1910, James takes issue with Adams’s claim that one can 
identify the tendency of human history with the entropic heat death of the universe.  While the 
end of the universe is irrelevant to human history, James suggests the goal of humanity can be 
understood as a certain state of equilibrium.   It is not the quantity of energy in the universe that 
is important for human history, but its distribution.   
I protest against your interpretation of some of the specifications of the 
great statistical drift downwards of the original high level energy. 
[…] 
To begin with, the AMOUNT of cosmic energy it costs to buy a 
certain distribution of fact which humanly we regard as precious, seems to 
be an altogether secondary matter as regards the question of history and 
progress. Certain arrangements of matter on THE SAME ENERGY-
LEVEL are, from the point of view of man's appreciation, superior, while 
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others are inferior. 
[...] 
The 'second law' is wholly irrelevant to 'history,' save that it sets a 
terminus; for history is the course of things before that terminus, and all that 
the second laws says is that, whatever the history, it must insert itself 
between that initial maximum and that terminal minimum of difference in 
energy level.  As the great irrigation-reservoir empties itself, the whole 
question for US is that of the distribution of its effects—of WHICH rills to 
guide it into; and the size of the rills has nothing to do with their 
significance.  Human cerebration is the most important rill we know of, and 
both the 'capacity' and the 'intensity' factor thereof may be treated as 
infinitesimal.  Yet the filling of such rills would be cheaply bought by the 
waste of whole sums spent in getting a little of the down-flowing torrent to 
enter them.  Just so of human institutions; their value has in strict theory 
nothing whatever to do with their energy-budget—being wholly a question 
of the form the energy flows through.  Though the ULTIMATE state of the 
universe may be its vital and psychical extinction, there is nothing in 
physics to interfere with the hypothesis that the PENULTIMATE state 
might be the millennium—in other words a state in which a minimum of 
difference of energy-level might have its exchanges so skillfully canalizes 
that a maximum of happy and virtuous consciousness would be the only 
result.  In short, the last expiring pulsation of the universe's life might be, 'I 
am so happy and perfect that I can stand it no longer.' You don't believe this 
and I don't say I do.  But I can find nothing in 'Energetik' to conflict with its 
possibility.  You seem to me not to discriminate, but to treat quantity and 
distribution of energy as if they formed a single question.” (Letter W.J. To 
H. Adams, June 17, 1910) 
 
The ethics of energy that James puts forward is almost identical to William Thomson's ethics of 
energy.  As for Thomson, who proposes that “the directional flow of energy through space 
offered human beings the opportunity of directing, though not restoring, those mighty gifts of the 
Creator” (Smith, 101), James writes that “as the great irrigation-reservoir empties itself, the 
whole question for US is that of the distribution of its effects—of WHICH rills to guide it into.”  
As in his neural ethics, human must manage an “instability” within the “'high' nerve-centres” 
(Principles, 139), effecting “changes of equilibrium” (Varieties, 197) in order to achieve a state 
of virtue and happiness.  Regardless of whether the end of history is the equilibrium of 
thermodynamic heat death, the “millennium” is, itself, understood as a certain balanced 
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distribution of energy.   
In his The Vicious Circle, Pierre Klossowski reads Nietzsche as torn between the fact of 
his body, as a scene of disorganized energies, and a scene of consciousness.  As Klossowski 
writes, “all evil and suffering are the result of the quarrel between the body's multiplicity, with 
its millions of vague impulses, and the interpretive stubbornness of the meaning bestowed on it” 
(33).  Whereas for James, the goal of humanity is to bring equilibrium to an unstable system, 
Nietzsche takes the side of excess, of a “chaos of impulses,” against the equilibrium of a 
balanced system. 
Nietzsche experienced this dissolving confrontation between somatic and 
spiritual forces for a long time, and he observed it passionately.  The more 
he listened to his body, the more he came to distrust the person the body 
supports.  His obsessive fear of suicide, born out of the despair that his 
atrocious migraines would never be cured, amounted to a condemnation of 
the body in the name of the person being diminished by it.  But the thought 
that he had not yet finished his life's work gave him the fortitude to side 
with the body.  If the body is presently in pain, if the brain is sending 
nothing but distress signals, it is because a language is trying to make itself 
heard at the price of reason.  A suspicion, a hatred, a rage against his own 
consciousness and reasonable person was born.  This person—fashioned by 
a particular epoch, in a familial milieu he increasingly abhorred—is not 
what he wanted to conserve.  He would destroy the person out of a love for 
the nervous system he knew he had been gifted with, and in which he took a 
certain pride.  By studying the reactions of his nervous system, he would 
come to conceive of himself in a different manner than he had previously 
known—and indeed, in a manner that will perhaps never again be known.  
Consequently, he developed a mode of intelligence which he wanted to 
submit to exclusively physical criteria.  He not only interpreted suffering as 
energy, but willed it to be so.  Physical suffering would be livable only 
insofar as it was closely connected to joy, insofar as it developed a 
voluptuous lucidity:  either it would extinguish all possible thought, or it 
would reach the delirium of thought.  (Vicious Circle, 24-5) 
 
As for James, the conflict is between the person and the nervous system, between the body, and 
the consciousness the body supports.  Whereas for James these “millions of vague impulses” 
must be brought under the control of a “meaning,” for Nietzsche the horizon of thought is 
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precisely the cultivation of these impulses, supported by the conviction that these impulses 
themselves signify:  from within the impulses and energies consciousness perceives that “a 
language”—a language of the body—“is trying to make itself heard at the price of 
reason”(Vicious Circle, 24).   
Winfried Menninghaus suggests that we should understand the relationship between the 
“person” and “the body that supports it” is terms of disgust.  Disgust, in other words, is the 
person's disgust for the body.  As Menninghaus writes, quoting liberally from a series of 
Nietzsche’s untranslated notebooks,  
Aesthetic judgment—this at least Nietzsche's opinion in the Gay Science—
makes no demands; rather, it promises something—and indeed bestows it.  
In contrast, moral judgment subsumes aesthetic distinctions to the demands 
issuing from the position of 'truth':  'The beautiful, the disgusting, etc. is the 
older judgment.  As soon as it is appropriate by absolute truth, the aesthetic 
judgment is inverted into moralistic demand.”  Then “the aesthetically 
offensive quality of the inner man without his skin—bloody pulp, fecal 
bowels, entrails”—leads to the imperative of exclusion: “Hence away with 
it in thought.” In this case, the aesthetic judgment of the body shifts into a 
“prejudgment” of it: “All excretions disgusting...disgust increasing with 
refinement.  The functions linked to this also disgusting.”  Placing moral 
demands on the body thus institutes shame and disgust at one's own 
physical nature. (156) 
 
Nietzsche and James agree, it would seem, on the relationship of moral judgment to the body.  
For both, moral judgment is opposed to the physical nature of the body. As James writes, the 
characteristic “instability”(Principles, 139) of the “nervous system” is a “defect” of the higher 
animals. As James continues, “[t]he higher and the lower feelings, the useful and the erring 
impulses, begin by being a comparative chaos within us—they must end by forming a stable 
system of functions in right subordination”(143).  The moral man brings a hierarchical order to 
the chaos of the impulses.  Whereas James takes the side of moral judgment against the chaos of 
the impulses, Nietzsche, appealing to aesthetic judgment, takes the side of the body, of the 
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disgusting inner man, against the moralism of the ideal.    
 
III. James, Wilde, Stein, and the Aesthetics of the Decomposing Body 
 
 In what follows, I turn to a constellation of literary texts, which I will argue all respond to 
William James’s description of the nervous system as a thermodynamic system.   The nervous 
system is either understood as a system that is brought into equilibrium by the moral ideal, or 
which exerts itself as a disorganized chaos.  As in the terms of Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, 
the nervous system is either a “fire machine” or a “steam engine”(30), it is either the perpetual 
motion of a energy that is always in excess of control, or a system regulated by laws of 
equilibrium.   
In his The Tragic Muse, Henry James, like his brother, proposes an ethics of mastery, 
based on the self-control of the actor who ascribes to Diderot’s Paradox.  Like William James, 
Henry James proposes a heroic position that overcomes the disorganization of the sensualist.  
Oscar Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray, which was written just after The Tragic Muse was 
published, offers a complex parody of the ethics of mastery that Henry James puts forward.  
While both Henry and William James argue that the heroic mind can dispassionately master 
habits and impulses, Dorian Gray loses himself to the habits that he is unable to master.  In terms 
of Menninghaus’s reading of Nietzsche, The Picture of Dorian Gray offers a parody of the 
equivalence of moral purity and aesthetic beauty.  Wilde develops the problematic of a disgust 
for the “inner man,” where the moral demand of aesthetic beauty results in the grotesque face, 
stained with Dorian's sin, which fills Dorian with shame and disgust.  The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, however, stops short of developing a true aesthetic of the disorganized and disgusting 
  95 
body.  The horrifying transformation of Dorian’s magical portrait does not function to elevate the 
disorganized “inner man” as an aesthetic object, but rather to critique a notion of moral mastery 
that Wilde finds in Henry James.  It is in Gertrude Stein’s “Melanctha,” which I will argue 
directly responds to William James’s ethics of mastery, that the disorganized body is developed 
as not merely a critique, but as an aesthetic body in its own right, turning the failure of an ethics 
of mastery, and the body that this failure produces, into the basis for a certain modernist 
aesthetic.   
The Tragic Muse opens as Nick Dormer has “come to a crisis.”  Nick’s father had held a 
seat in parliament.  After his father’s death, Nick briefly held, and then lost, this seat, and he now 
lives in Paris where he pursues a dilettantish career as a painter, searching for a Paternian “unity 
of art” which aims at “quickening sensibility” (19).   The crisis comes when Mr. Pinks, who won 
the seat in the general elections, dies.  Julia Dallow, Nick’s love interest, wants Nick to stand, 
and, along with his father’s friend, Mr. Carteret, they are prepared to supply him with sufficient 
financial backing.  Nick’s mother and sister, who are quickly running out of money, depend upon 
Nick to stand, for if he stands he will become doubly wealthy: not only is Julia Dallow rich, but 
Mr. Carteret, who thinks of Nick as the son he does not have, will make Nick his heir if Nick 
becomes a successful politician.  Just before hearing the news of Mr. Pinks’ death, Nick meets 
Gabriel Nash, an Oxford aesthete who has taken Miriam Rooth, an aspiring actress, under his 
wing.  Nick is, thus, faced with a dilemma:  Will he take on a political career, the career expected 
of him Julia Dallow, Mr. Carteret, and his mother, or will he follow the artistic path laid out by 
Gabriel Nash and Miriam Rooth?  
For James, of course, this is a clear ethical choice.  To develop the ground of certainty 
upon which this choice will proceed, James appeals to the artistic development of Miriam Rooth.  
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An ethics, that is, emerges out of the structure of the actor’s consciousness.  Miriam Rooth, who 
aspires to be the “English Rachel,” is modeled after Rachel, the celebrated actress of the French 
Comedy who, as Rachel Brownstein writes, was “in the history of the European theatre […] the 
first international dramatic star”(4).  Under the tutelage of the aged and retired actress Madame 
Carré, who ascribes to Diderot’s theory of the actor’s divided consciousness, Miriam will 
become a star of the modern stage. 
 In an 1887 essay introducing Coquelin to the American stage, Henry James writes that 
Coquelin  
is a master whom one watches very much as one watches some supreme 
dancer or trickster on the vertiginous tense wire feeling him as certain to 
pile danger high as not to risk his neck by excess.  This safe playing with 
the danger of excess—which is a defiance of the loss of balance under 
exhilaration—connects itself with the actor’s command of the effects that 
lie entirely in self-possession, effects of low tone, indications of inward 
things.  (12) 
 
It is in these terms that James introduces Madame Carré.   
 
The old actress presented herself to a casual glance as a red-faced woman in 
a wig, with beady eyes, a hooked nose, and pretty hands; but Nick Dormer, 
who has a perception of physiognomy, speedily observed that these free 
characteristics included a great deal of delicate detail—an eyebrow, a 
nostril, a flitting of expressions, as if a multitude of little facial wires were 
pulled from within.  (82) 
 
In the language of Diderot’s double consciousness, Madame Carré seems a puppet controlled 
from some secret internal locus.  Madame Carré is initially aghast at Miriam’s performance, and 
proclaims that “I didn’t perceive in what she did a single nuance, a single inflection or intention” 
(93).  However, she makes clear that natural talent is not important for the development of the 
actor.  Against the claim of natural talent, Madame Carré appeals to Rachel.  Rachel is 
the very instance that proved her point—a talent embodying one or two 
primary aids, a voice and an eye, but essentially formed by work, 
unremitting and ferocious work.  ‘I don’t care a straw for your handsome 
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girls,’ she said: ‘but bring me one who is ready to drudge the tenth part of 
the way Rachel drudged, and I’ll forgive her her beauty.  (92-93) 
 
The actor’s ability to occupy a position outside of experience is not due to some special 
physiognomic constitution, but, rather, to hard work.  The split in consciousness that allows one 
to master emotion, to turn life into performance, inheres in any subject, waiting to be cultivated.  
Thus it is that Miriam, through hard work, manages, over the course of the novel, to attain the 
control of expression and emotion that allows her to become the “English Rachel.”  
While Gabriel Nash downplays the importance of the theater in his hierarchy of the arts, 
James’s aesthete, like Carré, Rachel, and Miriam, possesses the double consciousness of the 
actor.  It is through Nash that Diderot’s actor’s aesthetic sensibility becomes a both a theory of 
consciousness and an ethic in the novel.  Since the successful actor depends upon the cultivation 
of a double consciousness, it is a specific relationship between intention and material, rather than 
the kind of material product, which characterizes an artistic temperament.  As Coquelin writes, 
“creation is one thing; durability another.  Marble is more lasting than canvas, verses more 
enduring than marble, but time devours them all” (51).  Thus emotions, while fleeting, are, for 
Coquelin, “material to be utilized” (61). This redefinition of the relationship between mastery 
and material defines the field within which the aesthete will appear.  At the uncomfortable first 
meeting between Nick’s fiancé, Julia Dallow, and Gabriel Nash, Dallow asks Nash if he is an 
artist. 
‘I try to be,’ Nash replied, smiling; ‘but I work in such a difficult 
material.’ 
He spoke this with such a clever suggestion of unexpected reference 
that, in spite of herself, Mrs. Dallow said after him— 
‘Difficult material?’ 
‘I work in life!’  (106) 
 
Gabriel Nash’s seeming withdrawal from life, his refusal to identify with the materials that are 
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being used—in the terms of Diderot’s Paradox, a refusal to identify with the emotions that are 
portrayed—is his assumption of a position from which any experience can become an object, a 
material, in which the subject can work.  The aesthete does not care about production, but, rather, 
about assuming a structural position.   
Julia Dallow wants to marry the next prime minister, and is worried that that, since Nick 
is only standing because she wants him to, he will have no great success.  Nick agrees that he is 
doing what others expect from him, but insists that he is on ethically stable ground to take others’ 
desires as his own.   
‘It isn’t only for you,’ he argued gently; ‘you’re a great deal, but you’re not 
everything.  Innumerable vows and pledges repose upon my head.  I’m 
inextricably committed and dedicated.  I was brought up in the temple; my 
father was a high priest and I’m a child of the Lord. And then the life 
itself—when you speak of it I feel stirred to my depths:  it’s like a herald’s 
trumpet.  Fight with me, Julia—not against me!  Be on my side, and we 
shall do everything.  It is fascinating, to be a great man before the people—
to be loved by them, to be followed by them.  An artist isn’t—never, never.  
Why should he be?  Don’t forget how clever I am.’   (298) 
 
Nick continues that his desire for a political career is, in part, motivated by a fear of his mother: 
“she represents infinite possibilities of disappointment and distress.  She represents all my 
father’s as well as all her own; and in them my father tragically lives again” (298).  Nick insists 
that his desire to be loved by others, to win social approval, is a legitimate factor upon which to 
make decisions.  Yet Julia is unconvinced.   
It is ultimately Gabriel Nash who becomes the spokesperson for duty.   When Nick tells 
Nash that he is considering becoming a politician in order to satisfy social demand, Nash 
reprimands Nick “for grossness of immorality” (266), and asks if Nick can “recognize in any 
degree the elevated idea of duty?” (265).  Nick is surprised that Nash appeals to duty, for “duty is 
doing and I inferred that you think rather poorly of doing—that it spoils one’s style.”  Nash 
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responds that “doing” is only a failure is one does “wrong.”  He then offers a “cannon of 
certainty” through which one might know what ones correct duty would be.  Nash continues that 
“we must recognize our particular form, the instrument that each of us—each of us who carries 
anything—carries in his being.  Mastering the instrument, learning to play it in perfection—
that’s what I call duty, what I call conduct, what I call success” (266).  “Duty,” for Diderot’s, and 
Coquelin’s, actor, is mastery of material.  Since the material presented to Nick is his ability to 
paint—Nash remarks that his instrument, his ability to paint, is “a regular Stradivarius!”(267)—
Nick’s duty, his imperative, is to master his instrument.  The instrument one masters is 
irrelevant; the ethical subject is simply the subject who masters.   
When Dorian Gray proposes, in a passage that echoes Coquelin's manual on acting, that 
“it is only shallow people who require years to get rid of an emotion,” Wilde seems to take aim 
at James’s notion of aesthetic mastery.  As Dorian continues, “a man who is master of himself 
can end a sorrow as easily as he can invent a pleasure.  I don't want to be at the mercy of my 
emotions.  I want to use them, to enjoy them, and to dominate them” (89).  In these terms, the 
continual transformation of the portrait of Dorian reveals Dorian's failure, for while he claims to 
dominate the emotions that traverse him, the portrait becomes the evidence that he is indeed at 
the mercy of his emotions, dominated by his enjoyment.  In his Tame Passions of Wilde, Jeff 
Nunakawa writes that Wilde does not work to attain “the seizing of desire but rather a vision of it 
softening, not a subject strong enough to control his passions, but rather species of passion that, 
by their very nature, are slight enough to be good as managed”(28).  The Portrait of Dorian 
Gray, in its grotesque parody of the ethics of mastery that James puts forward in The Tragic 
Muse, suggests, likewise, that the passions that emerge “from cell to cell”(Wilde, 141) in the 
human brain cannot be mastered; all one can hope is that these passions remain benign, slight 
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enough to leave the aesthetic subject intact.  Wilde's dual critique of Pater and James takes us to 
a scene of neural energies, of habits that are inscribed in the material substrate of the human 
mind.   
For Pater, the problem involves neither the mastery of emotion, nor the “softening of 
desire.”  This problem does not emerge for Pater, because he opposes the specificity of 
subjective experience to the muting of this specificity through habit.  As he writes in the 
“Conclusion” to The Renaissance, “it might be said that our failure is to form habits: for, after 
all, habit is relative to a stereotyped world, and meantime it is only the roughness of the eye that 
makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike” (152).  In The Picture of Dorian Gray, 
Dorian, likewise, searches for a mode of experience outside of habit.  Jut as Pater insists that “the 
theory or idea or system which requires of us the sacrifice of any part of this experience, in 
consideration of some interest into which we cannot enter, or some abstract theory we have not 
identified with ourselves, or of what is only conventional, has no real claim on us” (153), Dorian 
“never fell into the error of arresting his intellectual development by any formal acceptance of 
creed of system” (Wilde, 106).  
Wilde suggests that the world of “stereotyped habits” is precisely a “flameless” world.  
He narrates the experience of waking in the middle of the night, and taking account of silent 
bedroom.   
The flameless tapers stand where we had left them, and beside them lies the 
half-cut book that we had been studying, or the wired flower that we had 
worn at the ball, or the letter that we had been afraid to read, or that we had 
read too often.  Nothing seems to us changed.  Out of the unreal shadows of 
the night comes back the real life that we had known.  We have to resume it 
where we had left off, and there steals over us a terrible sense of the 
necessity for the continuance of energy in the same wearisome round of 
stereotyped habits, or a wild longing, it may be, that our eyelids might open 
some  morning upon a world that had been refashioned anew in the 
darkness for our pleasure, a world in which things would have fresh shapes 
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and colours, have little or no place, or survive, at any rate, in no conscious 
form of obligation or regret, the remembrance even of joy having its 
bitterness and the memories of pleasure their pain.  (Wilde, 105) 
 
Wilde, that is, here suggests the opposition between the “flameless” world, where energy 
continues in the same “wearisome round of stereotyped habits,” and the dream of a world that is 
fresh, without history or regret.  This “flameless” world has been leached of color precisely 
through repetition:  the book has been studied, the wire flower too often considered, and the 
letter is a reminder of social convention.  In the opening pages of the novel, Dorian considers a 
laburnum tree, “whose tremulous branches seemed hardly able to bear the burden of a beauty so 
flame-like as theirs” (Wilde, 18).  The poisonous flowers of the laburnum tree present the 
temptation and lure of forbidden fruit, at once irresistible and deadly.  As John Paul Riquelme 
writes, one element of Wilde's critique of Pater involves a shift in the valence of Pater's metaphor 
of the “flame” of experience.   
Dorian's flame-like experiences as a child and later are painful or even 
infernal, not ecstatic in the way that Pater's “Conclusion” suggests. Wilde's 
references to flame evoke Pater, but the implications have been reversed. In 
Picture, it is not the flame of art and passion that we choose as our future.  
Instead, flames of an unpleasant kind have already made us what we are.  
The flame and its passionate intensity are destructive in Wilde, rather than 
being the salvation from destruction or a consolation for it.  (621-2) 
 
For Pater, as I have suggested, the opposition between the scene of the “flame of experience” and 
a world structured by “abstract theory” or convention carries a certain risk—as suggested for 
example by the Prior’s madness in “Apollo of Picardy”—if it is not managed through a specific 
literary ethic that arises out of the impasse between these two scenes.  Wilde suggests, in The 
Picture of Dorian Gray, that not only is the search for new experience deadly, but that it is 
deadly precisely because of the Paternian assumption of a border between experience, which 
Pater sees as registering a scene of perpetual and chaotic motion of impulses, and convention, 
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which Pater reads as a scene of equilibrium and balance, does not hold.   
The novel, that is, while narrating the Paternian search for experience unburdened by 
convention or history, works to show that not only is this search deadly, but that the terms of the 
search, in the opposition between experience and habit, are themselves flawed, for the search for 
“fresh shapes and colours” (Wilde, 105) is itself motivated by circuits of neural energy that are 
themselves indistinguishable from convention or habit.  As Lord Henry says to Dorian, “Life is 
not governed by will or intention.  Life is a question of nerves, and fibres, and slowly built-up 
cells in which thought hides itself and passion has its dreams” (162).  If Dorian is, as Lord Henry 
says, “a perfect type” (162), it is not because he turns away from habit, but because he gives 
himself over to the passions, thoughts, and habits that emerge out of the circuits of energy at 
work in Dorian's brain.    
When Dorian's search for experience without history drives him to an opium den, his 
intellect becomes a kind of epiphenomenal translation of circuits of energy that take form in the 
cells of his brain.   
It is said that passion makes one think in a circle.  Certainly with hideous 
iteration the bitten lips of Doran Gray shaped and reshaped those subtle 
words that dealt with souls and sense, till he had found in them the full 
expression, as it were, of his mood, and justified, by intellectual approval, 
passions that without such justification would still have dominated his 
temper.  From cell to cell of his brain crept the one thought; and the wild 
desire to life, most terrible of all man's appetites, quickened into force 
each trembling nerve and fibre.  (141) 
 
Rather than an escape from repetitive experiences and habitual actions, the language of “souls 
and sense,”—the language, presumably, of the flame-like laburnum—is itself the manifestation 
of a kind of neuronal habit.  Not only does the search for an alternative to a “flameless” world of 
stereotyped forms lead Dorian into progressively destructive habits, but the search for experience 
is itself motivated by something that repeats in the cellular structure of Dorian's brain.  There are, 
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at most, different scenes of habit; “the continuance of energy in the same wearisome round of 
stereotyped habits” (Wilde, 105) describes both the colorless world of convention, and Dorian's 
search for new experience.   
This collapse of the distinction between the language of “flameless” convention and the 
“flame” of experience becomes central to Dorian's failed romance with the Sibyl Vane, the 
talented actress who loses her ability to act once she experiences a true emotion through her love 
of Dorian.  While Pater opposes the “flame” of experience to stereotyped experience that “that 
makes any two persons, things, situations, seem alike” (152), the actor is precisely she who is 
able to represent the same stereotyped emotion on command, she who can represent without 
being touched by the emotion.  When Sibyl experiences the “reality” of her love for Dorian, the 
imitations and repetitions of the theatre become subject, for her, to the same kind of critique that 
Dorian, and Pater, offer of the sterile world of stereotyped repetition.    
“Dorian, Dorian,” she cried, “before I knew you, acting was the one reality 
of my life.  It was only in the theatre that I lived.  I thought that it was all 
true.  I was Rosalind one night, and Portia the other.  The joy of Beatrice 
was my joy, and the sorrows of Cordelia were mine also.  I believed in 
everything.  The common people who acted with me seemed to me to be 
godlike.  The painted scenes were my world. I knew nothing but shadows, 
and I thought them real.  You came—oh, my beautiful love!--and you freed 
my soul from prison.  You taught me what reality really is.  To-night, for 
the first time in my life, I saw through the hollowness, the sham, the 
silliness of the empty pageant in which I had always played.  To-night, for 
the first time, I became conscious that the Romeo was hideous, and old, and 
painted, that the moonlight in the orchard was false, that the scenery was 
vulgar, and that the words I had to speak were unreal, were not my words, 
were not what I wanted to say.  You had brought me something higher, 
something of which all art is but a reflection.  (75) 
 
In terms of a Paternian rhetoric of the impression, it would seem that Sibyl sees through the 
“hollowness” of theatrical repetition precisely because she is exposed to an experience that is 
uncontaminated by habit. Yet Wilde understands this supposed opposition between real love and 
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its semblance as precisely the domain of melodrama.  Her affair does not deliver her from the 
theater, but rather serves to make her life, itself, theatrical.   When Sibyl's brother, James, is 
worried that an affair with Dorian will ruin her life, Sibyl reacts by telling him that he seems 
“like one of the heroes of those silly melodramas mother used to be so fond of acting in” (63).    
James is about to leave London and is anxious that he will no longer be able to watch 
over Sibyl.  He therefore confronts his mother with his suspicions about her own extramarital 
affair with his and Sibyl's father, in order to remind her of the stakes of Sibyl's actions.  His 
mother is horrified not at the fact of the question, but rather at its staging: “The situation had not 
been gradually led up to.  It was crude.  It reminded her of a bad rehearsal”(64).  Her response—
that James’s and Sibyl’s father was a “highly connected” (64) gentleman who failed to provide 
for them—motivates James to vow revenge if his sister is treated in a similar manner: “and 
believe me that if this man wrongs my sister, I will find out who he is, track him down, and kill 
him like a dog.  I swear it”(65).  Yet rather than hear this speech as compelling to action, Sibyl's 
mother is taken with the theatrical pathos of James’s threat. 
The exaggerated folly of the threat, the passionate gesture that accompanied 
it, the mad melodramatic words, made life seem more vivid to her.  She was 
familiar with the atmosphere.  She breathed more freely, and for the first 
time for many months she really admired her son.  She would have liked to 
have continued the scene on the same emotional scale, but he cut her short.  
Trunks had to be carried down, and mufflers looked for.  The lodging-house 
drudge bustled in and out.  There was the bargaining with the cabman.  The 
moment was lost in vulgar details.  It was with a renewed feeling of 
disappointment that she waved the tattered lace handkerchief from the 
window, as her son drove away.  She was conscious that a great opportunity 
had been wasted.  She consoled herself by telling Sibyl how desolate she 
felt her life would be, now that she had only one child to look after.  She 
remembered the phrase.  It had pleased her. Of the threat she said nothing.  
It was vividly and dramatically expressed.  She felt that would all laugh at it 
some day.  (65) 
 
James's threat excites her not because of its sincerity, but because it is such a convincing 
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imitation of a stereotyped dramatic scene.  There is only the opposition between experience that 
is worthy of the stage, and the “vulgar details” of life.   
Dorian, in turn, takes the same theatrical attitude toward his affair with Sibyl.  When 
Sibyl, cast aside by Dorian, collapses, he thinks that “Sibyl Vane seemed to be absurdly 
melodramatic” (76).  After she commits suicide, in an act of melodramatic excess, Dorian is—
like Sibyl's mother in the scene with James—thrilled by the dramatic force of the incident:  
“How extraordinarily dramatic life is!  If I had read all this in a book, Harry, I think I would have 
wept over it.  Somehow, now that it has happened actually, and to me, it seems far too wonderful 
for tears”(83).  Dorian's tragedy comes not as he turns away from habit towards the qualitative 
experience of his own impressions, but as he embraces repetition, as he gives himself over habit.  
Whereas James argues that habit can be mastered, that the impulses can be brought into a state of 
equilibrium, Wilde suggests that the energies of the human, forming circuits that run from “cell 
to cell” through the brain, are always out of control.  Any attempt to control these emotions, to 
exert an intellectual position that is not affected by emotion and desire is mere hubris and 
hypocrisy.     
 
III. Neurology, Will, and the Jewish Question 
 
When William James distinguishing between the “cretins and philistines” who offer an 
emotional response—among whom James would surely place Dorian—and the heroic minded 
moralist, he evoke Matthew Arnold’s language of cultural evaluation.  Matthew Arnold suggests 
that the movement of history is a dialectic of Hellenism and Hebraism, and that both tendencies 
contribute to the progress of humanity.  And yet, as Arnold writes, “Hellenism is of Indo-
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European growth, Hebraism is of Semitic growth; and we English, a nation of Indo-European 
stock, seem to belong naturally to the movement of Hellenism” (95).  Jonathan Freedman writes 
that Arnold associates the “middle class, Protestant spirit with the Hebraic” (46), and suggests 
that Arnold is chiefly concerned with restoring a Hellenism to an England dominated by Hebraic 
tendencies.  For Arnold, the philistine pride in “the number of the railroads he has built, or the 
bigness of the Tabernacle he has built” (Arnold, 44), and the “bondage to machinery” (50), 
through which the “best self” (64) is hidden under the tyranny of our “everyday selves” become 
forms of the Hebraic obedience that the Hellenic spirit must overcome.  The question of freedom 
and culture does not have anything to do with the question of whether one is (following Jewish 
law), or is not (following Christian law), allowed to marry one's deceased wife's sister—a 
question of perpetual parliamentary debate in Victorian England—but rather with a Hellenic 
overcoming of this bondage.   
Yet at the same time that the “Hebraic” constitutes a bondage to “machinery,” the Jew, as 
unassimilable alien, becomes a figure of resistance to Hebraism.  As Freedman writes,  
when Arnold shifts from the language of the Hebrew and the Hellene to that 
of class—whose divisions he describes as those between Philistines, 
Barbarians, and populace—he also discerns the lineaments of a new class, a 
classless class, a class wholly devoted to the idea of culture rather than their 
own personal or partisan interests.  (47)   
 
Arnold describes this new class in a language that Freedman suggests emerges from the problem 
of Jewish assimilation.  Arnold writes that “when we speak of ourselves as divided into the 
Barbarians, Philistine, and Populace, we must be understood always to imply that within each of 
these classes there are a certain number of aliens, if we may call them so.”  This original figure 
for the alienated intellectual depends upon an association with the Jew, “that paradigmatic 
outsider in Europe’s new cultural dispensation” (47).  The Jew not only serves to give body to a 
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topography of the alien within, but, as Freedman notes, “Jews work typologically in order to 
establish a genealogy for Arnold himself:  his description of Heine as failed poet chimes with 
Arnold’s vision of his own poetic failures, and delineation of Spinoza’s expulsion from his own 
community eloquently glosses Arnold’s own cultural position vis-à-vis insular, “Hebraic” 
England of the nineteenth century” (47). Freedman continues that “the career of the Jew is not 
only that of the alien within, indistinguishable subversive of the cultural dominant, but that of the 
alien who stands in opposition to all forms of cultural inhibition and social power, the alien who 
affirms his alienness as the very ground of his being” (48).   
A central moment in this identification comes, for Freedman, in Arnold’s sonnets, written 
in 1863, on the occasion of Rachel’s death.  Arnold begins his third sonnet to Rachel by 
proclaiming that Rachel “Springs from the blood of Israel’s scattered race.”  Precisely because 
her home is a “scattered race,” Rachel is able to move through any number of cultures. 
Ah, not the radiant spirit of Greece alone 
She had—one power, which made her breast its home! 
In her, like us, there clashed contending powers, 
 
Germany, France, Christ, Modes, Athens, Rome, 
The strife, the  mixture, in her soul are ours, 
Her genius and her glory are her own.  (Poems, 485) 
 
Because of her identity as alien, Rachel possesses a “genius” that is “all her own,” and is 
protected from identifying with “clashed contending powers” through which she moves.   
Rachel's Hellenic spirit comes from the fact that she is Jewish.  Henry James seems to draw the 
same conclusion, that aesthetic mastery is somehow related to “Israel’s scattered race,” in that 
Miriam Rooth, the model for a disinterested ethical stance in The Tragic Muse, is born “Roth.”    
Through his characterization of the moralist, who responds to the “still small voice” of 
the “ideal impulse” to reconstitute the body as a new Israel, William James participates in this 
  108 
tradition. The “still small voice” of the ideal impulse, a phrase that James repeats throughout the 
chapter on will, comes from The King James Bible.  In “The Book of Kings,” Ahab, the king of 
Israel, has married a foreign woman, Jezebel, who turns him away from the true God to worship 
Baal.  Elijah, the one prophet who remains true, returns to Israel from his hiding in the desert, to 
prove to Israel and Ahab that Baal is a false God.  After Elijah performs miracles, and kills the 
priests of Baal, Jezebel threatens Elijah, and Elijah, frightened, runs to the desert to pray for his 
own death.   Elijah is then instructed, in a dream, to go out and meet God.  Elijah is met first by 
an earthquake, as a show of God’s power, “And after the earthquake a fire; but the LORD was 
not in the fire: and after the fire a still small voice” (1 Kings 19:12).  This voice instructs Elijah 
to appoint new kings and prophets, and to orchestrate a slaughter of all in Israel who have ever 
followed Baal, so that only 7,000 faithful will live (1 Kings 19:17-18).  The “still small voice” 
reconstitutes Israel by making war on the foreign element within it, by separating those who 
belong from those who do not.  In James, the “still small voice” is the locus of a spiritual force, 
irreducible to “neural conditions” (Briefer Course, 104), which allows the subject to choose 
which object, that appears within the “neural machinery” (Briefer Course, 104), will receive 
attention.  To continue James's metaphor, just as Elijah is responsible for bringing Israel in line 
with God, by killing the unfaithful, the heroic minded moralist is responsible for bringing the 
neural system into a correct hierarchical order, by dispassionately choosing which habits to 
include, and which to exclude, within a new, and superior, state of energetic equilibrium. 
 
IV.  Gertrude Stein's Israel 
 
Whereas Henry James seems to adhere to William James ethics of Energy, and for 
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Dorian the tragedy is that he tries to master these impulses, Gertrude stein will privilege the 
disorganized body of impulses.  In James’s appeal to the “still small voice” of the ideal impulse, 
James identifies the sovereign will with Israel, which, through the inclusion of some elements 
and the exclusion of others, forms the boundaries of the nation.  In contrast, Stein’s Israel is that 
which has been arbitrarily excluded.   In an essay she wrote at Radcliff, “The Modern Jew who 
has given up the faith of his fathers can reasonably and consistently stand for isolation,” Stein 
argues that even for the modern, secular Jew, assimilation is provisional.  Stein writes that “[a] 
Jew admitted into the society of Gentiles is admitted on sufferance only.  As long as they like 
him personally all is well, but the instant he does aught that is blameworthy, swiftly comes 
approbation, not only to the man, but to his race”(427).  The Jewish nation provides the answer 
to this problem, for while “it is a degradation to be forced into isolation or to be suffered to 
escape from it, […] it is a noble and worthy attitude, to embrace isolation and make the race felt 
as a great and noble power, ever working towards the highest and noblest in the vanguard of 
nations” (427).  The paradox of the Jews as a “chosen people […] without a chooser” (426) is 
resolved: the Jewish people are not chosen by a chooser, but by their exclusion and—
involuntary—isolation.   
While the Jewish nation is an excess that cannot be integrated into Gentile society, pride 
in isolation is not an attempt to compensate for a failure of assimilation.  Stein returns to God’s 
blessing of Abraham, to show that the isolation of the Jewish people is the basis of what is noble 
in the Jewish race. 
God said to Abraham, “I am the almighty God; walk before me and be thou 
perfect and thou shalt be the father of many nations.” It was this feeling of a 
great destiny in the sense of being a great power, a nation standing by itself, 
ethical, civilizing, blessing other nations but apart from them.  These ideas 
were at the basis of the formation of the Jewish race, not a nation formed to 
disseminate a particular creed or type of worship, but a nation to stand 
  110 
apart, to be with nations but not of them, to be ever in the fore-front of 
progress and enlightenment but not to mingle with others. (425) 
 
Rather than a voice that tells Israel who to exclude in order to form a cohesive nation, Stein reads 
God’s command as one to stand apart, to accept isolation. God’s voice becomes, for the secular 
Jew, a myth that explains the idea, “at the basis of the formation of the Jewish race,” that the 
Jewish nation will take itself as that which is excluded from the system of nation states.   
While Stein was a lifelong opponent of Zionism, her understanding of the relationship 
between the Jewish nation and other nations relies upon terms that emerge through the Zionist 
debate. In the 1881 proto-Zionist pamphlet, “Auto-Emancipation:  An Appeal to His People by a 
Russian Jew,” published anonymously in German, Leo Pinsker addressed a growing resentment 
among the European Jewry over the failure of assimilation, and established a theoretical terrain 
that would prove important in the Zionist movement.  Pinsker writes that   
the essence of the problem, as we see it, lies in the fact that, in the midst of 
the nations among whom the Jews reside, they form a distinctive element 
which cannot be assimilated, which cannot be readily digested by any 
nation.  Hence the problem is to find means of so adjusting the relations of 
this exclusive element to the whole body of the nations that there shall 
never be any further basis for the Jewish question.  (193) 
 
Pinsker continues that “The fact that, as it seems, we can mix with the nations only in the 
smallest proportions, presents a further obstacle to the establishment of amicable relations.  
Therefore, we must see to it that the surplus of Jews, the unassimilable residue, is removed and 
provided for elsewhere” (193) through the establishment of “a home, if not a country of our 
own” (193).  Pinsker understands the relationship between a system of nations—Europe—and 
the unassimilable excess—the Jews—through a digestive metaphor that seems to locate the 
problem of “surplus,” of “unassimilable residuum” as a structural given.   
Whereas James places his heroic mind on the side of an assimilating will that constitutes 
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the moral subject, Stein identifies with an unassimilable surplus, constituted by its exclusion 
from the system of nation states.   Through an emphasis on racial identity, Stein opposes herself 
to a Zionism that, by making the Jewish nation a nation like any other nation, does away with the 
position of the Jews as “unassimilable residue.”  It is through the figure of a racialized body that 
Stein preserves this position, through a racialized Jewish identity that she identifies with the 
exception, rather than with a figure of assimilating will. 
Maria Farland notes that while critics often “stress Stein’s scientific work with William 
James as a catalyst for the representational strategies” (120) she would use in her literary career, 
“Stein’s work with James was a relatively minor episode in her scientific career, whereas her 
medical training spanned some five years” (120).  Stein studied with William James at Harvard, 
before going to medical school at Johns Hopkins, where, in 1897, she was in the first class to 
admit women.  At Hopkins, as Farland writes, the “neurologist Lewellys Barker assigned her the 
task of studying the nucleus of Darkeschwitsch of an infant brain, later incorporating her 
drawings and descriptions into his lengthy neurological textbook, The Nervous System (1899)” 
(121).  Stein spent four years drawing a deep neural structure within the ocular motor system of 
the infant brain, a structure so complexly related to other sections of the brain that Barker offers 
only speculation about how neural pathways connect it to the brain, and which, a hundred and 
ten years later, has not been fully mapped.  Farland continues that Stein's work both in “the realm 
of experimental science and later in the realm of experimental literature would require that she 
shift her self-representation away from the conception that traits like abstraction inhere in the 
anatomical body toward a new emphasis on the function of those traits in the disembodied mind 
and in consciousness” (143).  It is perhaps important to add that while for James there is a 
structure—modeled on “dual consciousness” of the actor and appealing to the metaphor of Israel 
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as elevated above other peoples—that provides a capacity for abstraction and brings these traits 
under a transcendental control, within the neurological milieu in which Stein worked, there are 
no clear answers for how “traits like abstraction inhere in the anatomical body.”  The mapping of 
the brain remained a tentative technical exploration of a body whose complexity exceeded the 
limits of scientific knowledge.  The identification with Israel as excluded from the assimilating 
system of nation states will become an identification with the unknown impulses and 
excitements of the brain, excluded by, and in excess of, James’s “heroic” will. 
I will suggest that we can read Stein's early novella Q.E.D., which Stein revised as the 
“Melanctha” section of Three Lives, as taking up a version of Arnold's dialectic of Hebraism and 
Hellenism, where the Hellenic spirit, as a search for an ideal self, becomes associated with 
James’s heroic will, which is able to assume a position of disinterested judgment before 
experience.  Whereas both Arnold and James understand Israel as a model for this disinterested 
position, Stein understands the exclusion of the Jew as a point of resistance to the heroic will.  
While James quips that “the sensualist never says of his behavior that it results from a victory 
over his ideals, but the moralist always speaks of his as a victory over his propensities”(549), I 
want to suggest that we can read Stein as offering a “victory over [...] ideals.”  This is not, for 
Stein, a defense of “sensualism,” but rather an argument that aesthetic value lies in the unknown 
processes that cause the human, rather than in the mastery of these processes in the name of an 
ideal.   
In Q.E.D., the Jewish Adele makes light of the Anglo-Saxon Helen’s heroic tendencies, 
proclaiming that “not being myself of an heroic breed, I don’t somehow realize that type much 
outside of storybooks” (220). Not only does a disagreement over the value of heroism mark the 
failure of Adele’s and Helen’s relationship, but Stein’s use of names in Q.E.D.—Adel is German 
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for “nobility,” a term that Stein uses in her Radcliff essay to describe the Jewish race—suggests 
that the problem of heroism be understood as a structural impass between Hellenism and 
Hebraism.  When Q.E.D. is recast as “Melanctha,” Jeff Campbell replaces the Jewish Adele.  Yet 
heroism is, again, the stumbling block in a failed relationship, and as Melanctha accuses Jeff of 
being “just too scared […] to really feel things way down” (86), Jeff discovers that he “ain’t got 
no longing to be brave” (86).   Melanctha's own attempt to know her own desires does not, of 
course, result in heroic mastery, but rather in her destitution and death.   
John Carlos Rowe cautions against reading “Melanctha” as a revision of Q.E.D.  Such 
readings, he writes, tend to “mistakenly reduce Q.E.D. to Stein’s biographical relationship with 
May Brookstaver, assuming that Adele is Stein and Helen Thomas is May […] to interpret Dr. 
Jeff Campbell as the latter text’s “version” of Adele in Q.E.D.”(230) and therefore to reduce 
“Melanctha” to a coded story about the special “knowledge” that comes from lesbian-feminist 
identity and relations” (230-231).  Rowe is certainly correct to warn against autobiographical 
reduction.  Yet effacing the continuity of character positions between Q.E.D. and “Melanctha,” a 
move which allows Rowe to take Melanctha Herbert as an emblem of Stein’s modernism, 
reducing Jeff to a figure of staid rationalism, produces what we might call a Hellenic reading, 
one that ignores the possibility of an alternate, Hebraic, legacy within the text.   
When Adele presents a racial typology of herself and Helen, she understands their 
difference as an opposition between an heroic will and unintentional action.   
‘How completely we exemplify entirely different types’ she began at last 
without looking at her companion.  ‘You are a blooming Anglo-Saxon. You 
know what you want and you go and get it without spending your days and 
nights changing backwards and forwards from yes to no.  If you want to 
stick a knife into a man you just naturally go and stick straight and hard.  
You would probably kill him but it would soon be over while I, I would 
have so many compunctions and considerations that I would cut up all his 
surface anatomy and make it a long drawn agony but unless he should bleed 
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to death quite by accident, I wouldn’t do him any serious injury.  No you are 
the very brave man, passionate but not emotional, capable of great sacrifice 
but not tender-hearted.’ (224) 
 
James writes that in the healthy will, “the normal thing is thus a sort of preliminary survey of the 
field and a vision of which course is best before the fiat comes.  And where the will is healthy, 
the vision must be right  (i.e., the motives must be on the whole in a normal or not too unusual 
ration to each other), and the action must obey the vision’s lead” (Briefer Course, 303).  Helen’s 
“blooming Anglo-Saxon” will brings out this structure of James’s will, where the decision occurs 
before experience, in a “theatre of simultaneous possibilities” (Essays on Psychology, 51).  
Adele, in her “compunctions and considerations” opposes the structure of Helen’s will with an 
action that accumulates in excess of intention.  For Adele, there is no space in which to form a 
vision and make a decision; rather, action emerges through indecision, the poor victim of Adele’s 
will would bleed to death while Adele was still deciding whether or not to kill him.  
Helen’s decisiveness and Adele’s indecision are figured as distinct modes of violence. In 
the narrative that Adele gives of Helen’s will, an anonymous body is cleanly sacrificed to her 
decision.  Adele’s indecision, in contrast, results in an disorganized violence.  Whereas Helen 
seems a professional assassin, Adele is figured as a unruly mob.  Helen breaks off her 
relationship with Adele in a letter.   
As long as I believed there was a chance of your learning to be something 
more than your petty complacent self, I could willingly endure everything, 
but now you remind me of an ignorant mob.  You trample everything 
ruthlessly under your feet without considering whether or not you kill 
something precious and without being changed or influenced by what you so 
brutally destroy.  (229) 
 
Adele, for whom the distinction between decision and action is collapsed, is figured as “an 
ignorant mob.”  Insofar as the mob is a dangerous and violent body that must be excluded from 
the body politic, the mob seems to offer a figure of insurrection against the authority of the 
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government.  Helen, as a figure of heroic will, is situated at what, for James, would be the non-
psychological locus of consciousness, from the perspective of which a will is able to pass 
judgment on experience.  Adele’s indecision is the excess that this will must exclude. 
When Stein revises Q.E.D. to “Melanctha,” the positions of Adele and Helen are largely 
preserved in Jeff and Melanctha, but whereas in Q.E.D. the problem of decision and indecision, 
of an assimilating will and a material excess, is figured as a conflict between two distinct, and 
racially determined, subject positions, in “Melanctha” it becomes a problem that each subject 
must confront.  In “Melanctha,” precisely because the racial lines have grown so complicated—
not only does black variously signify a broad negro sunshine, a viral power, and an apathetic 
carelessness towards life, but Melanctha has white blood, and both Jane and Jeff were raised in 
white houses—race can no longer serve as a basis for distinction.  
Because Melanctha and Jeff are not only in conflict with each other, but each subject to 
an internal conflict, their positions are more precarious than either Adele’s or Helen’s.  In 
Q.E.D., Helen’s accuses Adele of never having “stopped thinking long enough to feel” (214).  
This returns, in “Melanctha,” as Melanctha’s accusation that Jeff is frightened of experience.  
Yet, while Adele only briefly wonders if her mode of experience is inadequate before an 
afternoon alone, “lost completely in the tale of Dante and Beatrice,” this experience serves to 
reassure that “there is something in my glimpse and its alright and worth while”(216), Jeff is 
shaken by Melanctha’s accusation that there is something wrong with his perceptual habits.  
Likewise, while Helen’s heroism is racially determined, Melanctha must work to become 
courageous.  Stein writes that “Melanctha all her life was very keen in her sense for real 
experience.  She knew she was not getting what she so badly wanted, but with all her break neck 
courage Melanctha was here a coward, and she could not learn to really understand”(68). While 
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Melanctha seems to gain, through Jane Harden, the “courage” to know “what everybody wanted” 
(75), she ultimately cannot “make her wants and what she had, agree” (62), and no courage is 
able to master her experience of herself as “complex with desire” (61).  There is something in 
experience, that is, before which Melanctha, as well as Jeff, are cowardly.  The failures of 
courage in “Melanctha” articulate a gap between knowledge and desire, and call into question 
the possibility of assuming a position, however briefly, where one is safe from the vicissitudes of 
experience.  Whereas in Q.E.D. the relationship between a heroic will and a chaos of desire is 
divided between two characters, in “Melanctha” this opposition becomes internal to both Jeff and 
Melanctha, as a psychological, rather than purely racial, fact.   
After Jane Harden introduces Melanctha to the courage to know what she wants, 
Melanctha tries to instill this courage in Jeff.  However, in being exposed to Melanctha’s 
courageous knowledge of her desire, Jeff becomes anxious that she is playing a “game” (92) with 
him.  He becomes consumed with doubt and becomes convinced that “he could know nothing,” 
neither what Melanctha “really wanted with him” nor “what it was he felt inside him” (110).  
Melanctha’s courage, rather than reduce the world to known objects, makes something 
unknowable flare up within Jeff.  Jeff’s doubt that he could ever know either Melanctha’s or his 
own desire, opens him up to a new sensation—his own disgust.   
Jeff felt a strong disgust inside him; not for Melanctha herself, to him, not 
for himself really, in him, not for what it was that everybody wanted, in 
them; he only had disgust because he never could know really in him, what 
it was he wanted, to be really right in understanding, for him, he only had 
disgust because he never could know really what it was really right to him 
to be always doing, in the things he had before believed in, the things he 
before had believed in for himself and for all the colored people, the living 
regular, and the never wanting to be always having new things, just to keep 
on, always being in excitements.  (110) 
 
Jeff’s problem would seem to be that he no longer knows whether it is best to live ‘regular’ or, as 
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Melanctha lives, ‘in excitements.’  And yet, in this question of choice, what is foregrounded is 
that Jeff is unable to assume a position from which he could choose.  There is, for Jeff, no clear 
ethical ground upon which to base his choice, no disinterested perspective which he can assume.  
In choosing between excitements and regularity, Jeff fails to assume a ‘courageous’ position, 
from which he could master his desire. Jeff registers this failure as a disgust.   
While Melanctha is able to remain unchanged by her relationship with Jeff, it is through 
her relationship with, and betrayal by, Jem that she is introduced to doubt and the failure of 
courage.  Jem is presented as a version of what Melanctha aspires to be, as a paragon of the 
courage that Melanctha tries to learn from Jane Harden.  As Stein writes, “Jem was more game 
even than Melanctha.  Jem always had known what it was to have real wisdom.  Jem had always 
all his life been understanding” (154). Yet Jem’s “game” makes Melanctha “sick inside her with 
all her doubting” as she begins to wonder “what was it Jem really wanted to do with her”(159).  
Jem’s knowledge and understanding is of “what everybody wanted,” yet this knowledge of what 
everyone wants is an impossible knowledge, a reduction of the other to a known quantity which, 
by being known, supports the certainty of courageous knowledge. As Melanctha’s “game” 
introduces Jeff to the experience of something inside of him that he cannot know, Jem’s “game” 
introduces Melanctha to an experience of desire that she cannot master.   
In the final pages of the novella, after Melanctha is cast off by Jem, she loses Rose, her 
last support.   
Melanctha wanted badly to have somebody who could make her always feel a 
little safe inside her, and now Rose had sent her from her.  Melanctha wanted 
Rose more than she had ever wanted all the others.  Rose always was so simple, 
solid, decent, for her. And now Rose had cast her from her.  Melanctha was lost, 
and all the world went whirling in a mad weary dance around her.  (166) 
 
In the “mad weary dance” of the world, Melanctha is exposed to the failure of her knowledge.  
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She can no longer assume a courageous position through which she can find an object that will 
stand up to her desire, and that will make her “a little safe.” Unable to find a new experience, a 
world knowledge, that will explain what she feels, Melanctha withdraws from the search for new 
experience and “real wisdom,” falls sick with consumption, and dies.  Melanctha, in her pathetic 
end, and Jeff, as he is overwhelmed by disgust, would seem to be James’s “worthless ones.”  
And yet Stein’s figures of courageous knowledge, the heroes who can face experience without 
losing themselves within it, become culprits who reduce others to objects.  An ethical space 
opens up not through heroic mastery, but in the failure of mastery.    
Rowe argues that Stein derives Melanctha’s name from Phillipp Melanchthon, Martin 
Luther’s friend and collaborator in the Protestant Reformation.  After noting the religious and 
revolutionary connotations of Melanctha’s name, and following from Lisa Ruddick’s reading of 
Melanctha’s continual “wandering” in search for new “excitements” as an affront to William 
James’s ethics of attention, Rowe proposes that we take Jeff’s description of Melanctha  “as 
religion, rather than merely a devout representative of the church” as a reminder “of the Greek 
classical association of divinity with ‘wandering’ in the term for philosophical truth, aletheia, 
which is derived from the Greek roots, ‘alea’ and ‘thea,’ and [which] may be approximately 
translated as the ‘wandering divine’”(227).  Because Rowe, along with, for instance, Marianne 
DeKoven and Michael North, associates Melanctha’s ‘wandering’ with Stein’s modernism, he 
must explain away Melanctha’s tragic end.   
We can conclude that Melanctha Herbert is a misguided, confused, and 
socially or naturally determined woman, who concludes her pathetic life in 
a “home for poor consumptives,” where she “stayed until she died”.  Or we 
can read her as a prophetic figure, who does for her own time and place 
what Phillip Melanchthon had done for sixteenth-century Saxony by 
coordinating religion and reason, by insisting upon a revolutionary 
approach to both areas of human experience, and by inspiring a mode of 
discourse—call it Stein’s modernism—that had an influence far beyond 
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either prophetic figure’s powers.  (239-40) 
 
In locating Melanctha at the intersection of a Hellenism with a revolutionary Christianity—in the 
tradition of Pater’s Marius the Epicurean—Rowe emphasizes a position of courageous 
experience, equating Stein with a type of Hellenism, and turns away from the possibility that 
something of value might persist both in Jeff’s cowardice, and in Melanctha’s solitary and 
pathetic end.  Rather than ignore Jeff’s “strong disgust inside him” for what “he never could 
know really in him”(110), and Melanctha’s perplexity at the world “whirling in a mad weary 
dance around her”(166), in order to salvage Stein’s modernism, “Melanctha” suggests that there 
is some value in these disgusting, pathetic, and disorganized bodies.   
 When Oscar Wilde offers a parody of James’s ethics of mastery in The Picture of Dorian 
Gray, he stops short of proposing that the grotesque body, reveled in the final pages of the novel, 
is itself an aesthetic that should be valued.  The novel, rather, becomes an argument, as Jeff 
Nunakawa suggests, for a softening of desire, for the reduction of desire into something “slight 
enough to be good as managed”(28).  Stein, in opposing a “courageous” position to a “disgust” at 
the warring impulses cannot be brought under any heroic control, forces a conflict between these 
two positions.  Like Wiliam James, Stein opposes the moralism of the heroic mind to the chaotic 
impulses of of an instable system.  Whereas James takes the side of the hero, of the saint, against 
the disorganized body and mind, Stein elevates the chaotic body, turning the disorganized, 
excessive body, into an aesthetic.    
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D.H. Lawrence’s Subjective Science 
 
 In his two books on psychoanalysis—Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious, and Fantasia 
of the Unconscious—D.H. Lawrence argues that the universe is structured by a flow of sexual 
energy that both passes through various plexus and ganglia within the body, and relates each 
individual body to the material universe that surrounds it.  Like Pater, Lawrence distinguishes 
between energy as it is known by scientific thought and governed by the mathematical signifier, 
and a scene where the flow of natural energy is sustained by its own internal relationships. 
Lawrence argues that the sin of industrial humanity is to have tried to bring this flow of energies 
under the control of the intellect, and that an ethical being should participate in, rather than work 
to understand, this natural flow.   
In his critique of Freud, Lawrence argues that Freud’s unconscious is a perverse 
intellectualization of the flow.  Freud’s mistake, according to Lawrence, is to have theorized the 
object of desire.  It is because of this faulty assumption that an ideal object of satisfaction exists 
that Freud arrives at a theory of the Oedipal unconscious.  Against the Oedipal unconscious, 
Lawrence proposes a theory of the “pristine unconscious,” where energy is not organized around 
the search for an ideal object.  In Lawrence’s unconscious, there is only the flow of sexual 
energy, an endless circuit of desire.  Rather than set off on the impossible task of finding the 
perfect object of sexual desire, Lawrence argues that the human should work to integrate him or 
herself into the universal flow of sexual energy, that one should participate in, rather than work 
to understand, the universal flow.   
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I. The Logic of Life 
 
 Late in The Rainbow, Ursula looks through a microscope, and is filled with wonder at the 
“the unicellular shadow that lay within the field of light” (426). It seems impossible to her that 
this life could be explained by a scientific discourse. 
For what purpose were the incalculable physical and chemical activities 
nodalised in this shadowy, moving speck under her microscope? What 
was the will which nodalised them and created the one thing she saw? 
What was its intention? To be itself? Was its purpose just mechanical and 
limited to itself? [...] Suddenly she had passed away onto an intensely-
gleaming light of knowledge. She could not understand what it all was. 
She only knew that it was not limited mechanical energy. (426) 
 
Ursula’s revelation that life is beyond mechanism opens her up to a “new world” (426). She 
leaves the lab, “in dread of the material world” (427) to meet Anton Skrebensky, with whom she 
enters into an ecstatic sexual relationship. With Skrebensky “she was no mere Ursula Brangwen. 
She was Woman, she was the whole of Woman in the human order” (430). As “Woman” she 
kisses Skrebensky and is enveloped by “the soft flow…the warm fecund flow of his kiss” (432). 
She finds herself beyond consciousness, beyond speech, as her individual identity—as Ursula—
is revealed as a mere “vessel,” that constrains a primal darkness. “It was bliss, it was the 
nucleolating of the fecund darkness. Once the vessel had vibrated till it was shattered, the light of 
consciousness gone, then the darkness reigned, and the unutterable satisfaction”(433). As Ursula 
and Skrebensky “put off their puppet form”(436) to participate in this dark flow, Ursula is filled 
with contempt for the people that she imagines surround her: “What are you, you pale citizens? 
[…] You subdued beast in sheep’s clothing, you primeval darkness falsified to a social 
mechanism”(434). 
 In pairing a scene of laboratory science with a scene of sexual transformation, Lawrence 
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suggests that just as a vital force at work in the cell cannot be reduced to mechanical energy, the 
truth of the human cannot be reduced to “social mechanism.” And yet while Lawrence opposes 
the truth of a vital flow to the fiction of scientific mechanism, Ursula nonetheless encounters the 
mystery of life through a microscope—an apparatus of scientific inquiry. Lawrence describes the 
dark flow she experiences in language borrowed from scientific discourse. When Ursula wonders 
at the “will which nodalised” (426) the activities in the cell, and is herself exposed to the 
“nucleolating of the fecund darkness”(433), Lawrence uses two quasi-scientific words, of his 
own coin: “nodalise" and “nucleolating.”13 Each of these words, in their accepted adjectival 
sense, refers to a unified body that is divided into parts. A “nodal point” designates “a center of 
convergence or divergence,” or “a joint or point of branching of the stalk of a crinoid or other 
invertebrate animal”(OED), and it seems clear that Lawrence uses “to nodalise” in reference to 
the various discrete processes at work in the cell body. By making the adjective “nodal” into a 
verb, Lawrence raises the question of the grammatical subject—the will—responsible for 
producing and maintaining these nodes in the development of the cell. Likewise, while 
“nucleolated” refers to something that has a nucleolus, a “nucleolating” force is that which 
produces nuclei. At a grammatical level, then, Lawrence's vitalism ascribes a subject to scientific 
discourse. Ursula's attention to the unicellular organism orients her toward the grammatical 
subject of science. As she wonders at the “will which nodalises” the processes of the cell, her 
position remains that of the amazed spectator. However, when she is taken up in the dark flow 
that moves through Skrebensky's kiss, she is no longer a spectator, but herself subjected to this 
“nucleolating” force that allows her to take up her true position as “Woman” in the “human 
order” (430). 
                                                
13  The OED cites Women in Love as the first use of the verb “to nodalise.” According to the OED, the 
adjective “nucleolated” does not exist as a verb. 
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 Ursula's experience of this unconscious flow delivers, in part, on the genetic promise of 
the Brangwen Family.  Lawrence writes in the opening lines of The Rainbow that “There was a 
look in the eyes of the Brangwens as if they were expecting something unknown, about which 
they were eager” (1).  As a promise of what the novel will approach, this “unknown” has a 
doubled signification. It is not merely the constantly receding temporal horizon towards which 
the action of the novel proceeds, but also a mode of experience that is unknowable and 
necessarily inarticulable, an “unutterable satisfaction” beyond the “light of consciousness,” 
where “another activity” begins. As Lawrence writes of Tom Brangwen's first sexual encounter, 
A daze had come over his mind, he had another centre of consciousness. 
In his breast, or in his bowels, somewhere in his body, there had started 
another activity. It was as if a strong light were burning there, and he was 
blind within it, unable to know anything, except that this transfiguration 
burned between him and her, connecting them, like a secret power. (33) 
 
This “unknown” is not contingently, but rather constitutively excluded from Tom's intellectual 
comprehension, and much of the action of the novel consists in its protagonists’ work to 
negotiate this unknown. When, later in the novel, Tom returns to the Marsh after visiting his 
brother, and is confronted with the normalcy of his life, “he realized how fixed everything was, 
how the other form of life was beyond him, and he regretted for the first time that he had 
succeeded to the farm. He felt a prisoner, sitting safe and easy and unadventurous” (86). This 
failure to live up to the revelation of an unknown, “secret power” becomes a kind of death 
sentence: when Tom is caught, drunk, in a flood, Lawrence's language suggests that he is 
drowned by the same dark unconscious flow that constitutes a sexual union. “[I]n utter darkness, 
the unconscious, drowning body was rolled along, the waters pouring, washing, filling in the 
place. The cattle work up and rose to their feet, the dog began to yelp. And the unconscious, 
drowning body was washed along in the black, swirling darkness, passively” (244). Just as Tom 
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is “blind within” the primeval flow of ecstatic revelation, it is the darkness of the flowing waters 
that render him unconscious at his death. 
That we understand the “darkness” of the “pouring” waters that render Tom unconscious 
as the fatal return of an unrecognized “flow” to which he is “blind” in his first sexual encounter, 
is suggested both by the rhetorical identity of the destructive inhuman forces in the two scenes 
and by Lawrence's juxtaposition of Tom's failure with two evocations of the philosophical 
category of “the Unknown.” Tom's realization that there is an “other form of life” that is passing 
him by comes after he finds that his brother “has been reading Herbert Spencer” (86); later in the 
novel, just before Tom drowns, this other form of life is again related to the reading of “the 
Agnostic writings” (238). The term shared by Spencer and the Agnostics, and which suggests 
that for Lawrence there is a technical term in play, is the philosophical category of the 
“Unknowable.” 
As I have argued above, for Spencer, the “Unknowable” comes from William Hamilton 
and H.L. Mansel, in whose work it emerges as the product of a quasi-Kantian limitation of 
human intellect, such that the field of the “Unknown” is posited beyond the field of phenomenal 
perception and intellectual activity.  By positing the “Unknown” as an “Absolute,” thought 
reminds itself that it cannot overstep its bounds by granting either a positive or negative content 
(as they accuse the dogmatic Kantians of doing) to this beyond of perception as it is conditioned 
by the laws of thought. As Spencer writes, we must posit “the continued existence of an 
Unknowable as the necessary of the Knowable” (Spencer, 154-5).  
Whereas for Pater, as I have suggested, the “Unknowable,” as “that plenary substance of 
which there is only one phase or facet in what is there expressed”(17), is only suggested at by the 
presence of “soul” in literature, for the agnostics and scientific naturalists who appealed to 
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Spencer, the “Unknowable Absolute” becomes deified. As Bernard Lightman writes, in his study 
of the origins of agnosticism, “Huxley talked of the unknowable behind nature in tones of awe 
and reverence” (136).  Lightman continues that in Frederick James Gould's popular pamphlet, 
Stepping-Stones to Agnosticism, published in 1890, “the description of agnosticism was 
unashamedly Spencerian. Belief in a God was laid down as an agnostic principle on the basis 
that Spencer’s ‘doctrine of the Unknowable is assented to by so many professed Agnostics’” 
(142). While Huxley distanced himself from this explicit deification of the “Unknowable” 
Lightman argues that the “Unknowable” continued to be figured as a support for and guarantee 
of scientific knowledge. As Lightman writes, “a law of nature as formulated according to the 
present state of scientific progress may be a product of human thought, however, the agnostics 
faithfully believed that embedded in nature there were laws that grounded the natural 
order”(Lightman, 176). Spencer's “Unknown” thus became identified with a naturalized “deity of 
agnosticism” that “was virtually synonymous with the laws of the natural order” (Lightman, 
153). In evoking Spencer and the agnostics as signifiers for the “unknown” that Tom refuses to 
venture into, Lawrence situates the novel with respect to this tradition of thought. 
 Whereas in Tom's failed relationship to the unknown, the unknown remains, as for 
Spencer and the Agnostics, an unknowable absolute, the scientific language through which 
Ursula encounters this unknown force suggests that unknown has a logic, into which the human 
can enter. By using the same language to describe the processes at work in a cell, and a mode of 
ecstatic sexual relation, Lawrence suggests that the human can express the logic of the material 
world, just because the human is part of the material world. Lawrence thus repeats the kind of 
move that Henri Bergson—with whom he was familiar—makes in the opening pages of Creative 
Evolution, as he criticizes Spencer for failing to enter into the logic of the “Unknown,” and thus 
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of excluding a true study life from the domain of philosophy. Quoting Spencer's declaration that 
“the absolute is not in our province; we are brought to stand before the Unknowable” (Bergson, 
xxi), Bergson argues that “for the human intellect, after too much pride, this is really an excess of 
humility” (Bergson, xxi). 
If the intellectual form of the living being has been gradually modeled on 
the reciprocal actions and reactions of certain bodies and their material 
environment, how should it not reveal to us something of the very essence 
of which these bodies are made? Action cannot move in the unreal [...]. 
Intellectual activity, in so far as it relates to a certain aspect of inert 
matter, ought, on the contrary, to give us a faithful imprint of it, having 
been stereotyped on this particular object. (Bergson, xxi) 
 
Since the forces that compose Spencer’s category of the “Unknowable” situate the body Bergson 
argues that intellectual activity, itself dependent upon the logic of the matter that is its material 
support, must carry within it the logic of these forms.  While Lawrence's preoccupations are not 
the same as Bergson's, both open a field of thought by declaring that since the human, with its 
intellect, is part of the material world, the truths of the material world can be revealed through a 
mode of intellectual activity. Lawrence, like Bergson, does not understand the “Unknown” as the 
beyond of thought. Rather, in the preface to his Fantasia of the Unconscious, he suggests that 
thought itself should be divided: since “objective science of modern knowledge concerns itself 
only with phenomena, and with phenomena as regarded in their cause-and-effect relationship,” 
and “even biology never considers life, but only mechanistic functioning and apparatus of life,” 
it is necessary to articulate a “subjective science,” that will enter into a “great field of science 
which is as yet quite closed to us”(62). In other words, Lawrence at once preserves and modifies 
the distinction between the philosophical and scientific world and the “unknown” that lies 
beyond it. Rather than define thought as allied with science, as for Spencer and the agnostics, 
where the “Unknowable” is the unconditioned exterior that guarantees the stability of the natural 
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world, Lawrence takes the field of thought as itself divided into the field of mechanical 
knowledge—the field of “knowing”—and that of a vital force that can be expressed through the 
program of a “subjective science.” 
 In articulating a subjective science that is linked to a transformative sexual flow, 
Lawrence appeals to the tension between a position that locates life, beyond science, as an 
unknowable universal cause, and a position that finds life in the flowing transfers of energy 
described by thermodynamics. Lawrence at once identifies a mode of qualitative feminine 
experience—in which Ursula becomes “the whole of Woman in the human order” (430)—as the 
beyond of scientific thought, and proposes that this field can be entered into through the 
language of thermodynamics.  Rather than refuse scientific discourse in favor of a unified vital 
scene, Lawrence suggests that the scene of scientific discourse itself can be appropriated such 
that rather than exclude the subject, it reveals the as yet hidden depths of human subjectivity. 
 While for a mechanical energetics, the flow of energy and transformation of bodies is 
governed by the laws of thermodynamics, for Lawrence the flow of energy is lawless. In his 
Fantasia of the Unconscious, Lawrence offers the following brief analysis of Einstein's theory of 
relativity: 
As far as I can see, Relativity means, for the common amateur mind, that 
there is no one single absolute central principle governing the world. The 
great cosmic forces or mechanical principles can only be known in their 
relation to one another, and can only exist in their relation to one another. 
But, says Einstein, this relation between the mechanical forces is constant, 
and may be expressed by a mathematical formula: which mathematical 
formula may be used to equate all mechanical forces of the universe […]. 
What I doubt is the equation formula. It seems to me, also, that the 
velocity of light through space is the deus ex machina in Einstein’s 
physics. Somebody will put salt on the tail of light as it travels through 
space, and then its simple velocity will split up into something complex, 
and the Relativity formula will fall to bits. (190) 
 
Lawrence does not mistrust the notion of a hidden ontology that resides in the movements of 
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forces, but rather the idea that there is a law, articulated in mathematical language, and invented 
by the intellect, which governs the purely imminent relationships between these forces. 
Lawrence offers that the universe is purely relational and in no need of a transcendental term—
the equation formula—that will organize these forces. 
 In these terms, Lawrence repeats a version of the distinction that Pater draws between 
two scenes of transformative energies. Where Pater distinguishes between the thermodynamic 
heat death of the universe, proceeding towards equilibrium, governed by a mathematical 
equation, that, as Sebastian von Stork offers, has “zero is equal to zero for its result”(Imaginary 
Portraits, 120) and an immanent “antiphonal rhythm, or logic [...] proceeding uniformly from 
movement to movement, as in some intricate musical theme”(Plato, 17), Lawrence distinguishes 
between a theory of force where forces are equated by a mathematical formula, and a theory 
where forces operate according to their own immanent logic. Whereas Pater theorizes this scene 
of immanent forces, of primary nature, as the scene of qualitative and subjective experience that 
can be inscribed within the objective and technical material of artistic discourse, and in my 
reading of Wilde's The Picture of Dorian Gray and Stein's “Melanctha,” the disgusting human 
body becomes, itself, an aesthetic object, Lawrence will argue that an understanding of the logic 
of primary nature, and an overcoming of disgust and shame, will turn this scene of disgust into 
an erotics of nature. 
 Lawrence's most detailed exploration of the logic of primary nature comes in his two 
book-length essays on psychoanalysis.  In these far-ranging essays, Lawrence opposes the 
structure of what he calls the “vital unconscious” to the law-governed field of Freud's oedipal 
unconscious. Lawrence argues that in Freud's Oedipal unconscious, the material of the 
unconscious is interpreted through a series of laws that are themselves foreign to the 
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unconscious. Freud's law-governed unconscious thus falsifies the field of Lawrence's vital 
unconscious. Lawrence’s essays on psychoanalysis and the unconscious argue that the structure 
of the vital unconscious is equally the structure of the material world. The essays thus present a 
sometimes wildly speculative biology, in which physical and psychical reality are joined in the 
logic of a primary nature that is neither feminine, nor masculine, but rather sustained by a 
universal bisexual energy. 
 For Lawrence, the logic of the material world must begin with the subject. Inverting the 
Gospel of John, Lawrence begins not with the “Word”—a transcendental mark that establishes 
the material world—but with the “life pulse” of a “living creature”: 
In the beginning was a living creature, its plasm quivering and its life-
pulse throbbing. This little creature died, as little creatures always do. But 
not before it had had young ones. When the daddy creature died, it fell to 
pieces. And that was the beginning of the cosmos. Its little body fell down 
to a speck of dust, which the young ones clung to because they must cling 
to something. Its little breath flew asunder, the hotness and brightness of 
the little beast—I beg your pardon, I mean the radiant energy from the 
corpse flew away to the right hand, and seemed to shine warm in the air, 
while the clammy energy from the body flew away to the left hand, and 
seemed dark and cold. And so, the first little master was dead and done 
for, and instead of his little living body there was a speck of dust in the 
middle, which became the earth, and on the right hand was a brightness 
which became the sun, rampaging with all the energy that had come out of 
the dead little master, and on the left hand a darkness which felt like an 
unrisen moon. (FU, 69) 
 
The flippant tone and light derision through with which Lawrence speaks of the “daddy creature” 
and “little master” serves to ridicule both paternal mastery, and the very idea of an origin. Not 
only is the inaugural act in Lawrence's universe the death of the organism, rather than a regal act 
of creation ex nihilo, but while the cosmos was created by the death of the “daddy creature,” the 
“daddy creature’s” life is itself dependent on the forces that its death inaugurates. Lawrence's 
origin tale can thus only be presented as the subversion of an origin tale. Since the circuit 
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between life and death is internal to life, “there never was any beginning” (FU, 69). The “life-
pulse” that is liberated at death of the organism is both previous to, and in excess of, the “daddy 
creature.” And yet Lawrence argues that we must begin with an individual creature, rather than 
with the flow of the life pulse embodied in this creature, so that the life force itself does not take 
on a transcendental character. 
Out of living creatures the material cosmos was made: out of the death of 
living creatures, when their little living bodies fell dead and fell asunder 
into all sorts of matter and forces and energies, sun, moons, stars and 
worlds. So you got the universe. Where you got the living creature from, 
that first one, don't ask me. He was just there. But he was a little person 
with a soul of his own. He wasn't Life with a capital L. (FU, 70) 
 
At the beginning is the living creature, but this living creature's life depends upon the “life pulse” 
that moves through it. The “life pulse,” in turn, depends upon the existence of living creatures. 
There can be no beginning because the logic of life, of primary nature, does not follow rules or 
laws. Nature exists only in relation to itself. It has no outside, no beginning, and no end. 
 While Lawrence's story about the origin of the universe stays at a certain level of 
metaphysical abstraction, when he moves to consider the embryonic development of the 
organism, his logic takes on a hallucinatory specificity. As the cosmos begins with the division 
of the first creature into matter and energy, life begins with the first division of the egg, which 
establishes the “great division” of life and nature. 
So, in the first division of the egg-cell is set up the first plane of psychic 
and physical life, remaining radically the same throughout the whole 
existence of the individual. The two original nuclei of the egg-cell remain 
the same two original nuclei within the corpus of the adult individual. 
Their psychic and their physical dynamic is the same in the solar plexus 
and lumbar ganglion as in the two nuclei of the egg-cell. The first great 
division in the egg remains always the same, the unchanging great 
division in the psychic and the physical structure; the unchanging great 
division in knowledge and function. It is a division into polarized duality, 
psychical and physical, of the human being. It is the great vertical division 
of the egg-cell, and of the nature of man. (FU, 81) 
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This “great vertical division,” beginning with the first division of the egg-cell, is preserved in the 
formed organism as the division between what Lawrence calls the two central nerve centers of 
the body—the embodied brains of the solar plexus and lumbar ganglion. While “the solar plexus 
is the center of all the sympathetic system” (FU, 80) the center of attraction that proclaims that “I 
am I, the vital center of all things” (FU, 80) the lumbar ganglion is center of repulsion that 
proclaims that “I am I, in distinction from a whole universe, which is not as I am” (FU, 80). The 
solar plexus has to do with incorporation and “controls the great intake of love and of milk, of 
psychic and of psychical nourishment” (FU, 81), and the lumbar ganglion has to do with 
excrement, with the process by which “the milk is urged away down the infant bowels, urged 
away towards excretion” (FU, 81) In these two centers “the motion is the same” but the “vital 
relation” (FU, 81) is different. The same force moves through these two centers of the human; 
the difference between these centers—and the division within the human—can be known only 
through the relationship between them. 
 This vertical division reappears as the detailed structure of the universe: 
Light and dark, these great wonders, are relative to us alone. These are two 
vast poles of the cosmic energy and of material existence. These are the 
vast poles of cosmic sympathy, which we call the sun, and the other white 
pole of cosmic volition, which we call the moon. To the sun belong the 
great forces of heat and radiant energy, to the moon belong the great forces 
of magnetism and electricity, radium-energy, and so on. The sun is not, in 
any sense, a material body. It is an invariable intense pole of cosmic 
energy, and what we see are the particles of our terrestrial decomposition 
flying thither and returning, as fine grains of iron would fly to an intense 
magnet, or better, as the draught in a room veers towards the fire, attracted 
infallibly, as a moth towards a candle. The moth is drawn to the candle as 
the draught is drawn to the fire, in the absolute spell of the material 
polarity of fire. And air escapes again, hot and different, from the fire. So 
is the sun. (FU, 172) 
 
Not only do celestial objects—the sun and moon—exist as collections of forces, but these 
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collections of forces are themselves “poles of cosmic sympathy.” While magnetism and 
electricity are lunar forces, and heat and radiant energy are solar forces, the opposition of the sun 
and moon as “vast poles of cosmic sympathy,” suggests that this opposition is, itself, understood 
on the model of an electrical circuit. The universe itself becomes an electrical circuit. The 
material existence of individual body exists as a moment in this universal flow, and the universal 
flow is, itself, nothing but the relationship between these poles of “cosmic sympathy.” 
 Lawrence’s theory of sexual difference is established on the model of this universal 
electrical circuit. While “man is polarized upwards, towards the sun and the day,” “woman is 
really polarized downwards, towards the center of the earth. Her deep positivity is in the 
downward flow, the moon pull” (FU, 196). A sexual relationship comes when these two poles 
are brought into relation. 
From the powerful dynamic center the female sends out her dark 
summons, the intense dark vibration of sex. And according to her nature, 
she receives her responses from the males. The male enters the magnetic 
field of the female. He vibrates helplessly in response. There is established 
at once a dynamic circuit, more or less powerful. It would seem as if, 
while ever life remains free and wild and independent, the sex-circuit, 
while it lasts, is omnipotent. There is one electric flow which encompasses 
one male and one female, or one male and one particular group of females 
all polarized in the same key of vibration. (FU, 194) 
 
Sexual difference is as real, and as illusory, as the poles of an electrical circuit. It does not exist 
apart from this polarizing circuit, and the circuit cannot exist without the poles. Each sex, like the 
sun and the moon, is an “invariable intense pole of cosmic energy”; together, they form a 
bisexual “dynamic circuit.” Lawrence's subjective science begins with the subject, as the death of 
a “little creature” liberates the material out of which the cosmos is made, and leads to the 
subjective experience of an ontologically grounded sexual encounter. Lawrence claims that not 
only does the subjective experience of an “omnipotent” “sex-circuit” reveal the structure of the 
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universe, but also that the material structure of the universe, itself, is derived from the life and 
death of the first creature. 
 As Anne Fernald notes, the speculative biology of Lawrence's essays on the unconscious 
“was almost universally panned” in contemporary reviews, and has “been largely ignored by 
critics and readers since” (184). Indeed, Lawrence begins the preface of Fantasia of the 
Unconscious by offering an apologia for the first volume, Psychoanalysis and the Unconscious.  
He has been ridiculed, he writes, as a “babbling mystic” (54), as “half-baked” (53) author of an 
“aimless book” (53) that makes the bizarre claim that the “the soul is in the solar plexus” (53). In 
answering this criticism, Lawrence insists that he is “not a proper archaeologist nor an 
anthropologist nor an ethnologist” nor is he a “‘scholar’ of any sort” (62), but rather an “amateur 
of amateurs” (62). Nevertheless, through his “half-baked” theory of the bisexual electro-
magnetic flow as the reality that is both revealed by, and productive of, sexual difference, 
Lawrence appeals to a rich tradition of thought that theorizes sexual difference on the model of 
an electrical current. 
 Commenting on Lawrence's novels, Tim Armstrong writes that “Lawrence’s use of 
electrical metaphors suggests their easy applicability to sexual desire: electricity and magnetism 
are, as heterosexual desire is said to be, bipolar. It is even possible to suggest that gender is 
bipolar on the model of electricity and magnetism” (19). Lawrence’s theorization of desire and 
gender on the model of electricity and magnetism both traces the trajectory of, and intervenes in, 
what Thomas Lacquer calls the “epistemological divide” that “separates ancient and modern 
understandings of sexual difference itself”(142). According to Lacquer, over the course of the 
eighteenth century, “the ‘one-sex’ model of antiquity, in which women were viewed as ‘lesser’ 
men, gave way to a ‘two-sex’ model, in which ‘male’ and ‘female’ were seen instead as radically 
  134 
distinct”(142). When Sam Halliday relates this epistemological divide to contemporaneous 
developments in electrical science, he notes that the "‘one fluid’ theory of Franklin was 
confronted by the ‘two fluid’ theories of Charles François de Cisternay Dufay (1698-1739) and 
his successors,” where “‘positive’ and ‘negative’ were seen not as aspects of a single substance, 
but two entirely different things” (142). In other words, it is de Cisternay Dufay's quickly 
outdated model of electricity, where positive and negative correspond to two different 
substances, that most closely resembles the “modern” notion of sexuality, where male and 
female are radically distinct. Franklin's “one fluid” theory, extended to a model of sexual 
difference, would seem to hold that the single substance that has the potential to be either 
positively or negatively polarized is bisexual. 
 In grounding his theory of sexual difference in the flow of sexual energy, Lawrence 
evokes a roughly contemporary theorization of a bisexual flow that would have come to him 
from Edward Carpenter, Otto Weininger, and indirectly from Wilhelm Fliess. Émile Delavenay 
proposes that Lawrence was familiar with Weininger's Sex and Character.14 Indeed, Lawrence’s 
writings on a bisexual circuit composed of feminine and masculine elements bear a striking 
resemblance to Weininger’s own theorization of sexuality. For Weininger, sexual difference 
emerges through the flux between two ideal (and non-existent) types, of “Man” and “Woman.” 
“It is always a complete Man (M) and a complete Woman (W) who strive to join in sexual union, 
although they are distributed in different proportions between the two different individuals in 
                                                
14  The only explicit mention Lawrence makes to Weininger is a brief aside in his review of Fallen 
Leaves, by V.V. Rozanov, where he writes of Rozanov's “strange and self-revealing statements 
concerning Weininger”(Phoenix, 392). Otherwise, as Delavenay has argued, Lawrence was well 
acquainted with Edward Carpenter’s The Intermediate Sex, which draws, and quotes, heavily from Sex 
and Character. Delavenay argues in “Lawrence, Weininger, and ‘Rather Raw Philosophy,’” for the many 
structural similarities between Lawrence and Weininger, as well offering some speculation about 
Lawrence’s veiled references to Weininger. 
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every case” (29).  Weininger writes that “All human beings oscillate between the Man and the 
Woman in them,” and continues that “these oscillations of the sexual characteristics can be 
divined, like the oscillations of the earth’s magnetism, into regular and irregular ones” all of 
which obey “laws of periodicity” (48).  For Weininger, as for Lawrence, “Man” and “Woman” 
are two poles within a bisexual field. But for Lawrence, the oscillation is not internal to a single 
male or female subject. As Lawrence writes, against Weininger’s idea of bisexuality as presented 
in Carpenter’s The Indeterminate Sex, “every single cell in every male child is male, and every 
cell in every female child is female. The talk about a third sex, or about the indeterminate sex, is 
just to pervert the issue” (FU, 126). 
 For Weininger, and Carpenter, the sexual flow makes a double appearance in human 
subjectivity. First, there is the polarized flow of sexual energy within each human being. Second, 
there is the complementary sexual relationship between the two human beings, such that in an 
ideal relationship the proportional masculine and feminine characteristics add up to one man, and 
one woman. For Lawrence, as for Weininger and Carpenter, there is a flow of polarized sexual 
energy (between the solar plexus and lumbar ganglion) that is internal to the individual human 
body. Lawrence insists, however, that this current is a “single force,” that polarizes the man and 
woman differently, such each individual is all “man,” or all “woman”: “Biologically, it is true, 
the rudimentary formation of both sexes is found in every individual. That doesn't mean that 
every individual is a bit of both, or either, ad lib” (FU, 126). The idea that a man or a woman 
could have a mixture of masculine and feminine energy is, for Lawrence, a fantasy of modern 
society. The problem, for Lawrence, is a Christian ideal that “has taught us to be gentle and 
wistful: rather girlish and yielding, and very yielding in our sympathies. In fact, many young 
men feel so very like what they imagine a girl must feel, that hence they draw the conclusion that 
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they must have a large share of female sex inside them. False conclusion” (FU, 126-7). 
These girlish men have often, to-day, the finest maleness, once it is put to 
the test. How is it then that they feel, and look, so girlish? It is largely a 
question of the direction of the polarized flow. Our ideal has taught us to 
be so loving and so submissive and so yielding in our sympathy, that the 
mode has become automatic in many men. Now in what we will call the 
"natural" mode, man has his positivity in the volitional centers, and 
women in the sympathetic. In fulfilling the Christian love ideal, however, 
men have reversed this. Man has assumed the gentle, all-sympathetic rôle, 
and woman has become the energetic party, with the authority in her 
hands. The male is the sensitive, sympathetic nature, the woman the 
active, effective, authoritative. So that the male acts as the passive, or 
recipient pole of attraction, the female as the active, positive, exertive 
pole, in human relations. Which is a reversal of the old flow. The woman 
is now the initiator, man the responder. They seem to play each other's 
parts. But man is purely male, playing woman's part, and woman is purely 
female, however manly. The gulf between Heliogabalus, or the most 
womanly man on earth, and the most manly woman, is just the same as 
ever: just the same old gulf between the sexes. The man is male, the 
woman is female. Only they are playing one another's parts, as they must 
at certain periods. (FU, 127) 
 
It is important to note that Lawrence's tirade against womanly men and manly women is not 
directed against the logic of a fundamental bisexuality. Rather, he distinguishes between an 
electro-magnetic sexual force and the elements it polarizes. Lawrence argues that the Christian 
ideal, which has made men aspire to have a “sensitive, sympathetic nature,” makes men play the 
role of women. Because this is merely role-playing, the male and female positions remain, as 
always, determined by a polarizing force. From Lawrence's perspective, Weininger and 
Carpenter are right to find a bisexual force at the heart of sexual difference. He refuses, however, 
the idea that this bisexual force is internal to the single human subject: there cannot be a 
feminine moment in the male position, or a masculine moment in the female position, because 
each sex is polarized differently by flow of bisexual energy. 
 Weininger’s theory of bisexual and periodic flows of sexual energy derives much of its 
force from Wilhelm Fliess’s 1897 study, The Relation Between the Nose and the Female Sex 
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Organs, Presented in their Biological Significance. Fliess's study was important to the early 
Freud, and Lawrence’s proximity to Fliess will help clarify Lawrence's critique of Freud. As 
Paul Roazen writes, the publication of Sex and Character furthered a rift between Fliess and 
Freud, as Fliess accused Freud of leaking, through Freud’s patient and Weininger’s friend 
Hermann Swoboda, Fliess’s ideas of sexual periodicity and bisexuality to Weininger. 
Freud discussed Fliess's pet idea on the multiple roles of bisexuality 
inhuman life (for instance, how feminine men attract masculine women 
and vice versa) with a patient in treatment. The patient, Herman Swoboda, 
then communicated the thought to his friend Otto Weininger, who, as 
Freud put it, 'thereupon struck his forehead and ran home to write down 
his book.' Weininger's book was an immense success, and Fliess 
interrupted the lapse in his correspondence with Freud and demanded to 
know how this 'burglary' of his ideas had taken place. (93) 
 
Fliess’s own wildly speculative study moves from the visual resemblance between the structure 
of bone and tissue in the nose and female genitalia, to the seemingly functional—in that each 
involves a spontaneous flow of blood—resemblance between a nosebleed and a menstrual period 
to, a universal theory of a bisexual flow that periodically traverses the human body. Through an 
impressive series of tables that chart the dates of important incidents in patients’ lives, recording 
everything from menstrual flows and nosebleeds to migraines, anxiety attacks, births, and deaths, 
Fliess argues that these phenomena are the expression of periodic flows of a universal sexual 
substance. These flows occur in two periods, and Fliess, as he writes, has “named the series of 
twenty eight days 'feminine' and the series of twenty three days 'masculine'”.15 Anxiety “is 
produced at periodic days” if these flows are not allowed expression. 
 Aligning his theory with Freud's early idea of repression, Fliess writes that anxiety occurs 
only when this flow is repressed. 
                                                
15  Fliess’s study is unfortunately not translated into English. The translations are my own, from the 
French translation of Fliess's German. “Nous avons sans rien préjuger, nommé féminines les séries de 
vingt-huit jours et masculines les séries de vingt-trois jours”(254) 
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The sexually mature man, who is able to entirely satisfy his reproductive 
instinct, does not experience anxiety. The excitation finds its normal 
expression, and through this expression its balance. But in the 
circumstances defined by Freud, if this balance is imperfect, a part of this 
unspent substance accumulates and resurges, transformed into anxiety. It 
is a little like electrical force that, when resistance is opposed, accumulates 
and then finds its balance in periodic discharges that produce effects like 
light and heat, or even motor effects that would not have appeared if the 
current had not been restricted. (238)16  
 
Fliess's cure for a wide range of emotional as well as physical problems is thus to bring the 
patient into rhythm with these universal flows, by applying cocaine to the mucous membrane of 
the nose. Fliess—unlike Weininger, Carpenter, or Lawrence—does not argue that each human 
being is sexualized by these two periodic pulsations of sexual energy. Rather, he argues that each 
human's life is determined by the periodic expressions of this force. However, like Lawrence, 
Fliess argues that the fundamental reality of human life is determined by this flow of energy. 
 Serge André writes that even more astonishing than the speculative fervor of Fliess’s 
theory is that “Freud, who in early 1896 was the first reader of this manuscript, had virtually no 
objections to this ‘nose-genital,’ as he called it. On the contrary, he sang its praises, extolling its 
brilliance and originality and finding nothing to amend” (29). Indeed, Freud’s Project for a 
Scientific Psychology, which was first envisioned as a joint project between Freud and Fliess, 
understands human experience as the expression of a flow. Freud’s starting point in the Project is 
a theory of “neuronic excitation as quantities in a condition of flow” (356). This “flow” results 
from the principle of “neuronic inertia, which asserts that neurons tend to divest themselves of 
                                                
16  “L’homme sexuellement mûr, que est en mesure de satisfaire entièrement à l’instinct de reproduction, 
n’a pas d’angoisse. L’excitation trouve son expression normale et par là son équilibre. Mais dans les 
conditions définies par Freud, si l'équilibre est imparfait, une partie de la substance non dépensée 
s’accumule et finit par resurgir sous la forme transformée de l’angoisse. Un peu comme la force 
électrique qui, lorsqu’une grand résistance lui est opposée, s’accumule et s’équilibre en décharges 
périodiques produissant des effects tels que la lumiére et la chaleur, ou encore des effets moteurs que 
n’apparaîtraient pas si le courant n’était pas entravé”(238). 
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quantity” (356). A simple organism that reacts to stimulus takes energy in from the 
environment—through sensory neurons—and expels it through motor neurons. The case changes 
slightly for complex organisms such as humans. “As the internal complexity of the organism 
increases, the neuronic system receives stimuli from the somatic element itself—endogenous 
stimuli, which cause equally for discharge” (357). To satisfy these endogenous stimuli—such as 
“hunger, respiration and sexuality” (357)—the organism must “learn to tolerate a store of 
quantity […] sufficient to meet the demands for specific action” (358). While some tension must 
be reserved within the “neuronic system,” the system still works “to keep its level of tension 
constant” (358). Hysterical or neurotic symptoms come when an excess of energy is stored and is 
unable to release its energy back into the environment. The problem of cathexis thus has to do 
with finding a way to release this reserve of energy and to thus reintegrate the energy that is 
stored up in the symptom into the flow of energy that passes into and out of the subject. Just as 
Fliess’s cocaine treatments allow the patient to express the periodic flow that traverses his body, 
for the early Freud, cathexis allows the patient to reintegrate the excess energy that is stored in 
the symptom back into the environment. 
 Yet there is an important difference between Fliess and the early Freud. Fliess is invested 
in revealing the bisexual pulsations of energy that move through the universe, and that affect the 
human according to definite periods. For Fliess, to use a psychoanalytic terminology, the 
unconscious is the scene of this bisexual pulsation, and the cure consists in bring the human into 
harmony with this scene. For Freud, in contrast, the unconscious only emerges in symptom. 
While for Fliess the importance of a symptom is that it reveals the ontological flow of sexual 
energy, Freud translates the symptom into conscious thought. Freud is interested in this flow of 
energy as a support for the technique of psychoanalysis, while Fliess's interest is in revealing a 
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speculative metaphysics. 
 In arguing for a link between a bisexual and universal electro-magnetic force and the 
structure of the unconscious, Lawrence thus returns to the originary ground of psychoanalysis. If 
Freud works to translate the symptom into conscious thought, while Fliess uses symptom to 
reveal an ontological truth, then Lawrence's critique of Freud might be seen as a return to the 
question of the relative emphasis that Freud and Fliess place on the symptom. Rather than 
understand the unconscious as that which is revealed when the symptom is translated into 
conscious thought, Lawrence understands this flow of energy, itself, as the unconscious. 
 Lawrence’s critique of psychoanalysis begins with what he sees as its practical failure. As 
Lawrence writes, “the analyst promised us that the tangle of complexes would be unraveled, the 
obsessions would evaporate, the monstrosities would dissolve, sublimate, when brought into the 
light of day” (PU, 9). Yet if neurosis is caused by the repressed Oedipal complex, then all 
psychoanalysis can offer is that “[a]ny inhibition must be wrong, since inevitably in the end it 
causes neurosis and insanity. Therefore the inhibition of incest-craving is wrong, and this wrong 
is the cause of practically all modern neurosis and insanity” (PU, 10-11). If we are to accept the 
unconscious as an important element of human life, and if “incest-craving…actually exists and 
refuses to give way before any criticism” then we have no option “but to accept it as part of the 
normal sex-manifestation” (PU, 11). 
 Lawrence’s solution to this impasse—for he argues that “incest craving” is, indeed, a 
“monstrosity”—is to argue that the Oedipal complex “is not caused by the inhibition of some so-
called normal sex-impulse” (7). Rather, “when the analyst discovers the incest motive in the 
unconscious…he is only discovering humanity’s repressed idea of sex” (PU, 11). The “incest 
motive” does not exist in what Lawrence calls the “pristine unconscious,” but rather is “a logical 
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extension of the existent idea of sex and love” that is transferred by the mind into the “affective-
passional psyche” (PU, 12). The Oedipal fantasy arises when the mind tries to theorize the object 
that would satisfy desire and put an end to this indestructible flow of desire.  The perfect 
object—the sexualized mother—exists only as an ideal of perfection that is invented as a solution 
to the reality of this unceasing flow of energy. While for the early Freud the Oedipal object is the 
limit to desire, for Lawrence the drive is an objectless and unceasing flow of sexual energy. 
Accordingly, the real unconscious cannot be approached through an ideal of satisfaction, but 
only through a participation in this flow of sexual energy. Rather than accept this Oedipalized 
ideal of the unconscious, Lawrence proposes that “we must go from centre to centre, chakra to 
chakra, to use an old esoteric word”(PU 35) in order to establish “the first field of the 
unconscious”(PU, 35). The “true, pristine, unconscious, in which all our genuine impulses arise 
[...] is the well head, the fountain of real motivity” (PU, 12), while the Freudian unconscious is 
“spawn produced by secondary propagation from mental consciousness” (PU, 12). The true 
unconscious—as a scene of relative forces moving within and through bodies, is a kind of 
primary nature, itself falsified by the rules that govern the secondary nature produced in Freud's 
scientific discourse.   
 Serge André argues that while it is Freud's break with Fliess over the question of the 
relationship of the human to this flow of sexualized energy that allows Freud to found 
psychoanalysis, Freud's most promising students—among them Jung and Ferenczi—were 
convinced by the logic of Fliess's bisexual flow. While Lawrence evokes Jung's libido as a 
description of the flow of unconscious energy, Ferenczi's “mutual analysis” is perhaps closer to 
Lawrence's position. Ferenczi argues that when the analyst and analysand analyze each other in 
the course of a psychoanalytic session, an energy is liberated that flows between the two. For 
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Ferenczi, psychic energy is a “semisubstance” that has the “extraordinarily or wonderfully 
pleasing quality of being both body and mind simultaneously, that is, of expressing wishes, 
sensations of pleasure-unpleasure, or even complicated thoughts, through chances in their 
structure or function (the language of organs)”(7). This “semisubstance,” that speaks through a 
“language of organs” can be liberated in the process of “mutual analysis,” where the libido forms 
a circuit between the analyst and analysand, a “libido-solution” that functions “both and a glue 
and as a healing substance”(13). As Ferenczi writes, it is important that “this mutual flux be 
taken in the substantial sense and not merely explained in terms of psychology” (12). This real, 
material energy, when liberated, allows that “the two unconsciousnesses thereby receive mutual 
help” (12). As in Lawrence's notion of the ontological fact of subjects united in a flow of energy, 
for Ferenczi, a flow of libido-energy forges a circuit between the two subjects. Lawrence refuses 
a language of the intellect for just this “language of the organs,” the play of forces between the 
solar plexus and lumbar ganglion. 
 For Freud, the impossibility of satisfaction that emerges from the discovery of the 
Oedipal unconscious implies an ethic. If the truth of desire is Oedipal desire, then participation in 
the social world demands the sacrifice of this desire. As he writes in The Psychopathology of 
Everyday Life, “a large part of the mythological view of the world, which extends a long way 
into most modern religions, is nothing but psychology projected into the external world [...] One 
could venture to explain in this way the myths of paradise and the fall of man, of God, of good 
and evil, of immortality, and so on, and to transform metaphysics into metapsychology” (SE 
6:256). Freud thus understands the ethos of psychoanalysis as the decoding of metaphysics into 
metapsychology. In his 1927 essay “The Question of a Weltanschauung,” Freud defines a 
Weltanschauung as “an intellectual construction which solves all the problems of our existence 
  143 
on the basis of one overriding hypothesis” (195), and proposes that psychoanalysis “is quite unfit 
to construct a Weltanschauung of its own: it must accept the scientific one” (196). And yet, as he 
continues, “the Weltanschauung of science already departs noticeably from our definition,” for 
while science “assumes the uniformity of the explanation of the universe[…]it does so only as a 
programme, the fulfillment of which is relegated to the future” (196). What science asserts as a 
“programme” is “that there are no sources of knowledge of the universe other than the 
intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized observations—in other words, what we call 
research—and alongside of it no knowledge derived from revelation, intuition or 
divination”(196). The ethics of the Weltanschauung of science, as part of a psychoanalytic labor, 
thus involves a critique of any non-scientific Weltanschauung, and the imposition of “a 
dictatorship of reason” (198) in its place. In terms of a psychoanalytic ethos, this involves the 
translation of the language of organs—the full range of hysterical symptoms—into rational 
discourse, which allows the patient to confront the impossibility of the desire at the center of his 
life. The language of organs always speaks of an impossible, full satisfaction; the 
Weltanschauung of science, as the ethos of Freud's psychoanalysis, involves trading this full 
satisfaction for the partial satisfaction of knowledge. 
Lawrence argues that the flow of the unconscious must be freed from the “dictatorship of 
reason.” For Lawrence, the question of the unconscious has nothing to do with the intellect that 
wants, or is denied, satisfaction.  Rather than the satisfaction of the subject, the question of the 
unconscious has to do with circuit that is satisfied.  As Lawrence writes, “As we live, we are 
transmitters of life. / And when we fail to transmit life, life fails to flow through us. / That is part 
of the mystery of sex, it is a flow onwards.  /  Sexless people transmit nothing” (Poems, 449).  It 
is the flow that is important for Lawrence, not the comprehension of the flow.  The flow is 
  144 
necessarily untranslatable, necessarily mysterious, because as a series of relationships it extends 
beyond the consciousness and life of the individual organism.   
The universe flows in infinite wild streams, related 
 in rhythms too big and too small for us to know, 
 since man is just middling, and his comprehension just middling. 
 
 If once, for a second, the universe ceased to flow 
 of course it would cease to exist. 
 The thought is unthinkable, anyhow. 
 
 Only man tries not to flow, 
 repeats himself over and over in mechanical monotony of conceit  
 and hence is a mess.  (Poems, 479) 
Beyond the scene of conscious knowledge, the human is connected to a flow of sexual energy 
where organs signal each other in dark waves of electromagnetic force, and the material 
interactions of bodies extend beyond what the intellect can conceive or control.  In trying to 
translate the symptom into conscious thought, by removing the human from the universal flow, 
and thus producing the field of the unconscious as an object of the intellect, Freud's inquiry rests 
at the level of “secondary nature.”  It is only by participating in the language of organs—in the 
flow of energy through ganglia and plexi, that “primary nature” can be realized.  It is only by 
sacrificing knowledge that nature can appear as a field without lack.   
 
II.    The Erotics of Lawrence’s Flow 
 
 Lawrence's essays on psychoanalysis grew, in part, out of “The Crown,” which Lawrence 
drafted as his contribution to series of anti-war lectures that he had planned, throughout 1915, to 
give with Bertrand Russell. The lectures were canceled when Lawrence broke with Russell after 
reading and commenting on Russell’s draft for his own lecture, entitled “Philosophy of Social 
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Reconstruction.” When Russell makes the seemingly modest proposal that there is “[n]o need of 
hate or conflict: only the failure of inward joy brings them about,” Lawrence responds with the 
marginal note that “[t]here will always be hate and conflict. It is a principle of growth: every bud 
must burst its cover, and the cover doesn’t want to be burst” (Letters, 95). In a letter that 
Lawrence sent Russell as response to the manuscript, Lawrence attacks Russell, in no uncertain 
terms, as “[t]he enemy of all mankind” (Letters, 6): “[i]t is not the hatred of falsehood which 
inspired you. It is the hatred of people, all people of flesh and blood” (Letters, 6). The severity of 
Lawrence's attack on Russell comes from the fact that he reads Russell's appeal for peace and 
inward joy as an affront to the logic of his subjective ontology. For Lawrence, the scenes of 
nature and human subjectivity depend upon an opposition through which the bisexual electrical 
circuit is maintained. When the opposition between these terms collapses, the logic of nature, of 
the flow, likewise collapses into “nothingness.” The satisfaction of desire would be the end of 
desire. 
 In “The Crown” Lawrence imagines a fight between the lion, “the king of beasts” (1) and 
the unicorn, “the defender of virgins” (1), over a “Crown that hovers between them, 
unattainable” (1). “It is,” Lawrence writes, “a greater thing to have an enemy than to have an 
object” (2). This fight is their “raison d'être” (2). Yet if “the lion really destroyed, killed the 
unicorn [...] would not the lion at once expire? Is not the unicorn necessary to the very existence 
of the lion, is not each opposite kept in stable equilibrium by the opposition of the other?”(2). 
The lion and the unicorn are in the “terrible position” of having a “purpose which, if once 
fulfilled, would of necessity entail the cessation from existence of both opponents” (3). As 
Lawrence writes “we are, then, rounded upon a void, a hollow want, like the lion. And this 
makes us draw all things into ourselves, to fill up the void. But it is a bottomless pit, this void. It 
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ever it were filled, there would be a great cessation from being, of the whole universe” (4), a 
“sudden crumbling into universal nothingness” (6). 
 Russell, in arguing for peace, is guilty of “blaspheme against the raison d'être of all life” 
and of trying to “destroy the essential, intrinsic nature of God” (18), for while peace leads to a 
“universal collapse,” it is through opposition that a “stable equilibrium” is maintained. The 
problem with the war in Europe is that this structured opposition has ceased. The Lion has 
“really beat the unicorn” (13), while the unicorn has “achieved supremacy in another field” (13). 
Each is blinded by its own crown, and so “without rhyme or reason they tear themselves and 
each other, and the fight is no fight” (13).  In that structured conflict is sustains the universe, “it 
is a greater thing to have an enemy than to have an object” (2).   
 For Lawrence the tragedy of modern life is that we live in a world that has lost this 
structured equilibrium, that rather than participate in the logic of the flow that Lawrence 
describes in his essays on psychoanalysis, we work to impose a human order, a transcendental 
limit, on the logic of the flow.  In both Women in Love, and Lady Chatterley's Lover, Lawrence 
argues that the immorality and unhappiness of the industrialist comes as he takes the wrong 
attitude towards the flow, working to impose his will as a transcendental principle that governs 
the flow, and thus to reproduce the logic of the flow as an object of human knowledge. In 
contrast to this attempt to produce the flow of energy as an intellectual object, Lawrence finds a 
moral participation in this flow of sexualized energy in Ursula's relationship to Birkin, and in 
Lady Chatterley's relationship to Mellors.  As in Pater's Imaginary Portraits of Sebastian von 
Stork and the Prior St-Jean, where human behavior is understood as the negotiation of known 
and unknown scenes of energy, Lawrence's dual conception of the flow—one ruled by a 
thermodynamic imposition of equilibrium, the other by the natural flow of forces—becomes a 
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metapsychological terrain, which his characters must negotiate. 
 In Women in Love, as Gerald's father becomes ill, Lawrence appeals to the same language 
of collapse and disintegration that, in his reading of Russell, results from an intellectualization of 
the flow of energies. “The whole unifying idea of mankind seemed to be dying with his father, 
the centralizing force that had held the whole together seemed to collapse with his father, the 
parts were ready to go asunder in terrible disintegration”(228). It is in an attempt to master this 
decentered world that Gerald turns to the mine, and tries to recover the unity that was lost with 
his father’s death. In his new role as a captain of industry, he attempts to construct an 
oppositional circuit that will limit this “terrible disintegration.” Yet the circuit that Gerald 
constructs is not the vital circuit of Lawrence's primary nature, but the mechanical circuit 
governed by the mathematical laws of secondary nature. Lawrence writes that Gerald is 
possessed with the “desire to translate the Godhead into pure mechanism” (236), to find “the 
perfect system that subjected life to pure mathematical principles” (239), a system that will allow 
him to become “the God of the machine, Deus ex Machina” (236). The terms of Lawrence's 
critique are clear. Instead of participating in a vital electrical circuit, Gerald attempts to find a 
mathematical principle that will bring the various forces of the universe into relation, by finding 
a common language—that of mathematics—into which all these forces can be translated. 
Gerald's industrialism thus returns to Lawrence's critique of Einstein's theory of relativity. As 
noted above, the truth of the theory of relativity is that “The great cosmic forces or mechanical 
principles can only be known in their relation to one another, and can only exist in their relation 
to one another” (191). However, he argues, “this relation between the mechanical forces is 
constant, and may be expressed by a mathematical formula” (191). The “equation formula” that 
relates these relative forces in a common mathematical language “is the deus ex machina in 
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Einstein’s physics” (191). Gerald translates the “Godhead” in that he, like Einstein, wants to 
come up with a mechanical principle that will impose a rigid form on the field of forces that 
composes the universe.   
 For Gerald, as for Lawrence, the scene of these tumultuous forces is that of a divide 
between an upper and lower region. Gerald's attempt to impose a “deus ex machina” on the 
relation between these forces comes through his mining reforms. As Lawrence writes, “New 
machinery was brought from America […] all the control was taken out of the hands of the 
miners […]. Everything was run on the most accurate and delicate scientific method, educated 
and expert men were in control everywhere, the miners were reduced to mere mechanical 
instruments”(238). This scientific method imposes a divide between a scene of intellectual 
control, in which Gerald manages the mine from his office on surface of the earth, and the 
physical labor of the miners work in the bowels of the earth. Like Lawrence’s opposition 
between solar plexus lumbar ganglion, this opposition between two distinct levels is maintained 
by an electrical circuit, as Gerald's chief innovation involves electrifying the mine. “Expert 
engineers were introduced in every department. An enormous electric plant was installed, both 
for lighting and for haulage underground, and for power. The electricity was carried into every 
mine” (238). Gerald's “translation of the Godhead” is astonishing in its accuracy, as the 
electrified scientific management of the mine replicates the flow of electrical energy between the 
two levels of the human. 
 Yet in playing at being a “God of the machine,” Gerald removes himself from the 
subjective processes of the flow, and encounters the full weight of the “void [and] hollow want” 
(4) at the center of human subjectivity. Again echoing the language of Lawrence's response to 
Russell, Gerald says that “you seem to be clutching at the void—at the same time you are the 
  149 
void yourself.—And you don’t know what to do” (338). It is to fill this “infinite void” (351) that 
Gerald turns to Gudrun, sneaking into her bedroom in the middle of the night. When he finds her, 
it is an “infinite relief. Into her he poured all his pent-up darkness and corrosive death, and he 
was whole again” (358). In his recovered wholeness, he is “like a child at the breast.” He is 
“infinitely grateful, as to God, or as an infant is at its mother’s breast” (359). In producing the 
flow as an external relation, Gerald excludes himself from a participation in the flow. Gerald 
thus takes Gudrun as a limit to his unstructured subjective experience. The problem of Oedipal 
sexuality arrives as the consequence of Gerald's translation of, and thus exclusion from, the 
oppositional energy of the “Godhead.” 
 While Gerald, replenished by his newfound mastery, “slept the perfect sleep,” Gudrun is 
filled with horror: “They would never be together. Ah, this awful, inhuman distance which 
would always be interposed between her and the other being!”(360) Gudrun, taken as the object 
that will satisfy Gerald’s desire, realizes not only the distance between them, but also the failure 
of any object that could satisfy her desire. “Oh God, the wheels within wheels of people, it 
makes one’s head tick like a clock, with a very madness of dead mechanical monotony and 
meaninglessness. How I hate life, how I hate it. How I hate the Geralds, that they can offer one 
nothing else” (482). Gudrun wants relief—a “pure, deep, healing rest” (483)—but there is no one 
to grant her reprieve: “What then! Was she his mother? Had she asked for a child, whom she 
must nurse through the nights, for her lover? She despised him, she despised him, she hardened 
her heart. An infant crying in the night, this Don Juan” (484). Gudrun's horror at her exclusion 
from a participation in an ideal sexual relationship thus marks the return of the universal collapse 
that Gerald's “translation of the godhead” had worked to prevent. Gudrun, taken as an Oedipal 
object, is Gerald’s solution to the problem his own exclusion from the flow of the electrical 
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circuit, but this solution is no solution at all. Gudrun is left bearing the weight of this subjective 
excess, which she registers as an “inhuman distance” between any two beings. The failed 
relationship serves to clarify the forces of Lawrence’s distinction between the natural flow and 
its intellectual perversion.  Because Gerald severs the action of the flow from subjectivity he is 
cut off from participating in nature.  In that Gerald intellectualizes the logic of the flow, and in 
doing so, prevents himself from participating in it, he embodies the scientific method that 
Lawrence critiques in the essays on psychoanalysis. The failure of a sexual relationship between 
Gerald and Gudrun appears as the consequence of the fissure between Gerald's objective science 
and his subjective life. 
 Gudrun is thus left bearing the full weight of the void at the center of the subject, of an 
unsatisfiable “hollow want.” While for both Gudrun and Gerald a scene of unstructured 
subjectivity emerges as the remainder of industrial life and Oedipal sex, in Ursula and Birkin's 
sexual encounter a circuit is revealed from which nothing is excluded. Ursula falls to Birkin’s 
loins: “Kneeling on the hearth-rug before him, she put her arms round his loins, and put her face 
against his thighs. Riches! Riches!”(324). It is not the Oedipal satisfaction of an ideal object that 
they experience, but in Birkin’s words, “more than that” (324): his loins are “this dark, subtle 
reality of him, never to be translated. [...] The suave, pure, untranslatable reality of his loins of 
darkness” (331). 
She traced with her hands the line of his loins and thighs, at the back, and 
a living fire ran through her, from him, darkly. It was a dark flood of 
electric passion she released from him, drew into herself. She had 
established a rich new circuit, a new current of passional electric energy, 
between the two of them, released from the darkest poles of the body and 
established in perfect circuit. It was a dark fire of electricity that rushed 
from him to her, and flooded them both with rich peace, satisfaction. (331) 
 
While Gerald constructs an electrical circuit that connects to the bowels of the earth, Ursula finds 
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an electrical “life motion,” that proceed downwards from Birkin's thighs. Whereas Gerald, 
“translates the Godhead” by bringing it under mathematical control, this flow is established by 
the relative relations of the forced in play. As Ursula explores Birkin’s loins she moves 
“unconsciously.” 
With her sensitive finger tips, she was tracing some mysterious life-flow 
there. She had discovered something, something more than wonderful, 
more wonderful than life itself. It was the same mystery of his life-motion, 
there, at the back of the thighs, down the flanks. It was a strange reality of 
his being, the very stuff of being, there in the straight down flow of the 
thighs. It was here she discovered him one of the sons of God such as were 
in the beginning of the world, not a man, something other, something 
more. (325) 
 
Through the repetition of equally mysterious terms—a “mysterious life-flow”; “something more 
wonderful than life”; a “mystery of life-motion”; “his being”; “the very stuff of being”; “the 
beginning of the world”—Ursula and Birkin participate in a flow that extends beyond their 
understanding. Ursula moves her hands “down his back slowly, with a strange recurrent, 
rhythmic motion, yet moving slowly down, pressing mysteriously over his loins, over his flanks” 
(328). The unconscious, recurrent and rhythmic motion of the flow is equally the structure of 
Lawrence's paragraph, where repetition of equally mysterious terms establishes the “more than” 
of the flow. Whereas Gerald produces an industrial metaphor of the flow, forging a circuit 
between the surface and the mine, this imitation of nature excludes Gerald’s own subjective 
experience.  The flow into which Birkin and Ursula are interpellated seems to proceed by a 
metonymic logic, in that it emerges through the repetition of internally linked phrases. 
 In Modernism and the Fate of Individuality, Michael Levenson notes Lawrence’s 
tendency to either repeat or contradict himself from one sentence to the next within a paragraph, 
and reads this tendency in terms of the novels’ thematic concern about the relationship between 
unity and disintegration. As Levenson writes, while “in one obvious sense reversal is the 
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antithesis of repetition […], they are both incompatible with consecutive development” (152). 
For Levenson these contradictions are part of an attempt “to recover dualism from an 
encroaching monism, to establish two great streams instead of one dark river” (155). Levenson 
concludes that “[n]ext to the harmony of the ideal, the novel’s many disharmonies seem a 
confession of failure, but they seem far less discouraging when set against the perfect stability of 
death”(165). Yet far from a confession of failure, this refusal of “consecutive development” 
works to establish a relational meaning, as Lawrence, in articulating the flow of the electrical 
unconscious, works to articulate a relation beyond what Levenson identifies as a dialectic of 
unity and disintegration. While Gerald's attempt to find unity results in a kind of disintegration,  
the electrical flow established between Birkin and Ursula, where the unity is not imposed by an 
external force, is immune to the threat of disintegration. 
 Gerald's intellectualization of the logic of natural energies emerges out of a disgust for a 
certain logic of the organism. Early in Women in Love, in Halliday’s apartment, Birkin and 
Gerald contemplate an African carving. When Birkin argues that he can see in it “centuries of 
development in a straight line […] an awful pitch of culture” (80), Gerald is horrified. “‘What 
culture?’ Gerald asked, in opposition. He hated the sheer African thing” (80). Indeed, his disdain 
for the carving would seem to foreshadow his reduction of Gudrun, the avant-garde artist who 
makes her own small wooden figurines, to an oedipal object. Birkin affirms his affinity with this 
African carving later in the novel when he recalls an “African fetish,” “a tall, slim, elegant figure 
from West Africa, in dark wood, glossy and suave” as “one of his soul’s intimates” (262). The 
fetish has a face “with tiny features like a beetle’s” (263) and a knowledge that was “far beyond 
any phallic knowledge, sensual subtle realities beyond the scope of phallic investigation” (263). 
The figure has a “mystic knowledge in disintegration and dissolution, knowledge such as the 
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beetles have, which live purely within the world of corruption and cold dissolution” (263). While 
Gerald is overwhelmed by a “pent-up darkness and corrosive death” (358) that emerges of his 
anxiety over the possibility of a “universal collapse,” the beetle has a knowledge about how to 
live in the world of corruption and dissolution. As Lawrence continues, this knowledge of 
disintegration and dissolution “was why the Egyptians worshipped the ball-rolling scarab” (263). 
 While Gerald recoils in horror from the figurine, Birkin's meditation on the figure leads 
him to a comparison of Europe and Africa. While Africa has died one kind of death, in “the 
putrescent mystery of sun-rays” (263), Europe will die another in the “destructive frost mystery” 
(264). This division of Europe and Africa into two distinct zones follows Lawrence's division the 
universe into two levels, “the unchanging great division in the psychic and the physical structure 
[...] the unchanging great division in knowledge and function” (77) that structures the flow of 
energy though the universe. The division between Africa and Europe reaffirms a division 
between “a brightness which became the sun,” and “a darkness which felt like an unrisen moon,” 
a division which is reflected in human physiology as the difference between “the solar plexus 
and lumbar ganglion” (76), which themselves correspond to the incorporative function of the 
mouth, and the excremental function of the bowels. It is with respect to these oppositions that the 
resemblance between the beetle-like face of the figure and the “ball-rolling scarab” derives its 
critical force. The African fetish at once evokes a history and a religion that are alien to Europe, 
and articulates a logic through which this division between rational, scientific thought (Europe) 
and irrational vital subjectivity (Africa) is overcome. The ball that the scarab rolls is a ball of 
dung into which the beetle injects an egg. When the egg hatches, the larva grows as it feeds on 
the ball of excrement. The beetle thus becomes a trope for the interaction between these polar 
opposites. It lives in a world of “corruption and cold dissolution,” and is part of “destructive frost 
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mystery” (264), yet is a symbol of Africa's death in “the putrescent mystery of sun-rays” (263). 
The ball that the beetle pushes is both excrement and food. In it, the functions of the bowels and 
mouth become coincident as an excremental remainder becomes a source of nourishment. 
 In Another Kind of Love, Christopher Craft notes that after Lawrence's first exposure to 
homosexuality, during a visit to Cambridge, he recorded a dream in which there is “a beetle that 
bites like a scorpion.” Craft notes that scorpions don’t bite, but sting with their tails: “the 
mouth/tail or orifice/penetrator confusion expresses with hallucinatory accuracy the semantic 
lability of ‘sodomy,’ the elastic and ‘absolutely confused category’ that historically had 
subsumed, among other variations, both oral and anal modes of conjunction, often without 
modernity’s fastidious concern to the anatomical sex of the persons thus conjoined” (158). While 
the beetle evokes the “confused category” of sodomy, as Jonathan Dollimore writes, Lawrence 
had an “ambivalent attitude to homosexuality” (104). “If, in the homosexual embrace, [anal sex] 
is imagined as the sterile desire for dissolution and death, in the heterosexual embrace it 
seemingly becomes the transgressive search for life at its most searingly intense—a shattering of 
the self into a vulnerable, receptive authenticity”(105).  It is because Lawrence understands anal 
eroticism through the coprophagia of the dung beetle that anal erotics opens to the logic of 
primary nature.   
 In a certain sense coprophagia is the mode of relation through which the natural world is 
sustained. It is only through the articulation of a circuit through which food becomes excrement, 
and excrement becomes food, that nature can be conceived of as a self-sufficient system. Indeed, 
the historical development of the science of thermodynamics—the study of the transformation of 
energy—is coincident with scientific research into coprophagia. “In biology, the spontaneous 
generation of life from decaying substances was a prevalent view as recently as the seventeenth 
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and eighteenth centuries.” It was thought, for example, “that flies arose spontaneously from 
faeces” (Rationality in an Uncertain World, 157). Helmholtz writes that, before an understanding 
of thermodynamics processes, people “were not aware that eating could be connected with the 
production of mechanical power. Food, they believed, was wanted only to restore the little 
damages in the machine, or to keep off friction, like the oil which made the axles of wheels to 
run smoothly” (115-6).  Before the thermodynamic articulation of the organism as machine for 
transforming energy, it seemed that flies arose spontaneously from feces.  Through the 
realization that the egg draws nourishment from waste, coprophagia appears as the engine of 
these material transformations. A scientific articulation of the origin of life, and the processes 
through which life is sustained, turns around the scene of coprophagia, as the inhuman mode of 
conjunction through which the animal world is sustained. 
 When, in his management of the mine, Gerald replicates the logic of an electrical current 
that moves between the two levels of the human, his own subjective life appears as an obscene 
remainder that horrifies Gudrun. In the relationship between Birkin and Ursula, modeled on the 
dung beetle, the corruption, death, and dissolution that horrify both Gerald and Gudrun are 
eroticized. If, in the dung beetle, the incorporation of excrement enacts the flow between the 
series of oppositions—death and life, anus and mouth, lumbar ganglion and solar plexus—that 
structure the division Lawrence's universe, then it would seem that the “untranslatable” electrical 
flow, moving from Birkin's loins to Ursula's mouth as Ursula kneels behind Birkin, stands in for 
the unspeakable coprophagia of the dung beetle. Just as the dung beetle is a symbol for Ra, the 
Egyptian god of the sun, the “something more” that Ursula experiences is linked to her 
description of Birkin as “not a man” but “ one of the sons of God.” The circuit that Gerald forges 
through his scientific management of the mine is governed by a “God in the machine,” and 
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produces Gerald's subjective life as an obscene remainder. The circuit that Birkin and Ursula 
forge is governed by a different kind of God, who lives in corruption and death, and serves as a 
support for a metaphoric reincorporation of this obscene, excluded subjectivity. The internal 
relations through which the flows of the universe are maintained are figured as the process 
through which waste is transformed into nourishment, and in which the problem of a subjective 
remainder ceases to exist. 
 The relationship of waste to anal erotics becomes the central concern of Lady 
Chatterley's Lover. As in Women in Love, a mechanistic discourse, where “man tries not to 
flow,” and “repeats himself over and over in mechanical monotony of conceit / and hence is a 
mess (Poems, 479)” serves to produce subjectivity as the excremental remainder that is 
eroticized in a redemptive scene of anal intercourse. The failure of mechanism becomes the 
necessary support of a successful vital flow, in that it produces the excremental remainder that is 
incorporated in the ecstatic flow of sexual energy.  This double move is essential for 
understanding how it is that Lawrence produces a fantasy of primary nature.  The flow of 
primary nature appears only as the negation of the intellectualization of the flow.  The universal 
flow is only possible, because of the failure of the intellectualization of the flow.    
 Clifford is paralyzed from the waist down, and thus cut off from the lower regions where, 
Lawrence argues, the vital unconscious resides. Early in the novel he takes on a nurse, Mrs. 
Bolton, who both infantilizes him, and transforms him into a man of industry. It is “[u]nder [her] 
influence,” that “Clifford began to take a new interest in the mines. He began to feel he 
belonged. A new sort of self-assertion came into him. After all, he was the real boss in 
Tevershall, he was really the pits. It was a new sense of power, something he had till now shrunk 
from with dread”(109). Mrs. Bolton “said to Connie one day: 'All men are babies, when you 
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come to the bottom of them. Why, I've handled some of the toughest customers as ever went 
down Tevershall pit. But let anything ail them so that you have to do it for them, and they're 
babies, just big babies. Oh, there's not much difference in men'” (103). In one way, Lawrence 
writes, “Mrs Bolton made a man of him, as Connie never did. Connie kept him apart, and made 
him sensitive and conscious himself and his own states. Mrs Bolton made him aware only of 
outside things. Inwardly he began to go soft as pulp. But outwardly he began to be effective” 
(112). This indifference to subjective life and experience transforms him into “almost a creature, 
with a hard, efficient shell of an exterior and a pulpy interior” (115). As in Gerald's case, 
Clifford's engagement in the industrial world is internally related to an infantilizing Oedipal 
sexuality that functions to manage and limit the fact of subjective life. 
 This industrial creature has the same form as the “ball-rolling scarab,” yet where the dung 
beetle is a signifier for the movement between inside and outside, between food and excrement, 
the industrial creature comes to signify the impossibility of a movement between inside and 
outside.  The dung beetle expresses the philosophy of Lawrence's universal flow, while this 
industrial creature expresses Clifford's own philosophy of “conservative-anarchism.” As Clifford 
explains, this means that “people can be what they like and feel what they like, strictly privately, 
as long as they keep the form of life intact, and the apparatus”(187). While Connie argues that 
the desperation of the masses is caused by the structure of industrialization, Clifford counters 
that it is this structure that allows the masses to survive. Their livelihood, and thus their 
anarchical freedom, requires the rigid structure of industrial life. It is the workers choice to 
participate in the form of life they choose. As Clifford says, “I can't live their lives for them. 
Every beetle must live its own life” (189). The separation of the form of life from an anarchical 
freedom—in which subjectivity is lost to discourse—transforms Clifford into a “creature” and 
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the miners into “beetles.” Whereas the dung beetle, as the “ball-rolling scarab” that the Egyptians 
worshipped, is linked with a theological signifier, these beetles are a symbol of a base animality, 
of a world from which an animating spirit has withdrawn. 
 Cut off both figuratively—as an industrial creature—and literally—as a paraplegic—
from the lower centers that in which, Lawrence argues, subjective life resides, Clifford makes 
several attempts to produce a circuit that will unify what Lawrence describes as the two levels of 
the human. As in the case of Gerald's mining innovations, Clifford plans to electrify the mine. 
Yet whereas Gerald's idea is to use electricity to improve the efficiency of the mine, Clifford's 
idea is to use a waste coal to produce electricity. 
Clifford’s idea was, that his coal, even the poor sort, could be made into 
hard concentrated fuel that would burn at great heat if fed with certain 
damp, acidulated air at a fairly strong pressure. It had long been observed 
that in a particularly strong, wet wind the pit-bank burned very vivid, gave 
off hardly any fumes, and left a fine powder of ash, instead of the slow 
pink gravel. 
‘But where will you find the proper engines for burning your fuel?’ asked 
Winter. 
‘I’ll make them myself. And I’ll use my fuel myself. And I’ll sell electric 
power. I’m certain could do it. (155-156) 
 
On the one hand, Clifford's innovation narrates historical fact. As Neil Buxton writes, electricity 
had been used in mining from the 1880’s on, “in virtually every mining operation requiring 
mechanical power”(108), and by the first decades of the twentieth century it was discovered that 
“waste heat could be profitably employed to generate electricity”(109). Buxton continues that 
“by the first world war, a high proportion of collieries possessed their own small generating 
plants” (109). By using waste coal to produce electricity, industrial progress is aligned with a 
thermodynamic observation that waste contains energy, and thus value. Clifford's creative 
contribution to the history of industry becomes, for Lawrence, coincident with the attempt to 
replicate a natural coprophagic circuit, in which waste is transformed into energy. 
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 This same attempt to construct a mechanical relationship to his loins appears in Clifford's 
gas-powered wheelchair. Clifford's paralysis is both a mark of his separation from his subjective 
life, and of his industrial prowess. As he says to Connie, “[n]either my mind nor my will is 
crippled, and I don't rule with my legs” (190). When Clifford, in his wheelchair, and Connie, on 
foot, take a walk on the grounds, Clifford quips that he is “Sir Clifford on his foaming 
steed”(186), and continues that “I ride on the achievements of the mind of man, and that beats a 
horse”(186). Clifford's fantasy of mastering this circuit fails not in the pits, but in relationship to 
his own paralyzed limbs. When Clifford tries to climb a hill in his motorized chair, the motor is 
not strong enough, and he becomes stuck. Finally, Clifford gives up, and asks Mellors to help 
push the chair up the hill. “With a strange noise the chair was fighting the hill. Mellors pushed 
steadily behind, and up she went” (196). In this fight between man and a machine—an effort that 
almost kills Mellors, who is left exhausted, “his heart beating and his face white with the effort, 
semi-conscious” (198), Lawrence underlines the failure of Clifford's mechanical mastery of his 
legs, bowels, and sex.  In Clifford's failure to bring his lower regions under mechanical control, it 
is Mellors who is forced to take the place of the original that the prosthesis is supposed to 
replace. This identification of Mellors with a primal and dark energy is underscored by Mellors's 
first name, Oliver, which at the turn of the century was common slang for the moon (OED), that 
“other white pole of cosmic volition” in which reside “the great forces of magnetism and 
electricity”(FU, 172). It is Mellors who discovers how subjectivity, figured as the same kind of 
excremental remain that Clifford hopes to purify into fuel, can be incorporated into a new form 
of life, which leaves no subjective remainder. 
 It is thus no surprise that Connie's relationship to Mellors is mediated through the bowels. 
The first time Mellors sees Connie, “there was something so mute and forlorn in her, compassion 
  160 
flamed in his bowels for her” (120). After a sexual encounter, “Connie went slowly home, 
realizing the depth of the other thing in her. Another self was alive in her, burning molten and 
soft in her womb and bowels, and with this self she adored him” (140). It is the fact of Connie's 
material, excremental, existence that most interests Mellors: “Tha'rt real, tha art! Tha'art real, 
even a bit of a bitch. Here tha shits an' here tha pisses: an' I lay my hand on 'em both an' like thee 
for it. I like thee for it. Tha's got a proper, woman's arse, proud of itself. It's none ashamed of 
itself, this isna” (232). It is not in spite of an association with shit and piss that Mellors eroticizes 
Connie's anus and vagina. Rather, they are privileged because they are sites of excrement. 
When Mellors and Connie have anal sex, it is figured as a purification of the body from 
shame. “Though a little frightened, she let him have his way, and the reckless, shameless 
sensuality shook her to her foundations, stripped her to the very last, and made a different 
woman of her”(257). Rather than give a physical description of Mellors's penis or Connie's anus, 
Lawrence narrates the scene through a series of metaphors for purification. It is “necessary,” 
Lawrence writes, “forever necessary, to burn out false shames and smelt out the heaviest ore of 
the body into purity. With the fire of sheer sensuality” (257-8). In Lawrence's metaphor Connie's 
anus becomes a pit mine in which Mellors encounters a heavy ore that must be processed. Just as 
Clifford transforms waste coal “into hard concentrated fuel that would burn at great heat” (155), 
a “fire of sheer sensuality” (257) purifies the “ore” of Connie's shame. Connie's “shame” 
Lawrence suggests, is an insult to sex, and obscenity is overcome by the fire of a “shameless 
sensuality” that liberates Connie. 
 In Pornography and Obscenity, Lawrence writes that “[p]ornography is the attempt to 
insult sex, to do dirt on it” (12). Shame, in these terms is the product of this insult to sex. 
Lawrence thus argues that his explicit language and narration are neither pornographic nor 
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obscene because it is only shame that makes sex obscene. Yet in figuring the scene of anal sex as 
the restoration of a pure sexuality, Lawrence's erotics becomes dependent on obscenity. Since the 
purification of obscenity is the erotic content of the scene of anal sex, if there were there no 
obscenity to purify, this scene of anal sex would lose its erotic potential. Lawrence's idea of a 
purifying sex that functions to repair the identification of desire with obscenity and shame can 
only function if the subject is identified as obscene and shameful. Without the problem of an 
excluded subjectivity, there would be no need to articulate a discourse to repair this exclusion. 
Without a “heaviest ore” there is nothing to purify. The erotics of this experience, which helps 
return Connie to her “natural sexual flow” (276), depends both rhetorically and materially on the 
existence of a mode of subjective interiority that is excluded from discourse. 
 Lawrence, it seems, would agree with Freud that human sexuality exists in terms of a 
relationship with disgust and shame. 
Such feelings [of disgust] seem originally to be a reaction to the smell (and 
afterwards also also to the sight) of excrement. But the genitals can act as 
a reminder of the excremental functions; and this applies especially to the 
male member, for that organ performs the function of micturition as well 
as the sexual function. Indeed, the function of micturition is the earlier 
known of the two, and the only one known during the pre-sexual period. 
Thus it happens that disgust becomes one of the means of affective 
expression in the sphere of sexual life. The Early Christian Father's “inter 
urinas et faeces nascimur” clings to it and cannot be detached from it in 
spite of every effort at idealization. (Dora, 24) 
 
In Three Essays, Freud writes that while “Disgust seems to be one of the forces which have led 
to a restriction of the sexual aim [...] The sexual instinct in its strength enjoys overriding this 
disgust” (Three Essays, 18). In other words, as Tim Dean writes, desire and disgust are “two 
sides of the same coin” ( 24). In the “polymorphously perverse disposition [...] the mental dams 
against sexual excesses—shame, disgust, and morality—have either not yet been constructed at 
all or are in course of construction, according to the age of the child. In this respect children 
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behave in the same kind of way as an average uncultivated woman in whom the same 
polymorphously perverse disposition persists” (Three Essays, 57). As Dean argues, “Sexual 
desire might be described as that which can be satisfied only by exceeding a limit, specifically, a 
boundary of one's own psychic constitution. It is not just culturally conventional boundaries but 
one's own real limits that must be defeated in order to achieve complete erotic enjoyment”(137). 
If disgust is a sign of repression, the work of desire, of a “polymorphous perverse disposition,” 
involves the labor to eroticize the unidealized material of the body, to find, in the overcoming of 
the ego's disgust for the body, a limitless enjoyment. It is in the overcoming of a disgust at the 
body, through an eroticization of a body rendered obscene and shameful by moral judgment, that 
Connie comes to participate in a naturalized scene of sexual energy. 
 In the anal sex scene, Lawrence's metaphoric language shifts, as Connie's fear and shame 
are “roused up and routed by the phallic hunt of the man”(258) that finds, “at the core of the 
physical jungle, the last and deepest recess of organic shame”(258). While the comparison of 
Connie's anus to a mine depends upon a certain analogic similarity—both are dark openings— 
here, Connie's anus becomes a tropical “jungle,” through which the phallus passes, as if on a 
dangerous or difficult safari. As Lawrence writes, it “took some getting at, the core of the 
physical jungle” (258), and “the phallus alone could explore it” (258). A scene of absolute 
interiority, generally excluded from both visual and narrative representation, becomes an exterior 
scene, a “jungle.” As this phallic hunt cures Connie of her shame, a problem of subjectivity 
becomes coincident with physical interiority. 
 At the same time that the “inside”—Connie's anus—becomes a visually conceivable 
“outside,” Mellors and Connie become internal to a discourse that is governed by fetishistically 
detached genitalia. As they lie in bed, Mellors and Connie consider Mellors’ penis as an object 
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that neither of them possesses. “‘And now he’s tiny and soft like a little bud of life!’ she said, 
taking the soft small penis in her hand. ‘Isn’t he somehow lovely! so on his own, so strange! And 
so innocent! And he comes so far into me! You must never insult him, you know. He’s mine too. 
He’s not only yours. He’s mine! And so lovely and innocent!’”(219). When Connie comments 
on Mellors’s pubic hair, Mellors responds that “That’s John Thomas’s hair, not mine!”(219), and 
continues that “He’s got his root in my soul has that gentleman! An’ sometimes I don’ know 
what ter do wi’ him. Ay, he’s got a will of his own, an’ it’s hard to suit him. Yet I wouldn’t have 
him killed” (219). “‘No wonder men have always been afraid of him!’ she said. ‘He’s rather 
terrible” (219), to which Mellors responds “There! Take him then! He’s thine” (219). When, 
alone, Connie considers the “sense of freedom and life” that Mellors has given her, by restoring 
her “natural sexual flow”(276), she is struck by “the image of him, naked white with tanned face 
and hands, looking down and addressing his erect penis as if it were another being”(276). 
 As Mellors's penis becomes a separate entity, Connie’s genitalia is, likewise, separated 
from her body. Mellors tells Connie that “th'art good cunt, though, aren't ter? Best bit o' cunt left 
on Earth. When ter likes! When tha'rt willin'!”(185). Connie responds by asking what “cunt” 
means. 
'What is cunt?' she said. 
'An' doesn't ter know? Cunt! It's thee dow theer; an' wha I get when I'm 
i'side thee, and what tha gets when I'm i'side thee; it's as it is, all on't.' 
'All on't,' she teased. 'Cunt! It's like fuck then.' 
'Nay nay! Fuck's only what you do. Animals fuck. But cunt's a lot more 
than that. It's thee, dost see: an' tha'rt a lot besides an animal, aren't ter? —
even ter fuck? Cunt! Eh, that's the beauty o' thee, lass!' (185) 
 
Mellors's definition of “cunt” as a particularly human sensation of having sex seems far from the 
standard use of “cunt” as an obscene term for female external genitalia. This disembodied 
genitalia, like Mellors’s disembodied penis, locates Mellors and Connie as moments within the 
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impersonal flow of Lawrence's unconscious. 
 Dean writes, in a lucid account of the history of the fetish in psychoanalytic thought, that 
“by showing how human sexuality has less to do with genitalia than with the unconscious, Freud 
argued that nothing is sexual until it is made so”(148). 
Sexuality conforms to the dictates of fantasy, not to those of anatomy. 
Even genitalia require sexualization before they can be considered erotic, 
as any child will tell you. At a certain moment in the history of 
psychoanalytic thought, Lacan turned Freud's theory of fetishism on its 
head by declaring that, rather than the fetish substituting for the mother's 
missing penis, the penis itself take son the value of a fetish. Lacan's claim 
is that heterosexual women fetishize—although he might as well have aid 
that gay men do so too. Indeed, plenty of straight men seem to fetishize 
their own penises. (148) 
 
Thus, as Dean continues, “psychoanalytic accounts offer a description of human sexuality as 
ineluctably fetishistic, in the sense not of referring ultimately to the penis (or the phallus) but of 
drawing attention to the fantasmatic transformation of objects that have no preordained 
value”(148). As Lawrence transforms various sites the body—the womb, bowels, penis, and 
vagina—into detached erotic objects, these objects become signifiers within an unconscious 
logic. As a structural element in this bisexual flow, Connie's identity is reduced to the fact of her 
biological sex. As she notes, with Mellors “it wasn't really personal. She was only really a female 
to him” (127). 
But perhaps that was better. And after all, he was kind to the female in her, 
which no man had ever been. Men were very kind to the person she was, 
but rather cruel to the female, despising her or ignoring her altogether. 
Men were awfully kind to Constance Reid or to Lady Chatterley; but not 
to her womb they weren't kind. And he took no notice of Constance or of 
Lady Chatterley; he just softly stroked her loins or her breasts. (127) 
 
Connie vanishes as a “person” and reappears as a set of erogenous zones that sustain the flow of 
a trans-subjective energy. 
 Lawrence writes in one of his Pansies that “As a plant becomes pot-bound / man 
  165 
becomes ego-bound / enclosed in his own limited mental consciousness” (Poems, 474). In this 
metaphor, the ego-bound man will die, “Unless he is a sturdy plant. / Then he can burst the pot, / 
shell off his ego / and get his roots in earth again, / raw earth” (Poems, 475). While the pot-
bound ego is separate from the world, Lawrence's subject is part of the world, for this subjective 
world is not opposed to, but rather falsified by, the division between self and world, between ego 
and non-ego. The subject is not produced in relationship to an outside, just because the problems 
of “interiority” and “exteriority” have nothing to do with the scene of subjectivity. For Lawrence, 
the unconscious is the truth of physical reality. Subjectivity is no longer excluded from the 
external world, for Lawrence places the “pristine unconscious” at the limit where pure interiority 
collapses into pure exteriority. 
 Francis Ferguson notes that for all the transformative rhetoric of Lawrence's flow, these 
transformations seem to have a minimal effect on the social world. As she writes, “if Connie 
Chatterley has been formed by the sexual evangelism that changes bodies and lives, her 
conversion looks suspiciously like a matter of her being duped”(142). Rather than read Connie's 
transformation as linked to a modest class rebellion, Ferguson suggests that the novel works to 
solidify Connie's relationship both to Clifford, and to legitimate English society. Ferguson notes 
that “Mellors's job”—as a gamekeeper—“commits him to protecting Clifford's property against 
the members of his own class, the colliers whose poaching might thin out the ranks of Clifford's 
game” (143). Rather than abandon his job, which would result in Connie becoming a kind of 
“fair game” (143), Ferguson argues that even after Mellors leaves England he continues to 
function as a gamekeeper. This allows Lawrence to argue for a “game-law theory of marriage” 
that ensures Clifford's continual possession of Connie. “Game,” writes Ferguson, is “a movable 
version of real, that is, immovable property, is not a landholder's because of its emanating from 
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his land. Game, rather, is the landholder's property because it can never escape his claim no 
matter how far it strays” (144). 
Lady Chatterley's lover is Clifford's gamekeeper. Lady Chatterley's lover 
is the gamekeeper. Lady Chatterley is Clifford's game. It is not, however, 
that Connie Chatterley is Clifford's game because he possesses her as he 
does the rabbits or because she is as promiscuous as a rabbit. Instead, it is 
that in Mellors's dialect that her name is rabbit [...]. The gamekeeper keeps 
Connie. (145) 
 
It seems clear that the erotics of the relationship between Mellors and Connie depends upon, 
rather than revolts against, the class structure that situates their relationship. However, it is not 
merely the case that Mellors's relationship to Connie maintains Connie within the legitimate 
world of property. For at the same time their relationship serves to eroticize the differences of 
class and property that overdetermine their relationship, and thus to situate these “legitimate” 
claims of class and property within the logic of Lawrence's unconscious. 
 In the novel's epistolary conclusion—which for Ferguson marks the difficulty for Mellors 
and Connie of overcoming the illegitimacy of their relationship, and thus is evidence that the 
novel fails in its modest class rebellion—the lovers address each other in terms of their 
illegitimate, erotic marriage, as “Lady Jane and “John Thomas.” While this illegitimate marriage, 
which is celebrated when Mellors and Connie adorn their genitalia with flowers and Mellors 
proclaims that “This is John Thomas marryin' Lady Jane [...].  An' we mun let Constance an' 
Oliver go their ways”(237), offers an alternative to Connie's legal marriage to Clifford, it too 
depends on class differences, for John Thomas—which from the mid-nineteenth century was 
slang for a liveried servant—is like a penis in that it “‘stands’ in the presence of a 
lady”(Cassell’s Dictionary of Slang, 810). Ferguson's reading of a “game-law theory of 
marriage” roughly coincides with Clifford's own theory of conservative-anarchism, in that both 
declare that people can do what they want as long as the form of life is maintained. 
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 Lawrence seems to suggest, however, that the social order, itself, can be fetishized, and 
thus taken up into the logic of the transformative unconscious flow. Just as the logic of 
thermodynamics is initially presented as an exclusion of the subject but, when fetishized in a 
scene of anal eroticism, becomes the means through which this exclusion is overcome, class 
relations, when fetishized, are appropriated in the service of a erotics. While, as Ferguson 
suggests, Lawrence might be profoundly disinterested in changing the social order—for it is just 
this set of differences that becomes fetishistic material—it would be equally wrong to suggest 
that Lawrence is interested in maintaining the social order. In terms of Lawrence's erotics, the 
form of social relations is neither good nor bad: social relations are only the material through 
which Lawrence articulates the logic of his vital unconscious. The problems of a social 
formations—as the exclusion of subjectivity from Clifford's conservative-anarchism—becomes 
coincident with the erotic potential inherent within it. For if the social world excludes, as 
obscene, a mode of human experience, it is only on the basis of this obscenity that Lawrence 
erects his vital unconscious. 
 
III:   Lawrence's Animals  
  
 It is only by abandoning a search for intellectual control, Lawrence argues, that one can 
come to participate in the logic of the “universal flow.”  Given that he opposes industry and 
intellectualism to a participation in nature, it is no surprise that for Lawrence animal being 
appears as a privileged site of resistance.  It is through a consideration of the alien world of the 
animal that Lawrence theorizes the relationship between knowledge and the material fact of the 
universal flow.  While there is no way to enter into the subjective world of the animal, humans 
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and animals share the same world of action.  This shared world of action, beyond knowledge, 
allows Lawrence to theorize the universal flow.   
 Carrie Rohman proposes that for Lawrence “anti-industrialism and antirationalism are 
pivotal axes of thought that correspond—however complexly—with a kind of recuperative 
stance toward the animal”(25).  As Rohman continues, “Lawrence privileges the being of 
animals and seems to ascribe to them a more pure ontological mode that exists outside language 
that, if restored to the human animal, can save him or her from the deadening effects of advanced 
socialization”(103).  This privileging of the animal being thus walks a delicate line  “between 
respecting and co-opting the alterity of the animal other”(130).  Lawrence works to 
deanthropomorphize the animal, and to thus expose an inhuman mode of animal being.  This 
animal being functions as a limit to the human.  And yet at the same, time the inhuman world of 
the animal provides a model for a deanthropomorphized humanity, in which the human 
overcomes this limitation and participates in the richly satisfying world of animal being.  This 
double figuring of the animal depends, as Rohman writes, on the fashion in which Lawrence 
“spiritualizes the animal”(99).  If, in Clifford's description, the workers scurry in the pit like 
beetles, it is when the beetle is conjoined with the theological, as in the case of “the ball-rolling 
scarab” that “the Egyptians worshipped”(Women, 263), that the animal opens to the possibility of 
a discourse of the subject. 
    For Lawrence, then, the animal would seem to have a dual function.  The animal at 
once offers a limit to the human intellect, and an entrance to the logic of the flow of energy that 
operates beyond the limits of knowledge.  This tension is clearly apparent in the sequential 
poems “Bat” and “Man and Bat.”  In the first poem, “Bat,” the bat is only approached in terms of 
Lawrence's own emotional response to the bat.  Bats are “Creatures that hang themselves up like 
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an old rag, to sleep; / And disgustingly upside down. / Hanging upside down like rows of 
disgusting old rags / And grinning in their sleep. / Bats!”(Poems, 342).   This is a fully 
anthropomorphic language, in which the bats are described in terms of their resemblance to 
signifiers within the human world: Lawrence finds a visual resemblance between the form of a 
bat and the form of “rows of disgusting old rags”(Poems, 342) hanging up to dry.  Any 
consideration of the subjective world of the bad is rigorously excluded from the poem.   
 While in “Bat,” Lawrence is in the position of a removed spectator contemplating an 
aesthetic object, in the following poem, “Man and Bat,” he encounters a bat, flying around his 
room, at mid-morning.  Lawrence's initial reaction to the bat is the same as in “Bat.”  The bat is 
“disgusting,” “intolerable,” and “impure”(Poems, 342).  Lawrence chases the bat around the 
room, waving his white handkerchief, but the bat will not leave.  Every time the bat approached 
the open window, he “blew back, as if an incoming wind blew him in again”(Poems, 343).  
Lawrence eventually notes that “He could not go out, / I also realized.... / It was the light of the 
day which he could not enter, / Any more than I could enter the white-hot door of a blast furnace. 
// He could not plunge into the daylight that streamed at the window. / It was asking too much of 
his nature”(344).  As in the scene of transformative sex between Clifford and Connie, a series of 
moral and aesthetic judgments are first presented as an obstacle to a participation in the logic of 
the flow.  It is by overcoming this disgust that the logic of nature can reveal itself.  Lawrence’s 
disgust at the bat, like Gerald’s disgust at the beetle face of the African figurine, eventually 
opens to the logic of primary nature.   
 The poem thus becomes a kind of ethological study, in that Lawrence attempts to 
understand the bat's subjective world.  He turns on the electric light, “thinking: / now the outside 
will seem brown”(344), but this attempt to intervene in the bat's subjective world fails.  Finally, 
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the bat, exhausted, cowers in the corner.  The bat continues to disgust Lawrence.  It is 
“something unclean” that “must not squat, nor hang, obscene, in my room”(346).  Lawrence is 
thus presented with “a dilemma”(346):  should he “hit him and kill him and throw him 
away”(346), or does he have a duty to care for the bat?  The poem continues: 
Nay, 
I didn't create him. 
Let the God that created him be responsible for his death... 
Only, in the bright day, I will not have this clot in my room. 
 
Let the God who is maker of bats watch with them in their unclean 
 corners....  
I admit a God in every crevice, 
But not bats in my room; 
Nor the God of bats, while the sun shines. (346) 
 
Whereas in Lawrence's initial aesthetic judgement the bat is unclean because it reminds him of 
dirty rags, in this theological mode the bat is “impure” because it has another God.  Presumably 
the bat is a good bat and is, to the God of bats, a pure bat.  It is nevertheless, to Lawrence and his 
God, impure, unclean, and obscene.  And yet, since “the human soul is fated to wide-eyed 
responsibility / In life”(347), Lawrence picks up the bat in a flannel jacket, and shakes the bat out 
of the window.  This responsibility is not a choice, but the rule, the fate, of the human.  While 
Lawrence decides to be responsible, he is still filled with disgust: “I would have had to kill him if 
he'd bitten me, the impure one”(347).  If Lawrence were to kill the bat because of the aesthetic 
judgement that he passes on the bat, as something impure, then he would be guilty of bringing 
the under the sign of his own “God.”  He would have reduced the bat to its anthropomorphized 
appearance in his perceptual world.  However, if the bat were to attack him, he could kill the bat 
on its own terms.  If the bat attacked Lawrence, the “God that created him” would “be 
responsible for his death.”  The bat functions a limit to the human world, for the bat and the 
human have different “Gods.”  At the same time, as long as the radical difference between the 
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human world and the bat's world is respected, Lawrence suggests that there is a mode of material 
interaction between him and the bat.  It is only in overcoming this judgement that the bat is 
obscene that a mode of interaction between Lawrence and the bat is possible.  This material 
interaction, beyond the terms of disgust and purity, becomes the logic of the universal flow.   
 The poem does not end with a congratulatory gesture towards human life and human 
responsibility, but with an attempt to speak the self-importance of the bat’s world: 
And now, at evening, as he flickers over the river 
Dipping with petty triumphant flight, and tittering over the sun's departure, 
I believe he chirps, pipistrello, seeing me here on this terrace writing: 
There he sits, the long loud one! 
But I am greater than he... 
I escaped him....  (Poems, 347) 
 
The limit to anthropocentrism can only be found by an articulation of the bat's world, a world in 
which the bat, not the human, is central.  And yet this limit is articulated through 
anthropomorphic language, as Lawrence speaks of the bat’s world in human terms, as egotistical 
and self- important, congratulating himself on his daring escape.   
 As the ethologist Jacob von Uexküll, whose work is roughly coincident with Lawrence's, 
writes, “a kind of megalomania has seized men, and they will no longer recognize limits to the 
possibility of knowledge.  To the observer in the balloon this megalomania has something 
comical in it; human beings seem to him like flies gone so mad that they believe they can 
command a view of the entire universe and master it”(334).  Uexküll himself loosely quotes 
Nietzsche's myth of humanity, where “once upon a time, in some out of the way corner of the 
universe which is dispersed into numberless twinkling solar systems, there was a star upon which 
clever beasts invented knowing”: 
That was the most arrogant and mendacious minute of “world history,” 
but nevertheless, it was only a minute.  After nature had drawn a few 
breaths, the star cooled and congealed, and the clever beasts had to die.  
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One might invent such a fable, and yet he still would not have adequately 
illustrated how miserable, how shadowy and transient, how aimless and 
arbitrary the human intellect looks within nature.  There were eternities 
during which it did not exist.  And when it is all over with the human 
intellect, nothing would lead it beyond human life.  Rather, it is human, 
and only its possessor takes it so solemnly—as thought the world's axis 
turned within it. But if we could communicate with the gnat, we would 
learn that he likewise flies through the air with the same solemnity, that he 
feels the flying center of the universe within himself. There is nothing so 
reprehensible and unimportant in nature that it would not immediately 
swell up like a balloon at the slightest puff of this power of knowing.  And 
just as every porter wants to have an admirer, so even the eyes of the 
universe telescopically focused upon his action and thought.  (79) 
 
Nietzsche’s myth thus equates the arrogance of the intellect with the thermodynamic heat death 
of the universe—where “the star cooled and congealed.”  Nietzsche suggests that even if we 
consider the human intellect as a momentary eruption within world history, we are unable to 
understand the “misery” of the intellect within nature.  As Lawrence argues, the hubris that the 
intellect could understand world history itself, that it could impose its logic on nature, is equally 
“arrogant and mendacious.”  There must therefore be another way to truly displace the arrogance 
of the intellect.  Whereas for Uexküll or Nietzsche the idea of an egotistical animal registers the 
absurdity of epistemological certainty, for Lawrence the possibility that the animal is at the 
center of its own world suggests that the difference between the animal and the human is not so 
difficult to overcome.  When Connie tries to explain to Hilda that “love can be wonderful:  when 
you feel you live, and are in the very middle of creation”(251), Hilda responds by comparing 
Connie to just this parody of the self-important insect: “I suppose every mosquito feels the 
same”(251).  Connie finds Hilda's reasoning impeccable:  “Do you think it does?  How nice for 
it!”(251).  Rather than appeal to the mosquito as an example of hubris, the analogy between the 
human and the mosquito, for Connie, reveals an erotic truth.   
 If Lawrence writes a kind of metaphysical poetry, it is a metaphysical poetry after 
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Nietzsche, after Uexküll.  In John Donne's “The Flea,” the poetic importance of the flea is the 
erotic possibility it presents in the commingling of the poet and lover's blood. 
Mark but this flea, and mark in this, 
How little that which thou deniest me is;  
It suck'd me first, and now sucks thee,  
And in this flea our two bloods mingled be. 
Thou know'st that this cannot be said 
A sin, nor shame, nor loss of maidenhead; 
Yet this enjoys before it woo, 
And pamper'd swells with one blood made of two; 
And this, alas! is more than we would do.  (58) 
 
In Lawrence's “The Mosquito,” the blood-sucking mosquito is equally related to an erotics, but 
Lawrence's erotics emerges at an epistemological limit.  While the mosquito is “Obscenely 
ecstasied” drinking the “Forbidden liquor” of “My blood”(333), Lawrence writes, addressing the 
mosquito, that “You don't know that I exist, and I don't know that you exist”(333).  While Donne 
enjoins his addressee to spare the flea, and to thus have sex with him, Lawrence kills the 
mosquito.  Yet it is in this moment of violence that a kind of erotic union takes place, for while 
neither Lawrence nor the mosquito knows that the other exists, at the bite, then slap, each enters 
into the other's world.  As Lawrence writes, again addressing the mosquito, “Can I not overtake 
you? /... / Am I not mosquito enough to out-mosquito you?”(334).  Where there is no shared 
world of knowledge, the mosquito and human are joined in interlocking worlds of action, worlds 
in which each has an overdetermined relationship to the other.  On the one hand Lawrence kills 
the mosquito because of its “obscene enjoyment” of his blood.  Yet at the same time, in 
becoming “mosquito enough” to intervene in the mosquito's world, Lawrence himself 
participates in an “obscene enjoyment” of the mosquito's blood.  Likewise, when Lawrence saves 
the bat that is trapped in his room, it is part of his moral duty as a human.  But if the bat had 
bitten him, he would have been not just justified, but required, to kill the bat.  It is only the hubris 
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of knowledge that would allow the human to kill the animal because of its obscenity; it is an 
animal reaction that allows the human to partake of this obscenity.  The only way to think a 
shared world of action, in which the roles of “man” and “woman,” as well as “bat” or 
“mosquito” determine action without necessitating an appeal to a uniform epistemological space, 
is by theorizing a transcendental ground for each subject.   
 The fact that each animal lives in a mutually exclusive world defined by the centrality of 
its own God initially suggests that Lawrence substitutes a kind of multi-species polytheism—
where the human has a human-God, the bat has a bat-God, and the mosquito has a mosquito-
God—for Christian monotheism.  It is in this polytheistic world that the animal other is figured 
as impure or obscene.  A second theological gambit lies in Lawrence's effort to think the material 
relations between these different worlds, governed by different Gods. The question of these 
material interactions returns to the problem that Lawrence notes in Einstein's theory of 
relativity—that of how to think a world comprised of relative relationships without proposing a 
uniform language into which all these relationships are translated. 
  Lawrence's suspicion is that while relativity opens up the possibility of considering life 
and beings as immanently organized, the fact that these relations are mathematized suggests a 
retreat from the close consideration of the real relations that persist between phenomena.  Ian 
Hacking makes the same observation when he writes that “relativity was often presented in its 
day as a refutation of Kant’s transcendental aesthetic”(38).  Yet if, as Hacking continues, 
relativity was a refutation of the uniformity of space and time assumed in vulgar Kantian science, 
it was equally “an utterly Kantian moment in the philosophy of science” in that “the conception 
of physical science as unstable, as a matter or refutation and revolution, went in hand with a total 
lack of interest in the role of experimental science”(38).  Uexküll, whose close studies of the 
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animal world attempted to examine animal behaviour without assuming that his animal subject's 
live in a human world, is one notable exception to this trend.   As Giorgio Agamben writes, 
“Uexküll’s investigations into the animal environment are contemporary with both quantum 
physics and the artistic avant-gardes.  And like them, they express the unreserved abandonment 
of every anthropocentric perspective in the life sciences and the radical dehumanization of the 
image of nature”(39).  I want to suggest that Uexküll's theorization of the animal—which, like 
Lawrence's vision of “a God in every crevice”(346) argues that the condition of a 
deanthropomorphized animality is the articulation of a transcendental factor that conditions each 
animal's subjective world—clarifies the theoretical stakes of Lawrence's animals. 
 As for Lawrence, Uexküll's fundamental gesture is one of opposition to nineteenth 
century mechanistic energetics.  Uexküll begins his Theoretical Biology, in which he provides 
the theoretical basis for his in-depth studies of the subjective worlds of animals, by orienting 
both his technique and metaphysics in opposition to Hermann von Helmholtz.  Uexküll writes 
that while Helmholtz “indeed acknowledged that all objects must appear different to each 
subject...he was seeking the reality behind appearances. Many have done this before him:  but he 
differed from his predecessors in supposing that what lies behind appearance is not the 
“Weltgeist,” but the physical laws of the universe”(xv).  Uexküll suggests that Helmholtz tries to 
step beyond the world of appearance, by proposing a mathematically governed logic of the real.   
 Against Helmholtz's hypothesis that there are objective laws that govern the universe, 
Uexküll proposes that knowledge must proceed through the study of the subject.  “No attempt to 
discover the reality behind the world of appearance, i.e. by neglecting the subject, has ever come 
to anything, because the subject plays the decisive rôle in constructing the world of experience, 
and on the far side of that world there is no world at all.”  As Uexküll continues,  “All reality is 
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subjective appearance.  This must constitute the great, fundamental admission even of biology.  
It is utterly vain to go seeking through the world for causes that are independent of the subject; 
we always come up against objects, which owe their construction to the subject”(xv).  For 
Uexküll this is a fundamentally Kantian project: 
When we admit that objects are appearances that owe their construction to 
a subject, we tread on firm and ancient ground, especially prepared by 
Kant to bear the edifice of the whole of natural science.  Kant set the 
subject, man, over against objects, and discovered the fundamental 
principles to which objects are built up by our mind.  (xv)   
 
Thus, “the task of biology consists in expanding in two directions the results of Kant’s 
investigations:—(1) by considering the part played by our body, and especially by our sense-
organs and the central nervous system, and (2) by studying the relations of other subjects 
(animals) to objects”(xv).  Ethology, that is, is the study of what each animal constructs as its 
subjective spatial and temporal world.  The curiosity is that if we read Uexküll against a Kantian 
transcendental aesthetics that assumes a natural world of uniform space and time, then we must 
explain what it means that Uexküll understands his project as the experimental completion of a 
Kantian project.  A partial response comes in the fact that whereas Helmholtz grounds science in 
a naturalized transcendental aesthetic, Uexküll grounds biology in Kant's ethics.   
 Uexküll understood the development of the organism in terms of Mendelian genetics, and 
wrote in staunch opposition to Darwinian evolution.   As Richard Dawkins writes, before the 
synthesis of genetics and natural selection, the mechanism of evolution remained largely 
inexplicable.   
It is hard to overstate the fact that Darwin’s genetics were pre-Mendelian.   
The intuitively plausible blending inheritance theory of his time was not 
just wrong, it was grievously wrong and especially grievous for natural 
selection.  Darwinism's incompatibility with blending inheritance was 
pointed out in a hostile review of the Origin by the Scottish engineer 
Fleeming Jenkin.  Variation tents to disappear with every blending 
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generation, leaving not enough for natural selection to get its teeth into.  
What Jenkin should have realized is that blending inheritance is 
incompatible not just with Darwinian theory but with obvious fact.  If it 
were really true that variation disappeared, every generation should be 
more uniform than the previous one.  By now, all individuals should be as 
indistinguishable as clones.  (67)  
 
While Uexküll would have had good reasons to argue against the logic of natural selection, his 
critique proceeds on more firmly philosophical grounds.  He argues that since time and space 
exist as the subjective conditions of experience, and since different organisms experience time 
and space differently, it is strictly nonsense to think that the evolution of the organism is a 
response to the objective spacial and temporal conditions of its environment.  Since space and 
time are produced by the subject, then there must be something in the organism that is outside of 
space and time.  Uexküll finds this extra-spacial and extra-temporal cause in Mendelian genetics, 
which, “when understood in its full significance, refutes any mechanical explanation of the 
developmental process”(198).  Uexküll thus argues that the spacial and temporal body of the 
animal emerges as the effect of “impulses” that proceed from the genes.  He writes:  “We may 
say that the genes are “impulsive,” but by that term we must not presume a physical energy, 
following the rule of causality; rather, we must understand the power to covert an extra-spatial 
and extra-temporal plan into a physical phenomenon”(216).   Uexküll calls the animal's body the 
“framework” of the animal.  The development of the animal thus consists in the spacialization 
and temporalization of this plan, in the production of the animal's “framework.”   
What the subject gains in shape it loses in fresh life-possibilities.  Thus the 
framework slowly increases in complexity and solidity but it becomes 
more and more like a machine, and loses one super-mechanical power 
after the other, until finally there is left in each cell only a remnant of the 
protoplasm containing the genes that serve for the necessary repairs.  The 
framework restricts framework-formation.  (216) 
 
The animal body, which includes the sensory apparatus through which the animal constructs the 
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objects of its worlds, is produced by a super-mechanical power that resides in the genes.      
 Since the formed animal functions according to the same physical laws that would govern 
the functioning of a machine, it is only this framework-forming force, which resides in the 
protoplasm of the cell, that distinguishes an animal from a machine:  the animal, unlike a 
machine, can change its form, and repair itself when it is damaged.  Accordingly, when Uexküll 
speaks of the subject, he does not refer to the actual animal, but to the extra-spacial and extra-
temporal law that guides the development of the animal.  The subject follows a law that is not 
reducible to the environmental forces at work on the organism.  As Uexküll writes,  “all subjects 
have a rule of function of their own, which expresses itself not only in the framework, given 
once and for all, and in the activity thereof, but which also is able to repair all framework within 
certain limits; consequently, this rule represents a natural factor that is continually 
operative”(353).  Uexküll thus distinguishes between the animal as the body that is the object of 
scientific discourse, and the animal as the subject that is, by definition, excluded from 
mechanical scientific discourse.  The “rule of function” is, as Uexküll writes, the transcendental 
condition of the material development of the organism.  It is in an attempt to theorize the 
relationship of this transcendental condition to the material body of the organism that Uexküll 
turns to Kant's ethics.   
The manner in which the specific energies are associated dispenses 
with mechanical compulsion, but is, in its nature, an imperative.  All 
living beings develop, not in accordance with a causal “thou must,” as is 
characteristic of the unorganized forces, but according to a biological 
“thou shalt.” 
“As we know, since Kant’s day the ethical command “thou shalt” 
is referred to a transcendental influence on the empirical character of the 
human being, and the empirical character of the human being, with a “thou 
must,” forces the decision. 
On this analogy, we may describe all actions of the body as “thou 
must,” so long as they are based on the compulsion of the developed 
biological organization, and all super-mechanical invasions as a “thou 
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shalt,” proceeding from the impulse-system.   
This way of considering things permits us to say of the impulse-
systems that they are “imperative” in respect of form, which they always 
relate to the development or maintenance of the individual.  This 
individual is always a subject, because it always forms a new world-centre.  
Everything that happens, happens for the individual only in so for as the 
phenomenon becomes a new indication within it.  The indications are, so 
to speak, the lighthouses of the individual, from which it gets glimpses of 
the world.  Each individual has only so much world as is subjectively 
accessible to it.  (353-4)   
 
The empirical world of the animal is produced through “super-mechanical invasions,” on the 
model of Kant's categorical imperative, that form and revise the physical existence of the animal.  
For Uexküll the possibility of a subjective science, of an ethological study that enters into the 
animal's subjective world, depends upon the theoretical articulation of a transcendental 
condition—on the analogy of the Kantian ethical imperative—through which the animal, as a 
“law onto itself” produces the world within which it lives.  While all animals do not share a 
single imaginary world, organized by a single transcendental factor, each animal lives in a 
specific imaginary world, organised by a specific transcendental factor.  Just as for Lawrence, 
Uexküll suggest that teach animal has its “own God.”  
 For Uexküll this transcendental factor functions not only to produce the animal's physical 
body, and sensory apparatus, but also to coordinate the animal with the external world in which 
it lives.  The animal lives in absolute congruence with its environment, because the animal never 
encounters an object that is outside of its world.  Uexküll proposes that we can conceive of the 
animal's relationship to its world by imagining that the animal moves through the world just as a 
ball of food moves through the digestive tract:  “the animal corresponds to the food-ball, and the 
alimentary canal to the surrounding-world”(307).  Only whereas in the case of the ball of food 
moving through the digestive system, the ball of food is moved forward through the peristaltic 
action of the intestines, in the case of the animal moving through its world, the animal's motion 
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produces the tunnel through which it moves.  “If we follow the track of some selected animal, 
we can re-create its surrounding-world around that track, by setting up again the indicators with 
which it came into contact.  The surrounding-world of the animal thus becomes a tunnel”(307).  
As Uexküll writes, “the life-path of an animal, which we may imagine as a tunnel of indications 
holds only such things as exist through their relations to the animal—those and no others.  If we 
wish to enter into the life-path of an earthworm, for instance, we must not forget that it is 
composed of earthworm things, and of nothing else”(307).   
 While the animal produces the “indication tunnel” through which it moves, the “function 
circle” is formed of elements that are independent of the animal.  As the animal advances 
through its tunnel-like surrounding world, “each forward movement causes an indicator to 
disappear and a new one to arise (306).  At each movement, a new “function-circle”(306) begins, 
in that the animal is engaged with a new element of the external world.  “The course of the 
function in each new circle means a new action, and so here also one action connects up with the 
others into a chain, which winds itself through the whole life”(306).  At the same time that the 
animal carves out a tunnel from the external world, “the rhythmic sequence of the function-
circles [...] is a creation of the external world, because the order in which the indicators appear 
depends on associations that are independent of the animal”(306).  Uexküll's example of the 
earthworm is, of course, fortuitous.  The earthworm moves through peristalsis, producing a 
tunnel as its surrounding world.  While this world is an earthworm's world, it is built of out the 
external world.  The specific density of the soil, its level of acidity, and the quantity of oxygen 
within correspond perfectly to the earthworm's needs.  This suggests to Uexküll that there is a 
perfect correspondence between the rhythms of the animal, and the rhythms of the external 
world.   
  181 
In terms of human thought, the inner rhythm of the animal knows the laws 
of the outer world, although the animal gets no information thereon 
through the indications at its disposal.  It is this knowledge possessed by 
the inner rhythm that I have called the “wisdom” of organisms.  Of course, 
there is no question here of knowledge, or wisdom in the human sense, but 
of a “congruity” of the internal processes of the animal with the laws of 
the external world.  (310) 
 
The same super-mechanical force that exists in the protoplasm of the animal ensures that the 
animal selects an external world whose rhythms are in perfect congruity with the internal 
rhythms of the animal.  When this congruity—generated by the super-mechanical forces—is 
taken into consideration, “the paltry analogy with the human way of doing things collapses into 
nothing, and we stand face to face with a real law of Nature, as free from exceptions as is the law 
of gravity”(315).  The extra-spacial, extra-temporal force shows that something in “the organism, 
in the species and in the community as well as in the individual [...] lies in the hands of a super-
mechanical natural power, which is to be recognized not through rules, but itself acts according 
to rules”(318).  The laws of nature that form the animal, and that relate the animal to the world, 
are irreducible to mechanical law, just because it is the supra-mechanical force that produces 
law.  It cannot be understood as a codified empirical law, because it is prior to, and productive 
of, the law governed field of empirical reality.   
 While Uexküll's ethological studies have had an important influence on twentieth century 
thought, his notion of a law of nature that ensures the congruity of animal and world now seems 
an embarrassing idiosyncrasy. Brett Buchanan writes, in his study of Uexküll, that Uexküll's 
refusal of Darwinism, and subsequent appeal to the “plan” that ensures congruity “could be the 
result of having misunderstood Darwin's ideas”(18).  Indeed, the problems that troubled Uexküll 
have been largely solved through modern evolutionary biology, which, from the 1930's on, 
synthesized Mendelian genetics and Darwinian evolution.  The extra-spacial and extra-temporal 
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plan has been located, in a matter of speaking, in the codes of DNA and RNA, and the 
congruence between animal and environment has been explained through a theory of adaptation 
that works not on the animal, but on specific genes.  However, as I've suggested, Uexküll's 
appeal to the “plan” and refusal of Darwinian selection is not a mere case of misreading.   
 Buchanan argues that for Uexküll “the meaning of biology as a 'theory of life' is to 
discover how meaning is generated through relationships.  One may be even tempted to say that, 
in order to know a living being, one must know the relations it is capable of forming; an animal 
is no more than its relations”(30).  Buchanan suggests that the definition of the animal as the 
relations that it is capable of forming is central to Deleuze and Guattari's appropriation of 
Uexküll.  For Deleuze and Guattari, writes Buchanan, “the main issue [...] falls on the nature of 
relations, but in such a way that they question the very meaning of the concept 'body' and 
'organism.'  They find life to be a play of differential relations that form brief assemblages, where 
animal life is no longer akin to a sphere but punctuated lines of flight”(38).  As Pater argues that 
“that clear, perpetual outline of face and limb is but an image of ours, under which we group 
them—a design in a web, the actual threads pass beyond it”(The Renaissance, 150), and 
Lawrence argues that the human exists only exists as a node within a flow of energy, the living 
body appears as intersection of forces.  Deleuze and Guattari write that “Von Uexküll, in 
defining animal worlds, looks for the active and passive affects of which the animal is capable in 
the individuated assemblage of which it is a part”(ATP, 283).    
 
For example, the tick, attracted by the light, hoists itself to the tip of a 
branch; it is sensitive to the smell of mammals, and lets itself fall when 
one passes beneath the branch; it digs into its skin, at the least hairy place 
it can find.  Just three affects; the rest of the time the tick sleeps, 
sometimes for years on end, indifferent to all that goes on in the immense 
forest.  Its degree of power is indeed bounded by two limits:  the optimal 
limit of the feast after which it dies, and the pessimal limit of the fast as it 
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waits.  It will be said that the tick's three affects assume generic and 
specific characteristics, organs and functions, legs and snout.  This is true 
from the standpoint of physiology, but not from the standpoint of Ethics.  
Quite the contrary, in Ethics the organic characteristics derive from 
longitude and its relations, from latitude and its degrees.  We know 
nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what 
its affects are, how they can or cannot enter into composition with other 
affects, with the affects of another body, either to destroy that body or to 
be destroyed by it, either to exchange actions and passions with it or to 
join with it in composing a more powerful body.  (ATP, 283-4) 
 
Deleuze and Guattari shift the focus from Uexküll's theorization of a transcendental factor—
modeled on Kant's ethics—that conditions the animal's material body and coordinates the 
rhythms of the body with the rhythms of the external world, to the network relations that situate 
bodies in their milieus.  In their Spinozist appropriation of Uexküll, the emphasis is no longer on 
the relation of the animal to its “surrounding world”—what they call the animal's “individuated 
assemblage”—but rather on the interactions between various milieus, on the ways with which 
bodies cross worlds, interact in unexpected ways, and enter into new, deterritorialized, 
assemblages.   
 It would seem that Lawrence occupies a position between Uexküll and Deleuze.  
Lawrence, like Uexküll, continually emphasizes that each animal's world is organized around a 
transcendental factor—its “God.”  And yet at the same time, in the mode of Deleuze and 
Guattari's interest in the interaction between bodies that belong to different milieus, Lawrence is 
interested in the material interactions that occur between different milieus, in the often violent 
contact between bodies that occurs outside of what either body knows of the other.  In these 
moments—the confrontation with the bat, or the slap that kills the mosquito—Lawrence shifts 
his focus from the observation of an epistemological limit, to a physical interaction of bodies that 
oversteps this limit.  Lawrence’s “flow” becomes the name for these material interactions 
between different milieus.   
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Whereas Deleuze and Guattari wish to strip the transcendental from Uexküll's theory of 
nature, for Lacan, it is just this transcendental factor that establishes the scene of natural 
meaning.  Lacan suggests that it is through, not despite, Uexküll's appeal to Kant's ethics that 
Uexküll illuminates something about how the human can think the natural world.  In Uexküll's 
Kantian language, the animal's world is entirely determined by a transcendental factor.  The “law 
of nature” that, on the model of Kant's categorical imperative, is not an element of empirical 
reality—and thus constrained by causal laws—determines the animal according to a non-causal, 
biological imperative.  Not only is the animal's world in perfect congruence with the external 
world, but the animal is in absolute congruence with the non-causal “law of nature.”  The animal 
is not determined by its environment, for its will is entirely subservient to the law of nature.  In 
Kantian terms, the animal is free, in that it is not determined by the law of cause and effect that 
governs the empirical world.   
 And yet for Kant, the idea of an absolute congruency between the categorical imperative 
and the will must be relegated to an infinite horizon.  It is for this reason that Kant argues that 
the immortal soul is a postulate of practical reason.  Because a complete adequacy between the 
categorical imperative and the will can never be achieved, the immortal soul must be posited as a 
support to an infinite labor.  The immortal soul can be assumed because it must “be just as 
possible as its object”—the labor to become adequate to the moral imperative—“because it is 
contained in the same command to further this object”(155).  As Kant continues “this adequacy 
is nonetheless demanded as practically necessary, it can be encountered only in a progression 
proceeding ad infinitum toward that complete adequacy; and according to principles of pure 
practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical advance as the real object of our 
will”(155).  The labor of the Kantian ethical subject, who is eternally split between pathological 
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determination—the subject's response to causal, empirical reality—and the moral law, is 
sustained by hope that in the infinite time available to the immortal soul this adequacy will be 
realized. 
 When Lacan reads Kant's ethics through the Marquis de Sade's Philosophy in the 
Bedroom, he argues that Sade substitutes the law of Nature for the Kantian moral law.  In his 
reading, Lacan foregrounds the importance of this irresolvable split between the pathological and 
moral subject.    As Serge André writes, in his explication of Lacan's Écrit, “Kant With Sade” 
the Sadian antihero  
makes himself, in effect, the instrument or the voice of a will towards 
absolute jouissance (V), that Natural Law which...for Sade, is a substitute 
for the Kantian moral law.  From there, he addresses his victim, to whom is 
left all the weight of subjectivity, and profoundly divides him between 
submission to the voice of the imperative and a revolt against pain ($), just 
until the point that the victim faints. (26) 
 
 André continues that “this manoeuvre of the Sadian master aims at producing a mythical 
subject, that is never achieved, neither by him, nor by the victim:  a “pure subject of 
pleasure”(26).   In Lacan's reading, both Kant and Sade work to follow the impossible demand of 
the moral imperative, in order to move towards a complete adequacy with this imperative.  Just 
as, for Kant, there can only be an asymptotic approach to this adequacy, André argues that for 
Sade, the “pure subject of pleasure” remains a myth.  While the Sadian master aims at what 
Uexküll describes as the perfect congruence between the subject and the natural law, Uexküll 
argues that the animal, wholly determined by the laws of nature, is the pure, undivided subject.   
  In a passage from his early and well-known Écrit  “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the 
I Function,” Lacan appeals to Uexküll in order to analyze the function of the image on the 
development of the organism.  “The fact that a gestalt may have formative effects on an 
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organism is attested to by a biological experiment” that shows that “it is a necessary condition 
for the maturation of the female pigeon's gonad that the pigeon see another member of its 
species.”  “Similarly” writes Lacan, “in the case of the migratory locust, the shift within a family 
line from the solitary to the gregarious form can be brought about by exposing an individual, at a 
certain stage of its development, to the exclusively visual action of an image akin to its 
own”(Écrits, 77).   Each of these is a “particular case of the function of imagos, which is to say a 
relationship between an organism and its reality—or, as they say, between the Innenwelt and the 
Umwelt”(Écrits,78).  In appealing to Uexküll terminology—for Uexküll the Umwelt is the 
animal’s exterior world while the Innenwelt is the animal's interior world—Lacan underlines the 
fact that the imago must be considered as part of the organism.  Lacan makes this point in a later 
seminar when he writes that for an animal the sign has a “captivating valence due to which its 
receiver, who sees the red of the robin redbreast for instance, and who is made for receiving it, 
undertakes a series of actions or henceforth unitary behaviour that links the bearer of this sign to 
its perceiver.  Here you have what gives us a precise idea of what may be called natural 
meaning”(Seminar III, 167).  Since for the robin, Lacan writes, the red coloring “corresponds to 
the guarding of the limit of its territory and the encounter alone occasions a certain form of 
behaviour towards its adversary”(Seminar III, 9), the red has an “imaginary function” in that 
“this red will have made him see red and seemed to him to bear within it the expressive and 
immediate character of hostility or anger”(Seminar III, 10).  The animal, as in Uexküll's 
description of the congruence between the animal and world, responds without hesitation to the 
image.  It is this intimate linking of the animal to the image that allows Lacan to write that “the 
imaginary is surely the guide to life for the whole animal domain”(Seminar III, 9). 
 Although Lacan appeals to the function of the image in the animal domain in his essay on 
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the mirror stage, there is an important difference between the logic of the image for the human 
and the animal.  Lacan notes that the child, who is born helpless and “premature”(Écrits, 77) 
lacks the ability exert muscular control over his disorganized body.  The child first comes into 
possession of his body when he identifies not with the experience of this disorganized body, but 
with the unified body, in the mirror, that he sees his mother looking at.  The child who passes 
through the mirror stage exchanges the subjective experience of his disorganized body for the 
unified, organized, but ultimately alien image that he sees in the mirror.  The mother's gaze 
serves as the transcendental support for the empirical world, as it “situates the agency known as 
the ego, prior to its social determination, in a fictional direction that will forever remain 
irreducible for any single individual”(76).  The relationship between the disorganized body of 
the drive and the image will remain as the subject's “discordance with his own reality”(76).  
Whereas the animal lives in a world that has a dyadic structure, the human lives in world with a 
triadic structure.  While the animal lives in a world of images that is fundamentally aligned with 
its subjective existence, the human lives in a world of images—first supported by the mother's 
gaze—that is fundamentally at odds with subjective experience.   
 Whereas for the human the formlessness of the disorganized body remains in conflict 
with the ordered world of images, the animal lives in a world of forms that is produced by the 
“super-mechanical invasions” of an “imperative” into the empirical world.  Lacan evokes the 
tension between these positions when he asks what “one might desire of one's own body.”  He 
responds that one might dream “of a total, complete, epidermic contact between one's body and a 
world that was itself open and quivering; dream of a contact and, in the distance, of a way of life 
that the poet points out to us; hope for a revelation of harmony following the disappearance of 
the perpetual, insinuating presence of the oppressive feeling of some original curse”(Seminar XI, 
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93).  If the original curse is the falsification of the subjects experience by a world of 
fundamentally alien images, then the dream of epidermal contact is a fantasy of an animal 
relationship to the imago, the fantasy of a world of images fundamentally aligned with 
subjective experience.   
 When Ursula and Skrebensky “put off their puppet form”(436) and discover, beyond the 
“material world”(427) a “new world”(426) of “primeval darkness” that is “falsified to a social 
mechanism”(434), Lawrence would seem to return to a version of Lacan's mirror stage in which 
the world is built out of the subject.  Ursula refuses the mechanical world of falsified forms, and 
lingers in the unknowable rhythms and patterns of the universal flow.  “She was free as a leopard 
that sends up its raucous cry in the night.  She had the potent, dark stream of her own blood, she 
had had the glimmering core of fecundity, she had her mate, her complement, her sharer in 
fruition.  So, she had all, everything”(434).  Momentarily,  the “irreducible” tension between the 
image, and the body it falsifies, seems to be overcome, as Ursula becomes a “dark, vital self.”  
As in Uexküll's theorization of the animal, or Sade's labor to produce an undivided subject where 
the “law of nature” overcomes the resistance of empirical reality, Ursula takes part in a natural 
logic in which a world constructed out of subjective experience takes the place of alienating 
social structures.   
 Eventually, however, the social world descends upon her.  After her traumatic break-up, 
and Skrebensky’s surprising marriage to another, she “gasped and groped to find the creation of 
the living God, instead of the old, hard barren form of bygone living [...]. Sometimes she lost 
touch, she lost her feeling, she could only know the old horror of the husk which bound in her 
and all mankind.  They were all in prison, they were all going mad”(480).  While, in the ecstasy 
of love the subject and world coincide without mediation, the world of falsified images and 
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social forms intervenes.  Ursula is imprisoned as her true body is falsified by the fictional 
determination of her social self.   As Ursula watches a rainbow form in the final lines of the 
novel, she waits for this revelation of harmony in which the world will be “built up in a living 
fabric of Truth, fitting to the over-arching heaven”(481).  Ursula's hope is that the corrupt world, 
the prison of falsified images, will give way to a harmony between subject and world.  Ursula's 
failure becomes the hope of a new world.  The chapter in which Ursula experiences both this 
transformative harmony between her body and the world and her exclusion from this harmony is 
entitled “The Bitterness of Ecstasy.”  It is only, Lawrence suggests, through the admission of a 
certain lack, that the hope of a harmony between subject and world arrives.  While ecstasy is 
bitter because of its failure, the bitterness of failure itself opens to ecstasy.  It is only because 
each subjective being, determined by its own transcendental god, is wholly other than each other 
being, that all beings share a world of material relations, beyond the limits of knowledge.  It is 
only because of a lack in knowledge that there exists a transformative world beyond knowledge.   
 Through his animals, which are figured as both a limit to the human, and as a marker of 
the human's potential to overcome a limit, Lawrence appropriates the fact of the limited human, 
excluded from animal being, as evidence that the human is part of animal being.  In Lawrence's 
poem, “Fish,” the animal serves first to articulate the limited epistemological world of the 
human, and possibility of a participation in nature.  Fish, Lawrence writes, have “One touch.  No 
fingers, no hands and feet, no lips; / No tender muzzles, / No wistful bellies, / No loins of desire, 
/ None”(335).  Despite this difference, Lawrence momentarily identifies with, the fish.  Yet he 
soon realizes that “I had made a mistake, I didn’t know him, / This grey, monotonous soul in the 
water”(336).   “Fish are beyond me” he continues, “I am not the measure of creation. / This is 
beyond me, this fish. / His God stands outside my God”(339).   Yet while his experience of this 
  190 
fish reveals what seems like an unbridgeable chasm between subjective worlds, the solitude of 
each fish becomes an analogue for the gulf that both separates the speaker from the fish, and 
each human from his fellow.  Each fish lives a lonely existence. “Admitted, they swarm in 
companies, / Fishes. / They drive in shoals. / But soundless, and out of contact. / They exchange 
no word, no spasm, not even anger. / Not one touch. / Many suspended together, forever apart, / 
Each one alone with the waters, upon one wave with the rest”(337).  And yet, there is “A 
magnetism in the water between them”(337).  The solitary relationship of each fish to the next 
opens to the trans-subjective flow of a magnetic force that unites them, analogous to the 
electrical and magnetic force that unites humans in a trans-subjective flow.  A mode of human 
experience that is phenomenologically equivalent to the silent communion of fish emerges as a 
poetic ideal.   
 Lawrence ends not with the articulation of the limited worlds of fish and humans, but 
with a theological gesture.  After offering his attempt to understand the fish Lawrence concludes: 
But I, I only wonder 
And don't know 
I don't know fishes 
 
In the beginning 
Jesus was called The Fish.... 
And in the end.  (340) 
 
Sandra Gilbert writes the fish exemplifies a “self-contained blood-being [...] beyond or beneath 
the double experience of the human being who so irrevocably exists both within and without 
himself”(171).   At the same time that the fish is self-contained, the pairing of Jesus with the fish 
suggests that the fish is, itself, doubled.  On the one hand the pairing of Jesus and the fish 
appropriates the fish as a symbol for human participation in the natural world, through the 
electromagnetic waves and flows that unite all life.  On the other, the fish reveals that there is no 
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“One God”: Jesus becomes a placeholder for this experience of the limited human subject who 
faces the alien world of natural being.  It is only, Lawrence suggests, through dispossession, 
through lack and castration, that the human can gain entrance into the unified world of animal 
being.   
 Lawrence's retelling of the resurrection of Jesus, The Man Who Died, presents the same 
narrative of lack transformed into excess.  The novella, which was originally entitled The 
Escaped Cock, begins not with Jesus's resurrection, but with “a peasant near Jerusalem who 
acquired a young gamecock”(163).  The young cock grows into a “certain splendour”(163).  By 
“some freak of destiny, he was a dandy rooster, in that dirty little yard with three patchy 
hens”(163).  Though he is kept in walled yard, he “gave shrill answers to the crowing of other 
cocks, beyond the wells, in a world he knew nothing of”(163).  The peasant, worried that the 
cock will one day fly away, tie a cord around his leg, “and he grew, with a gloomy, foreboding 
kind of knowledge, that he was tied by the leg”(164).  The same day that Jesus emerges from his 
tomb, the cock, “with a sudden wave of strength”(164), breaks the cord that had held him in 
place.  As Jesus stumbled down the road, newly awoken from death, and filled with pain and 
revulsion at the world, “in a kind of half-consciousness...he was roused by the shrill wild 
crowing of a cock just near him, a sound which made him shiver as if electricity had touched 
him”(167).  Jesus buys the cock from the peasant, and sets off into the world.  “He carried the 
cock, whose tail fluttered gaily behind, and who craned his head excitedly, for he too was 
adventuring out for the first time into the wider phenomenal world, which is the stirring of the 
body of cocks also”(181).  While Jesus is apart from the world, aloof and virginal, the cock is 
“hot...with life”(182).  Jesus thus turns away from the transcendence of the father, towards the 
cock that “is full of life and virtue”(183).   
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 Late in the novella, Jesus is recognized by Isis as Osiris.  She repairs his wounds and 
scars, and then they have sex.  “ 'Father!' he said, 'why did you hide this from me?'  And he 
touched her with the poignancy of wonder, and the marvellous piercing transcendence of 
desire”(207).  Jesus / Osiris impregnates Isis, and leaves to journey through the world.  Jesus, 
who had distained physical life, learns to be part of the physical world, of the “flow onwards,” 
and thus achieves a material resurrection.  As Jesus / Osiris leaves Isis, Lawrence writes that 
“The man who had died rowed slowly on, with the current, and laughed to himself:  “I have 
sowed the seed of my life and my resurrection, and put my touch forever upon the choice women 
of this day, and I carry her perfume in my flesh like essence of roses'”(211).  Jesus trades the 
death-like transcendence of the father—a transcendence of the flesh—for the “piercing  
transcendence of desire”(207), a seemingly contradictory transcendence in the flesh. 
One curiosity of the novella is Lawrence's literalization of the myth of Osiris and Isis, in 
which Isis reassembles the dismembered Osiris, but is unable to find his penis, and therefore 
builds him a new phallus.  Lawrence's Jesus is, like the reassembled Osiris, sex-less, and the 
sexual energy he finds is in the gamecock that teaches him life and sexual desire.  This is, in 
effect, the same manoeuvre from the final pages of Lady Chatterley's Lover, where Mellors' 
penis, which is “more cocky”(218) than Mellors, and which “has a will of his own”(219), is 
rhetorically detached from Mellors' body.  If the human, as Lawrence insists, is built around a 
“void and hollow want” then for both Mellors and Jesus / Osiris the void is given form as a 
detached phallus.  The castrated Jesus / Osiris becomes a signifier for the hole in human 
knowledge that opens to the plenitude of the material world, to those infinite rhythms of material 
exchanges.  Jesus, in other words, is castrated by the life that resides beyond him, compared to 
which he is lacking.  The phallus that he lacks, however, exists in the natural world.  It is only 
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through castration—the discovery that knowledge is limited, and that he does not possess, but is 
rather subject to the phallus—that Jesus is able to participate in the universal flow.  Jesus's 
castration becomes a signifier for both the limited world of the human, and for the unlimited 
flow of primary nature.   
 In his ontology of the flow the human is connected to the universe “in rhythms too big 
and too small for us to know”(Poems, 479).  While life is punctuated with moments of ecstatic 
participation in this flow, it is equally the experience of “darkness and corrosive death”(Women, 
358), or of the “void” of unsatisfiable desire that opens like a “bottomless pit”(Crown, 4).  
Lawrence's gambit is that these experiences of lack and loss can be refigured as evidence of the 
plenitude of the universal flow that moves through the cosmos.  Rather than imagine that the 
human is separate from vital being because of language or culture, Lawrence suggests that the 
plenitude of the natural world, itself, introduces lack into the human.  The human is incomplete 
just because the human is a structural element in a flow that extends beyond knowledge and 
experience.  This scene of natural meaning not only establishes the flow as the beyond of the 
social world, but appropriates the failures of the social world as its material support.  Gudrun's 
horror at the “awful, inhuman distance which would always be interposed between her and the 
other being!”(Women, 360), or Lawrence's description of Clifford Chatterley's subjective life as 
unstructured “pulp”(112), are not just places where the logic of the flow fails, but the means by 
which a lack is produced which, when taken up an as an element in the universal flow, becomes 
the substance of Lawrence's vital unconscious.   
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Thermodynamics and the Unconscious 
 
In Freud’s thermodynamic picture of the brain the unconscious is a system of repressed 
and unknown associations that intervene between phenomenal experience and the subject’s 
affective response to this experience.  In neurotic or hysteric patients, phenomena that should not 
elicit an emotional response has an effect, because of repressed, and unconscious, associations. 
While the deviations of energy, introduced by these unconscious associations within the neural 
system remain to be fully elaborated, the unconscious is, for Freud, the kind of thing that can be 
given a thermodynamic explanation. In his reading of Freud, Lacan insists on both the 
importance of scientific energetics for the development of psychoanalysis, and on the fact that 
the unconscious has nothing to do with energy. Lacan thus distinguishes between two problems 
in Freud’s thought.  On the one hand Freud gives a full thermodynamic explanation for the 
unconscious deviations between sensory experience and affective response, appealing to 
scientific discourse as a given and stable structure through which reality can be apprehended. On 
the other hand, because of his allegiance to a tradition of English empiricist thought, Freud must 
account for the persistence of the external world as the kind of thing that would merit an 
affective response.  
Whereas the strange Kantian legacy in England used the division between primary and 
secondary nature to distinguish between human perception and the ‘Unknown Absolute’ that is 
the external world, and while for a true Kantian—like Helmholtz—the existence of the external 
world is not a problem, but rather a question of the a priori forms of the intuitions, for Freud, 
because of his allegiance to English empiricism, the existence of the external world must be 
accounted for. Whereas thermodynamic thought tries to do away with the problem of why the 
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external world appears as coherent and consistent by assuming that the external world has an 
internal mathematical logic, Lacan foregrounds this empiricist problem, suggesting that the 
question of why the world coheres as a thing—as a Ding—must remain a central preoccupation 
of psychoanalysis.  
To trace this problem through Lacan’s thought I turn to Lacan’s reading of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, where Wittgenstein proposes that logic is the 
transcendental structure of both language and world. Wittgenstein derives his correspondence 
theory from Heinrich Hertz's 1893 The Principles of Mechanics, which attempts to explain how 
the mathematical language of thermodynamics—the same language that Freud appeals to as the 
basis of a scientific psychology—relates to physical reality. Both Lacan and the late 
Wittgenstein—who offered a critique of the logicism of the Tractatus in his later writings—turn 
their inquiries to the question of where this fantasy of a metalangauge, of logic as the beyond-of-
the-signified, comes from, and of why this fantasy troubles language. Whereas Freud’s 
thermodynamic unconscious is the neurally embedded reaction to the desired object, Lacan will 
suggest that the unconscious is the confrontation with the question of why objects of desire seem 
to inhabit the world. 
 
I.   Energy and the Unconscious 
 
 The ambitious goal of Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology is to provide a full 
thermodynamic explanation of human psychology.  As Freud begins, “the intention of this 
project is to furnish us with a psychology which shall be a natural science:  its aim, that is, is to 
represent psychical processes as quantitatively determined states of specifiable material particles 
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and so to make them plain and void of contradiction” (355).  Freud continues that “the material 
particles in question are the neurons” (355), and that these neurons are invested with a quantity 
of energy.  The flow of energy through these neurons are guided by a principle of “neural 
inertia,” modeled after the principle of conservation of energy, that dictates that neurons divest 
themselves of energy—by passing it on to the next neuron—in order to return to a position of 
equilibrium.  The entire neural system, governed by this principle, works to divest itself of the 
quantities of energy that enter into the system through the form of external stimuli, in order to 
maintain a state of equilibrium.   
 Freud returns to the question of metapsychology at various points throughout his 
writings—notably in Chapter VII of The Interpretation of Dreams, Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle, The Ego and the Id, and An Outline of Psychoanalysis—but the basic premise of this 
metapsychology, that the unconscious emerges as an effect of structured exchanges of neural 
energies, governed by a principle of equilibrium, remains essentially unchanged.  While Freud 
continually revised his psychoanalytic terminology—from the language of primary and 
secondary processes to the language of the ego, id, and superego, from the pleasure principle and 
the instincts to the death drive—he consistently understood these processes in terms of a 
thermodynamically regulated system of energy.   
 Patricia Kitcher thus distinguishes between Freud's “doctrines” and his “metatheoretical 
directives” (Freud’s Dream, 44).   
The distinction between doctrine and directive can be fairly clearly seen in 
other scientific programs.  In Newtonian mechanics, for example, 
substantive claims such as the laws of motion emerged from a program 
guided by the metatheoretic principle that the behavior of any physical 
object should be explained by determining the forces operating on it.  
Evolutionary biology tries to explain the characteristics of organisms on the 
assumption that all such accounts must involve the modification of features 
found in ancestral populations.  Applying the distinction to the puzzle about 
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metapsychology, what Freud continued to support were the metatheoretic 
directives embodied in his metapsychology.  The ideal of psychoanalysis 
was always to construct complete theories of mental phenomena that 
captured their dynamic, economic, and topographic dimensions.  By 
contrast, Freud was willing—at least in theory—to modify or cast aside 
substantive metapsychological claims such as the pleasure principle and the 
theory of instincts.  (44) 
 
While Freud's substantive theories continue to evolve, the dynamic and economic topography he 
first puts forward in the Project remains constant through his work.   
 The scientific understanding of the biology of the brain has gained an astonishing level of 
specificity over the last hundred and fifty years.  Late nineteenth century biology was, however, 
astonishingly advanced.  Lewellys Barker’s 1899 The Nervous System, for example, explores the 
connections between distinct neural clusters in with the same premise that guides contemporary 
understandings of neurobiology, understanding the brain as a system of connections through 
which energy, in the form of electrical impulses, flows, governed by the laws of 
thermodynamics.  As Patricia Kitcher writes, “when we take a careful look” at the 
metapsychological principles employed by Freud, “they turn out to be eminently defensible and 
very like the canons guiding contemporary interdisciplinary research in cognitive science” (41).  
Indeed, as Clark Glymour—a philosopher who works in connectionist theories of cognition—
writes approvingly, “In Freud’s Project, the infant is described more or less as an android run by 
a connectionist computer.  If the details are a little hazy, and perhaps if we press even incoherent, 
still I think there is little doubt that Freud’s conception of psychology and of the functioning of 
the mind is much the same as that of our contemporaries” (65).   When contemporary 
neurologists locate unconscious processes—repression, negation, affective transference—
through MRI and PET scans, they are, in some sense, fulfilling the promise set out by Freud's 
Project.   It is precisely this trajectory of Freud's thought that Lacan registers when he writes that 
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Freud hoped “that one day there would be a thermodynamic able to provide—within the future of 
science—the unconscious with its posthumous explanation” (Television, 39).  While Freud 
understands the unconscious as a system of neural connections, Lacan works to rigorously 
separate the unconscious from the biology of the brain.  Lacan’s critique of Freud’s 
thermodynamic thought, however, is complex, for at the same time that he insists the 
unconscious is not in the brain, he insists on the importance of Freud’s scientism for the 
development of psychoanalysis.  Lacan argues that in order to follow the path laid out by Freud, 
the language of physiology and thermodynamics must be untangled from the unconscious.  A 
central component of Lacan’s revision of Freud’s metapsychology thus involves a reckoning 
with the problem of energetics in Freud’s thought.   
 As Kitcher writes, “Freud's intellectual heirs have continued the denial of biological 
foundations, now with two motivations.  Besides the wish to enhance the creative genius of their 
hero, they are understandably reluctant to take seriously the idea that much of Freudian theory 
stands—or falls—with nineteenth-century biology” (43).  It is in just these terms, however, that 
Lacan's revision of Freud's metapsychology is of special interest.  Rather than deny Freud's 
intellectual heritage, as a systematic application of nineteenth-century biology, Lacan insists 
precisely on the importance of Freud's scientism.   
I am saying, contrary to what has been trumped up about a supposed break 
on Freud’s part with the scientism of his time, that it was this very 
scientism—which one might designate by its allegiance to the ideals of 
Brücke, themselves passed down from Helmholtz and Du Bois-Reymond’s 
pact to reduce physiology, and the mental functions considered to be 
included therein, to the mathematically determined terms of 
thermodynamics (the latter having attained virtual completion during their 
lifetimes)—that led Freud, as his writings show, to pave the way that shall 
forever bear his name.  (Écrits, 728) 
 
And yet while Lacan insists on the importance of scientific thermodynamics for the genesis of 
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Freud's thought, his central revision of Freud involves a critique of Freud's energetics.   
 In Television, a series of interviews conducted by Jacques-Alain Miller and broadcast on 
French television, Miller asks, in light of Lacan’s proposition that the unconscious is structured 
like a language, “what do you do with anything that doesn’t get mixed up with words?  What of 
psychic energy, of affect, or the drives?”(17).  Miller begins by posing the question of “natural 
energy” (18).  Lacan's perhaps predictable response is worth quoting at length.   
Natural energy—that’s another medicine ball used to prove that on 
that point as well one’s got ideas.  Energy—it’s you who added the tag 
natural, because in what they say, it goes without saying that energy is 
natural:  something to be expended, insofar as a dam can store it and make 
it useful.  However, it’s not because the dam looks picturesque in a 
landscape that energy is natural. 
That a “life force” should constitute that expenditure is a crude 
metaphor.  Because energy is not  a substance, which, for example, 
improves or goes sour with age; it’s a numerical constant that a physicist 
has to find in his calculations, so as to be able to work.   
To work in accordance with what has been fostered, from Galileo to 
Newton, as a purely mechanical dynamics—with what forms the core of 
that which is called, more or less correctly, a physics—something strictly 
verifiable. 
Without this constant, which is merely a combination of calculations 
[…] you have no more physics.  It’s generally thought that that’s the 
physicists’ business and that they adjust the equivalences between masses, 
fields, and impulses so that a number gets pulled out that complies with the 
principle of the conservation of energy.  But still, such a principle has to be 
stated in order for a physics to meet the requirements of verifiability; it is, 
as Galileo put it, a fact experimentally produced by a theory.  Or, to put it 
better:  the condition that the system be mathematically closed prevails even 
over the assumption that it is physically isolated. 
That’s not just of my own devising.  Each and every physicist 
knows clearly, that is to say, in a readily articulated manner, that energy is 
nothing than the numerical value of a constant.  (18) 
 
If energy assumes a system of signs governed by the “numerical value of a constant,” then 
energy cannot be “natural,” for it appears only within an articulated network of signifiers.  Lacan 
argues, in other words, that an appeal to affect, to the drive, to psychic energy, does not get rid of 
the problem that everything is “mixed up with words,” for, in that it is structure articulated in
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signifiers, a theory of natural energy is itself a linguistic construction.  Thus, as Lacan writes, 
nothing can be known “that doesn’t have the structure of language”(Television, 23).  It is with 
respect to the question of affect that Lacan presents himself as a moralist.  The only sin, for 
Lacan, is what Serge André calls “the ideology of ‘depression’” (263),17 where rather than 
function as a motivation to say something about the structure within which the human is caught 
up, “sadness”(Television, 22) is understood as the effect of a less than optimum “psychological 
tension”(Television, 22).   As André continues, “this ideology is articulated around the 
fundamental notion of a capital of energy (whether it has to do with monetary energy, nervous 
energy, the energy of the humours, or the moral energy of the individual)” (263).18 
Lacan’s insistence that there is no escape from language, that a theory of affect relies on 
an ideology of thermodynamics, has seemed, to some of Lacan's commentators, as a dogmatic 
imposition of theoretical orthodoxy.  As Adrian Johnston writes, “not only is Lacan’s apparent 
allergy to the life sciences common knowledge—he is notorious, particularly among those of a 
“poststructuralist” bent, for allegedly ignoring affects altogether” (254). 
A chorus composed of Lacanianism’s discontents tirelessly rehearses the 
charge that Lacan, going against what is said to be essential to the 
psychoanalytic endeavor both within and beyond the clinical setting, 
neglects everything that won’t be squeezed into the confines of the 
conceptual boxes constructed along the lines of classical structuralism. The 
tyranny of the signifier ostensibly imposed by Lacan is, from this 
perspective, to be countered through recovering and re-emphasizing Freud’s 
energetics, including his reflections on affective dynamics (but not through 
engaging in the least with what the sciences have to say regarding these 
matters).  (254) 
 
Relying on the work of the neurologist Antonio Damasio, as well as on Catherine Malabou's 
                                                
17  « L'idéologie de la ‘dépression’ »  
 
18  « Cette idéologie s’articule autour de la notion fondamentale d'un capital d'énergie (qu'il s'agisse de 
l'énergie monétaire, de l'énergie nerveuse, de l'énergie humorale ou de l'énergie morale de l'individu), 
dont la tendance doit être maintenue à la hausse pour conserver son pouvoir. » 
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work on the philosophical implications of the plasticity of the brain—in which structure is not 
given but emerges as an effect of neural connections—Johnston suggests the unconscious is not, 
as for Lacan, the experience of being caught up in the structure of language, but rather, that the 
unconscious is a structure, a system of relations between “unfelt feelings” and the feeling of 
these feelings.   
That is to say, instead of being elementary givens qua irreducibly 
immediate experiences of phenomenal consciousness, the phenomena of 
affective life involves filterings, foldings, mediations, and redoublings that 
make these phenomena much more complex and much less self-evident 
than is usually suspected. One fashion of putting this loosely is that feelings 
are always the feelings of feelings. And unconscious forces and factors 
subsist and intervene in the gap between feelings and the feelings of 
feelings. (257-8) 
 
Johnston argues that Lacan relies on an outdated notion of immutable structure, derived from 
Freud's energetics, and that a neurally embedded and scientifically defensible unconscious can in 
fact be located in the brain. While for Lacan the discourse of the unconscious registers the fact 
that “the body of the human being is itself affected by the structure, that is to say affected by the 
structure of language in which the human being lives and in which he takes possession of (and 
also disowns), his body” (André, 273),19 for Johnston the unconscious would seem to be a 
structure.  Despite Johnston’s conviction that that a neurologically informed line of Lacanian 
thought can we worked out, there is a real incompatibility between Johnston’s unconscious and 
Lacan’s unconscious.  In arguing that the unconscious is structured like a language, and not like 
a brain, Lacan is not imposing a rigid structure—as opposed to the plasticity of the brain—on the 
unconscious, but, rather, insisting that the unconscious responds to a problem of structure.  When 
                                                
19
    « le corps de l'être humain est lui-même affecté par la structure, c'est-à-dire affecté par la 
structure de langage dans laquelle il habite et dans laquelle il prend possession (et dépossession) de son 
corps » 
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Lacan writes that the unconscious is structured like a language, it is important to clarify what 
kind of structure language has.  Language, for Lacan, always fails, is never complete.  This 
would not be true if there were such a thing as a metalangauge, but, as Lacan never tires of 
repeating, there is no such thing as a metalanguage.  The structure of language is the structure of 
this failure.  As Lacan writes, “if I have said that language is what the unconscious is structured 
like, that is because language, first of all, doesn’t exist”(Seminar XX, 138).  The Lacanian 
unconscious is not the kind of thing that could inhere within the plastic structure of the brain, for 
the Lacanian unconscious is a linguistic construction that responds to a specific problem—to the 
fact that there is no Other, that there is no discourse that answers to the scene of human 
subjectivity.  If the neural unconscious existed, in other words, there would be no need for the 
Lacanian unconscious.  In his reading of Freud, Lacan will therefore insist that at the center of 
Freud’s thought, beyond the thermodynamic structure of the brain, there lies a problem of 
structure.   
 
II. A Neurological Solution to an Empiricist’s Problem 
 
 Johnston's critique at once clarifies the stakes of Lacan's turn away from a neurological 
explanation of the unconscious, and foregrounds Lacan's debt, through Freud, to a central 
problem of empiricist thought—the question of how, beginning with the particularity of sensory 
experience, one can arrive at a theory of coherent and consistent bodies.   While a 
thermodynamic theory offers an explanation to this problem, suggesting that there is no such 
thing as discrete experience—since the particularity of any fact occurs within the fluid 
transformations of the body which is the brain—Lacan will insist that the question of how
  203 
experience coheres remains the central problem for the human.  While Mansel's appropriation of 
Kant, which in large part derives from William Hamilton and is taken up by Spenser, was 
decisive in late nineteenth-century English thought on energetics, at the turn of the century, as 
Jacques Le Rider writes, “a specifically ‘Austrian’ philosophy [was] closer to ‘English’ thinking 
than to anything post-Kantian” (12).  In particular, “John Stuart Mill seemed to be exercising a 
greater influence on Viennese modernity than Kant” (12).  Freud assisted in the German 
translation of Mill's collected works, and, “cited A System of Logic, and referred freely to [Mill's] 
principle of the complication of causes” (Freud’s Dream, 13).  Lacan's reading of Freud works to 
disentangle Freud from two distinct philosophical traditions, arguing that a problem of how 
experience is organized (a problem of empiricism)  remains unsolved in Freud's thermodynamic 
explanation of the human (which is a Kantian solution, in that experience is organized by an a 
priori structure—the brain).  An understanding of Freud’s debt to Mill requires a brief tour of 
Mill’s epistemology.   
 In The Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, Mill articulates, through a close critique of 
Hamilton's philosophy of the conditioned (which is taken up by Mansel), a theory of knowledge 
and mind that does not require recourse to a priori laws of thought.  The problem that Mill faces, 
in that he wants to construct an epistemology that does not require any a priori laws, is that of 
how the experiencing mind can be constructed out of discrete experiences, without appealing to a 
general, a priori law, previous to experience, that would govern the organization of these 
discrete experiences.   
 To this end, Mill’s project will work to establish that thought can move from particular to 
particular, in order to generate general laws, without first appealing to an a priori law that 
governs the movement from particular to particular.  The problem that Mill faces was first 
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articulated by Hume:  in order to construct a theory of knowledge out of particular observations, 
it seems we must first import a general law about the uniformity of nature.  It seems that a law 
governing associations, a general law about the uniformity of nature, must be assumed, as a 
deductive premise, in order that the work of building a world out of discrete observations about 
phenomena can begin.   
We should never have thought of affirming that all phenomena take place 
according to general laws, if we had not first arrived, in the case of a great 
multitude of phenomena, at some knowledge of the laws themselves; which 
could be done no otherwise than by induction.  In what sense, then, can a 
principle, which is so far from being our earliest induction, be regarded as 
our warrant for all the others?  (Logic, 307) 
 
Mill's solution to this problem is to reverse the priority of deductive and inductive logic, by 
offering a novel interpretation of the syllogism—the form of logical argument where a general 
statement is the premise for deductions.  Mill's argument is that if we assume that general 
statements must provide the warrant for reasoning, then nothing can ever be known that was not 
already assumed by the premise.  As Mill writes, “It is universally allowed that a syllogism is 
vicious if there be anything more in the conclusion than was assumed in the premises.  But this 
is, in fact, to say, that nothing ever was, or can be, proved by syllogism, which was not known, 
or assumed to be known, before” (Logic, 183).  If knowledge is to advance, then we must change 
our understanding of the major premise of the syllogism. Mill thus argues that the major premise 
of the syllogism “All men are mortal, The Duke of Wellington is a man, therefore The Duke of 
Wellington is mortal” (185), is the conclusion of the inductive process, rather than the deductive 
warrant for the syllogism. 
 When, therefore, we conclude from the death of John and Thomas, and 
every other person we ever heard of in whose case the experiment had been 
fairly tried, that the Duke of Wellington is mortal like the rest; we may, 
indeed, pass through the generalization, All men are mortal, as an 
intermediate stage; but it is not in the latter half of the process, the descent 
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of all men to the Duke of Wellington, that the inference resides.  The 
inference is finished when we have asserted that all men are mortal.  What 
remains to be performed afterwards is merely deciphering our own notes.  
(Logic, 187) 
 
In other words, the gambit of reason comes when we move from the observation that, in all the 
cases before us, men are mortal, to the supposition that something is true for which we have no 
observational warrant, namely, that all men are mortal.  The major premise is not the beginning 
of the reasoning process, but rather its conclusion, “an affirmation of the sufficience of the 
evidence on which the conclusion rests” (204).  As Richard Rorty writes, the argument that a 
study of particulars could lead to laws, did “for science what the utilitarians had done for 
morality—making it something you could use instead of something you could merely respect” 
(Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 308).   For Mill, in other words, the cohesion of the world 
is not provided by an a priori structure; rather, the creativity of the human intellect consists of 
constructing a coherent world out of discrete phenomena.   
 The problem, however, Alan Ryan suggests, is that “Mill’s philosophy required an active 
mind which would construct an external world out of sensations, and order it according to 
rationally organized theories; and yet he had no way of accounting for the existence of such an 
active intelligence” (226).  As Donald McClosky writes, Mill's epistemology would seem require 
that one explains “mind entirely in terms of its actual and possible states.  A full translation 
would require the reference to its, the mind’s, states to be written out of the translation” (158).   
The full translation of the major premise “All men are mortal” would require, as Mill writes, a 
full “deciphering of our notes,” (All men are mortal means “John is mortal, Thomas is mortal, 
the Duke of Wellington is mortal, and etc...).  Likewise, the mind would seem to exist only as a 
series of mental events.  The problem is that in refusing the a priori structuration of the mind 
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Mill seems to open the mind to continual modification by the introduction of new feelings and 
experiences.  If mind is nothing but a shorthand for a series of feelings, the full translation of 
which is an always increasing set of experiences, then mind would seem to lack the stability 
required in order to construct a world. 
 Mill's solution to this problem is to introduce “mind” as a paradoxical limit of experience.   
If, therefore, we speak of the Mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to 
complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of 
itself as past and future:  and we are reduced to the alternative of believing 
that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or 
possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which is, 
ex hypothesi, but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. 
(Hamilton, 242) 
 
Mill’s critics have been unforgiving of Mill’s introduction of this paradoxical ground at the 
center of an empiricist epistemology.  As Ryan writes, “the extent to which this admission was a 
disaster for his whole philosophical system was lost on Mill” (266).  Mill's entire system—his 
defense of scientific reasoning, of inductive logic—seems to stand or fall depending on whether 
one accepts the mind as the paradoxical ground of experience, and his paradoxical solution 
seems at least as problematic as the problem it is supposed to solve. 
 It is in these terms that William James, in turning to neurology, presents a solution to the 
problem of mind in Mill's epistemology.  Instead of beginning from discrete phenomena and 
working to construct “mind,” James argues that we must begin with the body on which those 
forces act.    
Ordinary empiricism […] has always shown a tendency to do away with the 
connections of things, and to insist most on the disjunctions.  Berkeley’s 
nominalism, Hume’s statement that whatever things we distinguish are as 
“loose and separate’ as if they had ‘no manner of connection,’ James Mill’s 
denial that similars have anything ‘really’ in common, the resolution of the 
causal tie into habitual sequence, John Mill’s account of both physical 
things and selves as composed of discontinuous possibilities, and the 
general pulverization of all experience by association and the mind-dust 
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theory, are examples of what I mean.  (Essays in Radical Empiricism, 43) 
 
James proposes that his “radical empiricism” avoids this problem by conceiving of experience as 
embedded in habit.  As James writes, “no possible number of entities (call them as you like, 
whether forces, material particles, or mental events) can sum themselves together” (Principles, 
161).  As James continues, “'forces' themselves do not combine [...] a body is needed on which 
they may impinge, to exhibit their resultant effect” (Principles, 162).  The fact of the material of 
the brain, where forces inscribe themselves, becomes the principle of coherence that is missing 
from ordinary empiricism.   The brain, in other words, is the coherence that is lacking from 
“ordinary empiricism.”   
 It is perhaps counter-intuitive to read James's appeal to the brain as a Kantian solution to 
a problem of empirical thought.  Yet Thomas Carlson argues that James's appeal to neural 
structure as something that organizes perceptual material should be read as a reconfiguration of 
Kant's a priori structures.  Whereas for Kant, space and time are the a priori forms of the 
intuitions, Carlson argues that for James, it is neural structure that provides the a priori form of 
experience.  In these terms, James gives a Darwinian explanation of the Kantian categories.  It is 
worth nothing that this Kantian reading of James finds its correlate in a Jamesian reading of 
Kant.  In her Kant's Transcendental Psychology, Patricia Kitcher argues, against dominant trends 
in Kant scholarship, that Kant's categories are not prior to experience, but might be read, rather, 
as the immanent organization of experience within the apperceiving subject.  For James, in other 
words, the brain both emerges as the effect of empirical causes, and provides the a priori 
structure of experience.   
 What Lacan suggests in his critique of energetics, is that empiricists—insofar as they 
consider the brain the material basis of Kantian intuitions—are guilty of naturalizing an a priori 
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structure.  As Lacan writes, “The speaking being loves its body, because he believes he has one.  
In reality, he doesn't, but his body is his only consistency” (Seminar XXIII, 66).   The body—
even the special body that is the human brain—depends upon a theory of a priori structuration.  
The consistency of the human body, for Lacan, comes only through the appeal to a 
transcendental support, in the mirror stage.  When Lacan notes that the image united in the 
mirror is the “symbol of something that should be found in the structure of the cortex, the 
foundation of a certain relation of the man to the image of his body” (140, Seminar X)20— 
referring, presumably, to the fact the sensory and motor functions, in the brain, are organized as a 
map of the human body, such that the neurons that refer to the index finger, for example, are 
between the neurons that control the middle finger and thumb—he is not suggesting that the 
neural mapping of the body is the basis of the consistency of the body, but, rather, that the 
consistency of the body, even at the level of neural structures, is an effect of language.  As Lacan 
writes, “there is no real space.  It is a purely verbal construction, that we spell out in three 
dimensions, following what we call the laws of geometry” (Seminar XXIII, 86).  While the 
activity of the brain is a solution to Mill's problem of how a world can be built out of experience, 
Lacan will insist, in his reading of Freud's Project, that the problem of how the world coheres 
must remain at the center of psychoanalytic thought.  Lacan's critique of energetics amounts, in 
these terms, to the claim that neurology, in finding the unconscious as a neural structure, 
excludes a problem of structure.  When the unconscious is taken as a series of relationships that, 
as Adrian Johnston writes, “subsist and intervene in the gap between feelings and the feelings of 
feelings”(257-8), the unconscious appears within the structure of the brain.  For Lacan, the 
unconscious is a specific kind of linguistic construction that responds to the problem of empirical 
                                                
20  « symbole de quelque chose qui doit se retrouver dans la structure du cortex, fondement d'un certain 
rapport de l'homme à l'image de son corps » 
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thought, to the fact, for Lacan, that for the human there is no immanent ordering of experience.   
 
II.  The Problem of Structure in Freud's Project for a Scientific Psychology 
 
 Freud's topography, in the Project, consists of three neural systems, through which 
various quantities of energy flow.  The essential difference between these systems is that the 
while the peripheral system can “receive external stimuli,” the internal systems are connected 
“only with the interior of the body” (365).  The peripheral system (which Freud calls the Φ-
system) cannot store energy.  It receives energy from the external world which it either releases 
back into the external world, through a reflex action, or which it transfers into the first of Freud's 
two internal systems (which Freud calls the Ψ-system).  The Ψ-system, which is itself composed 
of the primary and secondary functions (which Freud will later call the pleasure principle and the 
reality principle), is able to store energy.  It is on the basis of this stored energy that the human 
can search out, or act on, objects that are not immediately present.  The problem that quickly 
emerges is that, since in the action of the primary processes—those processes that search the 
desired object—energy moves from the internal Ψ- system to the peripheral nervous system, 
there must be a check on the primary processes, to ensure that the system acts only on actual, as 
opposed to imagined, objects.  It is here that Freud's third system, the W-system, or 
consciousness system, comes into play, for consciousness is always, for Freud, in relation to real 
object that exist in the external world.  As Freud writes, “consciousness gives us what we call 
‘qualities’—sensations which show a great variety of ‘differences’ and whose differences depend 
on relations to the external world” (369). 
 Since Freud wants to give a quantitative explanation of the human, the question of 
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consciousness raises “the problem of quality” (369).  Freud thus proposes that “the structure of 
the neuronic system consists in contrivances for changing external quantity into quality” (370).  
It is the consciousness system (or W-system) that is responsible for this transformation of 
quantity into quality.   
I can see only one way of escape:  to revise our basic hypothesis of the 
passage of quantity (Q’n).  Hitherto I have regarded it only as a transference 
of quantity (Q’n) from one neuron to another.  It must have another 
attribute, however, of a temporal character; for the mechanics of the 
physicists have assigned this temporal attribute even to the motions of 
masses in the external world.  I shall describe this attribute briefly as 
“period.”  Thus I shall assume that the resistance of the contact-barriers 
applies only to the transference of quantity (Q), but that the period of 
neuronic motion is transmitted without inhibition in every direction, as 
though it were a process of induction.  (371) 
 
Most of the energy that enters into the body is filtered out by the groups of cells—the “nerve 
ending apparatus”, whether muscles, skin, the eyes, all of which have a threshold— through 
which the peripheral nervous system makes contact with the external world.  Some of the energy 
that passes through the “nerve ending apparatus” moves into the peripheral (Φ) system; the 
portion of energy that does not cause an automatic reaction passes into the internal (Ψ) nervous 
system.  The energy that passes through these two systems has a period, but these two systems 
register the quantity of energy, not the period of the impulses.  System W, in contrast, registers 
the period.   
Perceptual neurons are incapable of receiving quantities (Q’n), but that they 
assimilate the period of an excitation and that this condition of theirs of 
being affected by a period, while being filled with only a minimum of 
quantity (Q’n), is the fundamental basis of consciousness.  The Ψ-neurons, 
too, have of course their period, but this is devoid of quality, or, to put it 
more accurately, is monotonous.  Deviations from this specific psychical 
period reach consciousness as qualities.  (371-2) 
 
Conscious experience, in other words, depends upon a certain harmonization between the 
peripheral and internal nervous system, for it is only when energy enters into the nervous system 
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from an external cause that the periods of excitation in the internal system deviate from their 
“monotonous” norm.   It is this deviation in period that is registered as a quality by the 
consciousness system.  As Freud writes, “it is these modifications which pass from Φ through Ψ 
to W, and there, where they are almost devoid of quantity, generate conscious sensations of 
qualities.  This transmission of quality is not durable; “it leaves no traces behind it and cannot be 
reproduced” (372).  In Freud’s topography, this W-system ultimately forms the seat of judgment.  
Because the affective—qualitative—response in the W-system is determined by a the subtle 
periods of energy that pass through the peripheral (Φ) system into the internal (Ψ) system before 
being registered as qualities by the perceptual system (W), the affects registered by the 
consciousness system functions as a guarantee that the discharges of the primary processes 
correspond to real objects.  As Freud writes, “indications of quality are [...] primarily indications 
of reality, and are intended to serve the purpose of distinguishing the cathexes of real perceptions 
from the cathexes of wishes” (429). 
   When Freud articulates the desired object—the basis of the wish that originates in the 
primary processes of the internal (Ψ) system (which will become the pleasure principle), and 
which qualitative, conscious experience verifies is in some relationship to a real object of 
perception—he begins with an analysis of what happens when a perceiving subject encounters an 
object like himself, another human being.   
Let us suppose that the object presented by the perception is similar to the 
[percipient] subject himself—that is to say, a fellow human-being 
[nebenmensch].  The theoretical interest taken in it is then further explained 
by the fact that an object of a similar kind was the subject’s first satisfying 
object (and also his first hostile object) as well as his sole assisting force.  
For this reason it is on his fellow-creatures that a human being first learns to 
cognize.  The perceptual complexes arising from this fellow-creature will in 
part be new and non-comparable—for instance, its features (in the visual 
sphere); but other visual perceptions (for instance, the movements of its 
hands) will coincide in the subject with his own memory of quite similar 
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visual impressions of his own body—a memory with which will be 
associated memories of movements experienced by himself.  The same will 
be the case with other perceptions of the object; thus, for instance, if the 
object screams, a memory of the subject’s own screaming will be aroused 
and will consequently revive his own experiences of pain.  Thus the 
complex of a fellow-creature falls into two portions.  One of these gives the 
impression of being a constant structure and remains as a coherent “thing” 
[Ding]; while the other can be understood by the activity of memory—that 
is, it can be traced back to information about the subject’s own body.  (393-
4) 
 
For Freud the coherence of the other—the fact that the other is a “constant structure” rather than 
a loose and disorganized set of perceptions and associations, results from the memory trace of a 
first “satisfying object” and “sole assisting force” to the helpless infant.  The associations forged 
on the basis of this first object not only remain at work in later familial relationships, but become 
the basis for the subject’s engagement in the world.  Each new encounter with a “fellow 
creature” thus falls into “two portions”:  the sensory experience of the other, and the experience 
of the other as an object of desire.  It is only because the other has this feature of “thingness”—
that the other appears as a Ding—that the other appears as a meaningful object within the 
subject's perceptual world.   
 While Freud speculates that the “first satisfying object” was the mother's breast, he is 
equally clear that the object of desire is never given in experience.  As Freud writes, all 
“perceptual complexes are divided into a constant, uncomprehended portion—the “thing” 
(Ding)—and a changing, comprehensible portion—the attributes or movements of the thing” 
(441).  As Freud continues, “the ‘thing-complex’ keeps reappearing in connection with a variety 
of ‘attribute-complexes’” (441).  Following Freud's description of the Ding as the principle of 
cohesion that is missing from perceptual experience, Lacan writes that “Das Ding is that which I 
will call the beyond-of-the-signified” (Seminar VII, 54).  Whereas the “attribute-complexes” 
produce pleasure or pain, Lacan uses another word, jouissance, to name the specific experience 
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associated with proximity to the Ding.  While Freud's neural topography functions to keep the 
subject in a relationship to the Ding, the Ding, as that which determines the subject's attention 
and provides stability and coherence to the world, is missing from experience.  The problem of 
judgment, for Freud, consists of making sure that the Ding is only at work within certain 
“attribute complexes,” that enjoyment comes in its socially sanctioned forms.  In Lacan's 
reading, it is Oedipus, the incest prohibition, which establishes the mother as the prohibited 
object of desire and thus situates the Ding within a specific set of “attribute-complexes.”  It is 
only in symptoms, where an unremarkable set of “attribute-complexes” have a disproportionate 
effect, that the action of the Ding becomes palpable, for the Ding does not exist, but can only be 
deciphered through the inexplicable deviations that it introduces into life.  Lacan writes of the 
Project that “what Freud articulates as primary process in the unconscious—and this is me 
speaking here, but you can look it up and you’d see—isn’t something to be numerically 
expressed [se chiffre], but to be deciphered [se déchiffre].  I mean:  jouissance itself.  In which 
case it doesn’t result in energy, and can’t be registered as such” (Television, 19).  The Ding, as 
the missing object sought after by the primary processes, gives coherence to the energies that 
search out satisfaction but does not, itself, appear as an object that introduces energy into the 
organism, or that the organism can act on.   
 Whereas the operation of the primary and secondary processes can be described through 
the language of energetics, as the flow of energy through neurons, the Ding does not, itself, 
appear as energy.  It is thus through a consideration of the problem of “thingness” of phenomena 
that Lacan disentangles the unconscious from neural structure.  The Lacanian unconscious is 
concerned with the problem of the Ding, rather than with the system of energies, conditioned by 
the Ding, at work within the brain.   
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III.  “Fabricated Men” 
 
 In Freud's description, it is the Ding that produces the other as a true other, as something 
more than what is revealed through the perceptual experience of the other.  In The Philosophy of 
Sir William Hamilton, Mill, having defined “mind” as the paradox of a self-conscious series of 
feelings, turns, like Freud, to the question of other human beings around him. 
By what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe, 
that there exist other sentient creatures; that the walking and speaking 
figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other 
words possess Minds? [...] I conclude it from certain things, which my 
experience of my own states of feeling proves to me to be marks of it […].I 
conclude that other human beings have feelings like me, because, first, they 
have bodies like me, which I know, in my own case, to be the antecedent 
condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and other 
outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by 
feelings.  I am conscious in myself of a series of facts connected by a 
uniform sequence, of which the beginning is modifications of my body, the 
middle is feeling, the end is outward demeanor.  In the case of other human 
beings I have the evidence of my senses for the first and last links in the 
series, but not for the intermediate link.  I find, however, that the sequence 
between the first and last links is regular and constant in those other cases 
as it is in mine.  In my own case I know that the first link produces the last 
through the intermediate link, and could not produce it without.  
Experience, therefore, obliges me to conclude that there must be an 
intermediate link; which must either be the same in others as in myself, or a 
different one:  I must either believe them to be alive, or to be automatons:  
and by believing them to be alive, […] I bring other human beings, as 
phenomena, under the same generalizations which I know by experience to 
be the true theory of my own existence. […] We know the existence of 
other beings by generalization from the knowledge of our own:  the 
generalization merely postulates that which experience shows to be a mark 
of the existence of something within the sphere of our consciousness, may 
be concluded to be a mark of the same thing beyond that sphere.  (243-4) 
 
For Mill, as for Freud, the perception of another human being falls into two components.  On the 
one hand, there are the “outward signs” through which one experiences the other in the 
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perceptual field.  For Mill, as for Freud, the perceiving subject notes that the other has a body 
like his own—as Freud writes, “visual perceptions (for instance, the movements of its hands) 
will coincide in the subject with his own memory of quite similar visual impressions of his own 
body—a memory with which will be associated memories of movements experienced by 
himself” (393).  Yet there is nothing the field of visual perception that would suggest that the 
other is more than a series of automatic responses.  For both Mill and Freud, the other comes into 
existence only through a second associational leap, which grants the other the status of being a 
Ding—a coherent other.  But while for Freud the question is the relationship between the Ding 
and the attributes that it organizes, Mill, in his nightmarish vision of a world filled with 
automatons, gestures towards a world in which the principle of “Thingness” has vanished, 
towards a world in which there is no beyond-of-the-signifier. 
 For both Freud and Lacan, the world of experience is humanized only through the addition 
of an a priori principle that provides coherence to experience.  The mother is the first “Thing.”  
Yet whereas for Freud the human's earliest experience is the experience of the mother as a 
“Thing,” for Lacan the experience of the mother as “Thing” comes only through the stage of 
development that he calls the mirror stage.   Before the mirror stage, in Lacan's description, the 
child is exposed to the world of experience, and does not yet have the support of a transcendental 
principle through which experience can be organized.  In the mirror stage, the child, looking at 
the image of him or her self in the mirror, sees only disjointed and disorganized limbs.  Whereas 
Lawrence, as I have argued, suggests the world of experience possess an immanent principle of 
organization, Lacan insists that there is only a chaos of phenomena.  It is only when the child 
identifies with the body that he sees his mother smiling at in the mirror, that the body appears as 
a coherent “Thing” that he possesses.  In Lacan's developmental narrative, from the time that the 
  216 
child identifies with the body that he sees his mother admiring in the mirror—what Lacan calls 
the ideal ego, or i(a)—rather than with his experience of his disorganized and uncontrolled 
body—which Lacan describes as “the disorder of little “a”s—, he is caught up in the various 
dramas of seduction that will structure his or her relationships with others.   
Before the mirror stage, that which will be i(a) [the ideal ego] is in the 
disorder of little “a”s, where it is not a question of whether one has them or 
not.  It is not the exterior world that one is lacks, as one improperly 
expresses it, but rather oneself that is lacking. (Seminar X, 140)21 
   
For Lacan, the psychotic subject is he or she who has not passed through the mirror stage.  As 
Lacan notes, “the disorder of little “a”s” that exists before the mirror stage, returns in “the 
fantasy of the fragmented body that certain of you have encountered in schizophrenics” (Seminar 
X, 140).  As, for Mill, the world, without the addition of “mind,” is populated with automatons, 
for the psychotic the world is filled with what Lacan calls, after Schreber, “fabricated men.” 
  It is the Other, as that which provides coherence to the disorder of visual phenomena, that 
is missing for the psychotic.  In other words, it is the psychotic who refuses the Other as a 
transcendental support that will provide cohesion to the phenomenal world.  To understand 
psychosis, Lacan writes, one must return to the mirror stage.   
It suffices to refer to the moment I have marked as characteristic of the 
experience of the mirror and paradigmatic of the construction of the ideal 
ego in the space of the Other—the moment where the infant turns his head, 
tracing the familiar movement that I have described to you, towards this 
Other, this witness, this adult who is there behind him, to communicate to 
her, by his smile, the manifestations of his jubilation about something, let us 
say, that makes him communicate with this specular image.  If the relation 
that is established with the specular image is such that the subject is so 
captivated by the image that this movement is not possible, then the pure 
                                                
21  « Avant le stade du miroir, ce que sera i(a) est dans le désordre des petits a dont il n'est pas 
encore question de les avoir ou pas.  [...] Ce n'est pas du monde extérieur qu'on manque, comme on 
l'exprime improprement, c'est de soi-même.  Ici s'inscrit la possibilité de ce fantasme du corps 
morcelé que certains d'entre vous ont rencontré chez les schizophrènes. » 
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dual relation will dispossess him of his relation to the big Other.  (Seminar 
X, 142)22 
 
The psychotic, for Lacan, is precisely he or she who does not turn away from the particularity of 
visual experience.  The problem of how things hang together, the seeming impossibility within 
an empiricist epistemology of how a world could be constructed out of the particularity 
phenomena, becomes a fact of the psychotic’s lived experience.   
 Whereas for the neurotic subject the adult, smiling at the child's image, establishes the locus 
of the Other, and thus establishes the Ding as the beyond of the specular image, for the psychotic 
the Ding does not come to inhabit the image.  As Lacan writes, “in delusional speech the Other is 
truly excluded, there is no truth behind, there is so little truth that the subject places none there 
himself, and in the face of this phenomenon, his attitude is one of perplexity” (Seminar III, 53).  
Whereas Mill makes a rhetorical gambit in writing, of his experience of fellow human beings, “I 
must either believe them to be alive, or to be automatons” (Hamilton, 243), it is the psychotic, 
according to Lacan, who is truly caught in this problem.  When a non-psychotic subject address 
an other, the other is “humanized,” as it were, by the effect of an oedipal prohibition that makes 
the other appear as an object of desire.  In the psychotic, the principle of “Thingness” disappears.   
The Other being truly excluded, what concerns the subject is actually said 
by the little other, by the shadow of others, or, as Schreber will express 
himself to designate all human beings he encounters, by fabricated, or 
improvised men.  The small other effectively presents an unreal character, 
tending towards the unreal.  (Seminar III, 53) 
 
                                                
22  « Il suffit de se référer à ce moment que j'ai marqué comme caractéristique de l'expérience du 
miroir et paradigmatique de la constitution du moi idéal dans l'espace de l'Autre—ce moment où 
l'enfant retourne la tête, selon ce mouvement familier que je vous ai décrit, vers cet Autre, ce 
témoin, cette adulte qui est là derrière lui, pour lui communiquer par son sourire, les manifestations 
de sa jubilation, disons de quelque chose qui le fait communiquer avec l'image spéculaire.  Si la 
relation qui s'établit à l'image spéculaire est telle que le sujet est trop captif de l'image pour que ce 
mouvement soit possible, c'est que la relation duelle pure le dépossède de sa relation au grand 
Autre. » 
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As Lacan writes, it will be a long time before the psychotic “attempts to restore an order, which 
we shall call a delusional order” (Seminar III, 53).  In this period, when the Other is excluded, 
the subject is captivated by reality.  For Lacan's psychotic the phenomenal world does not 
cohere.  “Dispossessed of his relation to the big Other,” the subject is “captive to the image” 
(Seminar X, 142).23  Whereas the subject who passes through the mirror stage finds a 
transcendental support for the coherence of the physical world, and thus encounters various 
objects as “Ding,” the psychotic is troubled by the Ding.  Whereas for Hume or Mill, this 
skeptical threat can be explained away by referring to some other principle (custom, or the 
“mind”), the psychotic is left alone to bring coherence to the world, by producing a delusional 
meaning that explains the variety of perceptual experience.   
 In the delusion, as Lacan writes, the Ding—the principle of coherence—does not appear as 
a specular image.  In the case of Schreber, it is not the case, as Freud had argued, that Schreber is 
in “a mirror relation” with “that being who is the other for him, namely God himself,” a relation 
modeled on “man's relation to woman” (Seminar III, 87).  Rather, the relation, for Lacan, is 
between “God, with all that he implies, the universe, the celestial sphere”(Seminar III, 87) on the 
one hand, and on the other, “Schreber himself, literally decomposed into a multitude of 
imaginary beings with their toing-and-froing and their various transfixions” (Seminar III, 87).  In 
the delusion, the psychotic is subject to “the emergence in reality of an enormous meaning that 
has the appearance of being nothing at all—in so far as it cannot be tied to anything, since it has 
never entered into the system of symbolization—but under certain conditions it can threaten the 
entire edifice” (Seminar III, 85).  In other words, the psychotic solves the problem of how the 
world coheres in a distinct fashion.  The world is not organized around a desired object, but by 
                                                
23
   « Dépossedé de sa relation au grand Autre » and « captif de l’image » 
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an “enormous meaning” that brings order to phenomena within appearing itself—that is, within 
the world of phenomena.  The Ding does not inhabit certain object, but rather appears in reality, 
as a single meaning that brings coherence to all phenomena.  As Lacan notes, there is nothing 
inherently pathological about this psychic organization.  A particularly well-organized delusion 
might prove sufficient to bring order to the world.  It is only in “certain conditions” (Seminar III, 
85) that the delusion fails, that the subject is exposed to the problem of the incoherence of the 
world that the delusion is constructed to solve.   
 In other words, the two moments that Lacan identifies in psychotic phenomena correspond 
to two distinct philosophical moments: in the moment of the crisis, the problem is an 
overexposure to the particularity of experience, while in the delusion, the particularity of 
experience is brought under the sign of an a priori principle.   Psychotic phenomena express both 
the lack of meaning in the world—the “beyond-of-the-signifier,” that which is missing from 
reality—and the transcendental support for the disjointed phenomena of sensory experience.  The 
problem of the Ding, in other words, might be thought the shared problem of empiricist and a 
priori philosophies.  Kant famously declared that he was woken from his “dogmatic slumber” by 
Hume's skepticism; for Lacan, the delusional certainty of an a priori structuration of experience 
is a response to the problem of the Ding.  In other words, empiricist and idealist thought are, for 
Lacan, two ways of dealing with the problem of the Ding, with the fact that that which troubles 
thought is missing from reality.  If empiricist thought frames the problem of how a world is 
constructed out of experience, idealist thought solves this problem through the imposition of an a 
priori structure that organizes experience. 
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III. The Thermodynamic Ding, or, Wittgenstein's Psychosis 
 
 In Seminar XVII: The Other Side of Psychoanalysis, Lacan offers a brief reading of 
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as exemplary of a delusional solution to the 
problem of the Ding.  For Lacan, the Tractatus, in which Wittgenstein proposes that language 
signifies because language and world share the same transcendental structure, is possessed by a 
“psychotic ferocity” (62), through which a structure is elaborated that allows Wittgenstein to 
“not […] know anything about the place where truth is in question” (63).  Yet in this refusal to 
know anything about the place where truth is in question, Lacan writes, the Tractatus is a 
“prodigiously rich piece of stupidity, for it gives rise to a leverage point […] namely that there is 
no metalanguage”(Seminar XVII, 61).  Whereas in the Tractatus Wittgenstein argues that a 
logical metalanguage functions as the beyond-of-the-signified, from the late 1920's on, and 
stemming from his discovery that logic does not have a universal and unified form, Wittgenstein 
offers a thorough critique of the logicism of the Tractatus.  In his late work, that is, he is 
motivated by the same “leverage point” as Lacan—by the conviction that “there is no 
metalanguage.”  A reading of Lacan with Wittgenstein both frames the problem of the Ding—the 
place where truth is in question—and exposes the extent to which the philosophical heritage of 
thermodynamic thought is active within Lacan’s thought.   
 Lacan describes scientific discourse in terms that are nearly identical to his description of 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus.  As he writes, “our science's prodigious fecundity must be examined in 
relation to the fact, sustaining science, that science does-not-want-to-know-anything about the 
truth as cause” (Écrits, 742).  In foreclosing the problem of truth, science seems like “a 
successful paranoia” (Écrits, 742).  Russell Nieli notes, in a similar vein, that “the idea of world-
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encompassing, monastic science, such as that presented in the Tractatus, certainly did not 
originate with Wittgenstein.  It was, if fact, a common idea in certain intellectual circles in the 
latter half of the 19th century, being associated with such names as Helmholtz, Haeckel, and 
Mach” (158).  Indeed, it is often suggested that the relationship of language to world that 
Wittgenstein outlines in the Tractatus takes its inspiration from Heinrich Hertz's 1893 The 
Principles of Mechanics, which attempts to explain how the mathematical language of 
thermodynamics—the same language that Freud appeals to as the basis of a scientific 
psychology—relates to physical reality.  Like Lacan, who works in his reading of Freud's Project 
to show that the problem of the Ding is beyond of the field of energetics, and the basis of an 
experience—jouissance— that “doesn’t result in energy, and can’t be registered as such” 
(Television, 19), Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, works to conceive of both language and world as 
governed by logic, and thereby offers a precise description of the Ding as the beyond-of-the-
signified.   
  Hertz’s The Principles of Mechanics consists of two books.  The first book contains 
assertions that, Hertz writes, are “a priori judgments in Kant’s sense” that have to do with the 
“internal intuition of, and upon the logical forms followed by, the person who makes the 
assertations” (45).  In this first book, Hertz articulates the mechanics of an a priori geometrical 
space.  The second book moves from a study of a priori geometrical space, to a mathematics that 
understands “times, spaces, and masses to be symbols for objects of external experience” (139).  
The claims in the second book are consistent with the purely formal claims of the first book, but 
conform “not only the demands of thought” (45) but also to “experience.”  Hertz proposes that if 
we are to assume that mathematics is in accord with “external experience,” then we must be 
prepared to accept “a single general statement” about the internal logic of the physical world.  
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This “sole fundamental law of mechanics” is the proposition “that every system of natural bodies 
moves just as if it were assigned the problem of attaining given positions in given times, and in 
such a manner that the kinetic and potential energy shall be as small as possible”(16).   
 The consequence of this “fundamental law” is a theory of mathematical language in 
which the terms of mathematical relation signify because these same terms of relation are 
immanent to the physical world.  Mechanics is meaningful because of a meta-mechanical 
fundamental law.  While Hertz’s “fundamental law” proposes a logical structure that inheres 
within the world, it falls to Wittgenstein to universalize the relationship that Hertz articulates 
between mathematics and the world, taking into account the relation between language and the 
world.  
 Hertz is one of the few people cited by name in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
where Wittgenstein writes that “in a proposition there must be exactly as many distinguishable 
parts as in the situation that it represents.  The two must possess the same logical (mathematical) 
multiplicity.  (Compare Hertz’s Mechanics on dynamical models.)”(4.04)  James Griffin, 
mapping the similarities between the Tractatus and Hertz’s mechanics, writes that 
Wittgenstein says that there must be something common between picture or 
fact; or, as Hertz puts it, ‘there must be a certain conformity between nature 
and our thought’.  There must be conformity because, according to 
Wittgenstein, our names must behave as regards combining as the objects in 
nature behave, or, according to Hertz, because ‘the form which we give 
pictures is such that the necessity consequents of the pictures in thought are 
always the pictures of the necessary consequents in nature of the thing 
pictured’.  (100) 
 
The mathematical language of thermodynamic thought, as it is defended by Hertz, and taken up 
by Wittgenstein, solves the problem of the Ding by introducing the principle that “there must be 
a certain conformity between nature and our thought.”  The place where, as Lacan puts it, “truth 
is in question,” is covered over by meta-theoretical statement.  In appropriating the notion of a 
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logical metalanguage that determines relationships in both language and world from the 
fundamental law that Hertz articulates as the field of energetics, Wittgenstein at once 
pathologizes the mapping of language to world that is implicit in Helmholtz’s mechanics—and 
thus implicit in the claim that the mathematical language of physics, of thermodynamic theory, 
has an internal relationship to reality—and pushes to its limit the claim that language signifies by 
virtue of a hidden logical structure that inheres in both the signifying units of language, and 
between objects in the natural world.    
For the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, language refers to the world because the 
relationship of signifiers in a proposition—which can be revealed by symbolic logic—is the 
same as the relationship between objects in the world.  In the Tractatus, propositions of logic are 
true by virtue of their a priori form, rather than because of any content.  As Wittgenstein writes, 
“[t]he propositions of logic are tautologies” (6.1) precisely because of “the impossibility of 
illogical thought” (5.4731).  Wittgenstein argues that, since logic is the transcendental form both 
of language and of the facts that compose the world, language can only signify when it shows, by 
its form, a picture of how facts, in the world, are related.  The only propositions that are 
meaningful are propositions that, by, virtue of the logical form embedded within them, show a 
picture of how things are related in the world.  This means that any illogical use of language is 
meaningless, nonsensical, and without possible referent.  Yet since logic is the transcendental 
form of the world, “logic” is not, itself, an object in the world.  Therefore any proposition that 
tries to describe logical form—The Tractatus, for example—is, strictly speaking, nonsense.  
Wittgenstein thus concludes the Tractatus with a mystical appeal that his reader transcend the 
propositions he has just read:  “Anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as 
nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them”(6.54).  As in Lacan's 
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description of the “enormous meaning” that, in psychosis, the appearance of being nothing at 
all—in so far as it cannot be tied to anything, since it has never entered into the system of 
symbolization” (85), logical form is “nothing at all,” and is precisely that which is excluded from 
“the system of symbolization.”  The linguistic articulation of logical form must, therefore, be 
replaced by a mystical relationship to the world as a limited totality.  As Wittgenstein writes, 
“Feeling the world as a limited whole—it is this that is mystical” (6.45).  Through this mystical 
feeling, “[t]he solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem” (6.521).   
 Rudolph Carnap, who failed to notice the mystical conclusion to the Tractatus, found 
inspiration in the logical rigor of the Tractatus.  Carnap writes that his own “more radical 
outlook”—that metaphysical statements are not only excluded from science, but, strictly 
speaking, nonsense—“was influenced by Wittgenstein's view that metaphysical statements, 
while in principle unverifiable, are therefore senseless” (quoted in Nieli, 63).  Because language 
can be meaningful only if it refers, through its structure, to objects in the world, Carnap suggests 
that he owed to Wittgenstein the “insight that many philosophical sentences, especially in 
traditional metaphysics, are pseudo-sentences, devoid of cognitive content” (Intellectual 
Autobiography, 25).  Carnap was thus surprised, upon meeting Wittgenstein in 1927, that 
Wittgenstein seemed a mystic troubled by metaphysics.  As Carnap writes, Wittgenstein seemed 
to view mathematics and science “with an attitude of indifference and sometimes with contempt” 
(Intellectual Autobiography, 28), and he “sometimes had the impression that the deliberately 
rational and unemotional attitude of the scientist and likewise any idea which had the flavor of 
'enlightenment' were repugnant to Wittgenstein” (Intellectual Autobiography, 26).   
 For Carnap, the Tractatus, read as a technical procedure to expose the fraud of metaphysical 
statements, helped ground a logical positivist critique of Heidegger's philosophy as meaningless 
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and metaphysical.  Heidegger's own response to Carnap, in An Introduction to Metaphysics, 
clarifies the terms of Carnap's misunderstanding of Wittgenstein.  For Heidegger the 
“fundamental question of metaphysics” is “Why are there essents24 rather than nothing.”   
Perhaps the whole body of logic as it is known to us, perhaps all the logic that 
we treat as a gift from heaven, is grounded in a very definite answer to the 
question about the essent; perhaps, in consequence, all thinking which solely 
follows the laws of thought prescribed by traditional logic is incapable from 
the very start of even understanding the question about the essent by its own 
resources, let alone actually unfolding the question and guiding it to a strict 
answer.  Actually it is only an appearance of a strict, scientific method when 
we invoke the principle of contradiction and logic in general, in order to prove 
that all thinking and speaking about nothing are contradictory and therefore 
meaningless.  In such a contention “logic” is regarded as a court of justice, 
established for all eternity, whose rights as first and last authority no rational 
man will impugn.  Anyone who speaks against logic is therefore tacitly or 
explicitly accused of irresponsibility.  And the mere accusation is taken as a 
proof and an argument relieving one of the need for any further genuine 
reflection.  (An Introduction to Metaphysics, 25) 
 
In these terms, Carnap's mistake is to see the Tractatus as proving that metaphysics is 
meaningless, when in fact, the Tractatus attempts to solve, precisely, the problem of why there is 
something rather than nothing.  For Wittgenstein, it is not a question of doing away with the 
problem of metaphysics, but rather a question of solving the problem of metaphysics.  The 
Wittgenstein of the Tractatus does not consider metaphysics nonsense, as Carnap suggests. It is 
rather the case for Wittgenstein that, as Heidegger writes, “the whole body of logic [...] is 
grounded in a very definite answer to the question about the essent.”  If the Tractatus, as Lacan 
suggests, is a “refusal of the place where truth is in question,” it is a definite refusal.     
 The problem of the “Nothing” does not just appear as a term of external critique, as an 
interpretation of the Tractatus.  Besides The Principles of Mechanics, a second important source 
text for the argument of the Tractatus is Otto Weininger's Sex and Character.  As Desmond Lee, 
                                                
24   “Essent” is the translator's coinage.  As he writes, “essents” are “existents,” or “things that are” (An 
Introduction to Metaphysics,” ix).   
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who was one of Wittgenstein’s students after Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge in the late 
1920's, writes, Wittgenstein “had a great admiration for Weininger's Sex and Character and for 
the introduction to Hertz's Mechanics.  Both of these he made me read” (Portraits of 
Wittgenstein, 195-6).  It would be hard to choose two books more opposed in spirit than The 
Principles of Mechanics and Sex and Character.  While Wittgenstein appeals to The Principles 
of Mechanics as a model for his notion of the relationship between language and world, I want to 
suggest that the problem that the Tractatus solves—the problem of why there is something rather 
than nothing, which is equally the problem of Lacanian “Thing”—comes from Sex and 
Character, a book which is devoted to resolving the problem of a “nothingness” that threatens all 
being.    
 Sex and Character articulates a fundamental bisexuality in which there is the “existence 
of original sexual characteristics”—the two possibilities of Man and Woman—in every cell” 
(22).  This fundamental bisexuality does not, as for Lawrence, reveal the logic of a natural 
rhythm or flow.  Rather, it becomes a metaphysical battle ground between “Unadulterated Man'” 
who “is the image of God, of the absolute something,” and “Woman, including Woman in Man,” 
who “is the symbol of nothingness.”25  While sexual relationships are complementary—and 
Weininger offers a law through which the percentage of “Man” and “Woman” in the two 
partners each add up to “one”—this complementary does not solve anything, for each subject 
must overcome the Woman within.  The “Woman Question” is not to be solved at the level of 
the social link—by making a space for Woman in society—but, rather, through the articulation 
of a metaphysical position, through which the human overcomes the principle of “Woman,” and 
becomes “Man.” 
                                                
25  All emphasis, whether through italics or bolding, is Weininger's.   
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 For Weininger, the problem of humanity is the struggle to overcome this “nothingness.”  
Whereas animal life struggles against its environment, the human struggles against nothingness.  
“In humans it is not a limited being that struggle against a limited non-being (as in the animal 
kingdom):  the opponents here are limitless being and limitless non-being” (268).   
The purpose of Woman, then, is to be non-purpose.  She represents 
nothingness, the opposite pole to the divinity, the other possibility in 
humankind.  That is why, quite rightly, nothing is regarded as more 
contemptible than a man who has become a woman, and why such a man is 
respected even less than the most dimwitted and coarsest criminal.  And this 
also accounts for the deepest fear in Man:  the fear of Woman, that is, the 
fear of meaninglessness, the fear of the tempting abyss of nothingness. (268) 
 
Woman, as the “abyss of nothingness” is opposed to the principle of meaning, which 
Weininger finds in the logical proposition “A=A,” a proposition that is not in itself 
meaningful, but which is the basis of all meaning.   
A=A, the principle of all truth, cannot itself be a specific truth.  Whoever 
finds the principle of identity, or the principle of contradiction, devoid of 
meaning has himself to blame.  HE expected to find specific ideas in them, 
and he hoped to add to his fund of positive knowledge.  But those principles 
in themselves are no insights, no specific acts of thought, but the standard 
applied to all acts of thought.  This cannot itself be an act of thought which 
could be compared in any way to the others.  The norm of thought cannot 
be situated in thought itself.  The principle of identity adds nothing to our 
knowledge.  Rather than increasing a fortune, it profices the complete 
foundation for that fortune in the first place.  The principle of identity is 
either nothing, or it is everything.  (135) 
 
The principle of logical identity is not in thought, but is rather the standard applied to thought, 
and if thought is not based in the principle of identity, thought itself ceases to exist.  “Woman” is 
“amoral” and “alogical.”  She “has no relationship with the idea” and, “mathematically speaking 
[...] has no algebraic sign” (258).  Weininger proceeds to identify this lack of morals and logic 
with an excess of sexuality and drive at work in Woman.   In his reading of hysteria Weininger 
writes that the “foreign body” in the hysteric 
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is sexuality, which she does not acknowledge and which she does not accept as 
belonging to her, but which she can no longer banish, as she was able to do 
when her drives silently and as if forever retreated before the invasion of 
morality.  Even now the sexual ideas that she has repressed through a supreme 
effort may “convert” into all possible kinds of conditions and produce that 
protean illness, those leaps from one part of the body to another, that 
propensity to imitate anything, and that lack of any constancy, which have 
always made it so difficult to define hysteria by its symptoms.  But now no 
“conversion” completely absorbs the drive, which longs to express itself and 
which is not exhausted by any transformation.  (242) 
 
While “Man” is the principle of logic that affirms the existence of the world, “Woman,” who is 
“amoral” and “alogical,” given over to sexuality and the drive, is the negation of being, logic, 
and morality.   
 For Weininger, the nothingness of the drive can be overcome only if Man assumes a 
position of “genius.”   The genius is the fully conscious subject who is the “microcosm” of the 
world.  Weininger writes that the human being is “the only entity in nature […] which has a 
relationship with all the things in it” (151).  Weininger describes this relationship, felt by men of 
Genius, with the world as a whole as “a certain boundary feeling of the supreme reality” (147).  
Weininger borrows a Kantian vocabulary, but in a distinctly uncritical manner. 
Nothing is totally alien to [the Genius] and he is linked to all things in the 
world by a bond of sympathy […].  The moral law comes from the human 
soul, which holds all totality, and which can contemplate everything 
because it is everything:  the starry heavens and the moral law, they two are 
basically one and the same thing.  The universalism of the categorical 
imperative is the universalism of the universe.  (150)   
 
The man of genius, “the actual microcosm” (151) lives in this “state of universal consciousness” 
(151).  Woman, the drive, is the other possibility in humankind—unconsciousness, amorality, 
separation—while Man, realized in the genius, is the universal that overcomes this separation. 
In the mysticism of the Tractatus, it is, likewise, a certain relationship to the propositions 
of logic—as the norm of all thought—that overcomes the problem of the “nothing.” 
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Wittgenstein’s subject comes to occupy the same position as Weininger’s genius.  As 
Wittgenstein writes “I am my world.  (The microcosm)”.  Since “logic pervades the world […] 
the limits of the world are also its limits” (5.61).  Wittgenstein continues that “The subject does 
not belong to the world:  rather, it is a limit of the world” (5.632).  The subject and the world 
share the same limit—the transcendental structure of logic.  The subject, coordinated with the 
world, exists without excess, free from the drive.  Yet whereas for Weininger the “nothing” that 
is “Woman” is the other potential of humanity, Wittgenstein gives this “nothing” a precise 
logical form, for this “nothing” is nothing other than the excess that is logical form itself.  
Wittgenstein thus, against his will—and this is part of his “prodigious stupidity” for Lacan—
articulates the signifier as it produces the hole in being that Lacan names das Ding.  Wittgenstein 
must jettison this figure of excess—logical form itself—in order to save language from its 
excess.  The “nothing,” in other words, is the Ding, for it is precisely logical form, that which has 
no place within the world, that provides coherence to Wittgenstein's world.  The Tractatus, as 
Heidegger might be read to suggest, offers a definite answer to the question of why there are 
things rather than nothing.   
 
 
VI. Wittgenstein's self-critique: Language troubled by the Ding 
 
In the late 1920's, Wittgenstein's work on the logic of color perception brought him to the 
realization that there is no such thing as unified logical structure.26  If there is no such thing as 
                                                
26  Wittgenstein's argument that language and world share the same logical form depends upon the 
assumption of the necessity of logical form, which is distinguished from the accident of what is actually 
the case.  Nothing that happens in the world—accidents of what is the case—can contradict logical form, 
because logic is the form of all that happens in the world.  This means that no two elementary 
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unified logical structure, it cannot be the case that that logic is the transcendental structure of the 
world.  In 1931, not long after he had made this discovery, Wittgenstein recommended Sex and 
Character to G.E. Moore, who did not find the book to his liking.  In a response to Moore's 
distaste for Weininger, Wittgenstein writes that 
I can quite imagine that you don't admire Weininger very much with that 
beastly translation and the fact that W. must feel very foreign to you.  It is 
true that he is fantastic but is great and fantastic.  It isn't necessary or rather 
not possible to agree with him but the greatness lies in that with which we 
disagree.  It is his enormous mistake which is great.  I.e. roughly speaking if 
you just add a “ ~ ” to the whole book it says an important truth.  
(Cambridge Letters, 250) 
 
While Wittgenstein’s Tractatus articulates something like Weininger’s position of genius, from 
the 1930’s on, Wittgenstein takes this position of genius as an object of critique.  Rather than 
                                                                                                                                                       
propositions can contradict each other.  If two elementary propositions were in contradiction, then the 
distinction between necessity and accident, between transcendental logic and the accident of what is 
actually the case, would erode.  Therefore, in the Tractatus, the proposition “this point in the visual field 
is red” has the logical form: “this point in the visual field is red, and nothing else.”  The logical structure 
of color rules out the possibility that two colors would be at the same point in the visual field not because 
of a contradiction between two elementary propositions, but because a supplementary statement—'and 
nothing else'—rules out that another color could be present. 
 In “Some Remarks on Logical Form,” Wittgenstein revisits this problem.  He begins by calling 
into question whether, indeed, a statement about color can be analyzed into two statements, suggesting 
that instead each degree of color must be described by a separate elementary proposition.   
 Wittgenstein notes that the possible logical products of two statements, 'P' and 'Q,' should 
correspond to the following truth table: 
 P Q 
 T T 
 T F 
 F T 
 F F 
 Yet if “P”= “this is red” and “Q”=“this is blue,” then the actual possibilities are: 
 P Q  
 T F 
 F T 
 F F 
 A point in the visual field can be red, blue, neither, but not both.  The contradiction would be 
written as the top line of the truth table (T,T).  Yet the contradiction “gives the proposition a greater 
logical multiplicity than that of the actual possibilities” (“Remarks,” 35).  Color has a distinct logical 
structure.  Language and world are thus no longer underwritten by a single truth table, which defines the 
space of all logical possibility.   
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solve the problem of “nothingness” by occupying a position of genius, Wittgenstein takes the 
side of the “nothing” against genius.  In a series of notebook entries from 1931 Wittgenstein 
remarks on both Weininger’s influence on him, and asks what it means to be a Jewish thinker.   
In Sex and Character, “Woman” and “the Jew” occupy an identical position.  As the 
undifferentiated human can choose to be Man or Woman, he has the choice to be Christian or 
Jewish.  In the same way that Woman is the allure of nothingness, Weininger writes that 
“nothing is easier than being a Jew, nothing harder than becoming a Christian.  Judaism is the 
abyss over which Christianity is erected, and that is why the Jew is the strongest fear and the 
deepest aversion of the Aryan” (298).  Judaism is not a “race or a nation” but a “cast of mind, a 
psychic constitution” (274).  Weininger writes that “Judaism […] seems to be steeped in 
femininity” (276), and that the Jew, like Woman, lacks an “intelligible self”(278).  The Jew, 
Weininger continues, “believes in neither mystery nor the transcendent”(284), and “can never be 
a genius”(285). Wittgenstein’s commentators tend to be relieved that these seemingly anti-
Semitic comments don’t reach a more feverish pitch.  However, while in the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein identifies with Weininger’s genius, with overcoming the “nothing” that is both 
“Woman” and “Jew,” in his late thought, Wittgenstein embraces precisely the quality of “Jewish 
thought” that Weininger wants to overcome.   
In the notebook entry where Wittgenstein asks what it means to be Jewish, he writes, in a 
Weiningerian vein, that, “Even the greatest of Jewish thinkers is no more than talented […] I 
think there is some truth in my idea that I really only think reproductively”(CV, 19). Wittgenstein 
continues that “the Jewish mind does not have the power to produce,” but, rather, must engage in 
“the work of clarification” (CV, 19). It is just this work of clarification that Wittgenstein turns to 
in the Investigations, where, in working to discover the origins of a fantasy of a metalanguage, 
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he writes that “our investigation seems only to destroy everything interesting” (119).  If the 
Tractatus aspires to genius, to man as microcosm, the Investigations identifies the fantasy of man 
as microcosm as precisely that which must to be reduced to rubble through a process of 
clarification.  Wittgenstein’s new reading of Weininger, in which he identifies with the Jew, 
rather than with the Christian man of genius, is part of a shift in Wittgenstein’s understanding of 
the relationship between language and drive.  No longer is Wittgenstein’s a position, of genius, 
that will empty language of its excess.  Rather, he identifies the idea of genius, as a relationship 
articulated through logic to the world as a “limited whole,” as a fantasy that moves through 
language, and from which he wants to free himself.  Wittgenstein’s late thought shares, with 
Lacan’s thought, an understanding of the Ding as logical structure.   
If in the Tractatus Wittgenstein solves the problem of the Ding, the void at the center of 
being, through an appeal to logic, in the Investigations this solution is his object of critique.   
What we call ‘sentence’ and ‘language’ have not the formal unity that I 
imagined, but are families of structures more or less related to each other. 
—But what becomes of logic now?  Its rigor seems to be giving way here. 
—But in that case doesn’t logic altogether disappear?—For how can it lose 
its rigor?  Of course not by our bargaining any of its rigor out of it.—The 
preconceived idea of crystalline purity can only be removed by turning our 
whole examination round.  (One might say:  the axis of reference of our  
examination must be rotated, but about the fixed point of our real need.) 
(§108) 
 
Both the Tractatus and the Investigations, according to Wittgenstein, treat the same problem— 
“the fixed point of our real need”— but rather than solve the problem of the Ding, by appealing 
to logic as the limit of language and world, Wittgenstein turns to ask how it is that the problem of 
the Ding—the desire for a logical metalanguage—troubles language.   
 Wittgenstein begins his Philosophical Investigations by evoking the problem of ostensive 
definition in Saint Augustine.  “When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly 
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moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they 
uttered when they meant to point it out”(1).  As Wittgenstein notes, the problem with this picture 
of how language works is that it seems impossible that Augustine could ever know what his 
elders were pointing at.   
Now one can ostensively define a proper name, the name of a color, the 
name of a material, a numeral the name of a point of the compass and so on.  
The definition of the number two, “That is called 'two'”—pointing to two 
nuts—is perfectly exact.—But how can two be defined like that?  The 
person one gives the definition to doesn't know what one wants to call 
“two”; he will suppose that “two” is the name given to this group of nuts!—
He may suppose this; but perhaps he does not.  He might make the opposite 
mistake; when I want to assign a name to this group of nuts, he might 
understand it as a numeral.  And he might equally well take the name of a 
person, of which I give an ostensive definition, as that of a colour, of a race, 
or even of a point of the compass.  That is to say:  an ostensive definition 
can be variously interpreted in every case. (§29) 
 
It is precisely this scene that Lacan turns to in both his first seminar, On the Technical Writings 
of Freud, and in his third seminar, The Psychoses, in order to identify the problem of the beyond-
of-the-signifier.  In arguing for the necessity of a beyond-of-the-signified to ensure meaning, 
Lacan reminds his audience that “the trap, the hole one must not fall into, is the belief that the 
signified are objects, things”(32). 
The signified is something quite different—it's the meaning, as I explained to 
you by means of Saint Augustine, who is as much of a linguist as Monsieur 
Benveniste, that it always refers to meaning, that is, to another meaning.  The 
system of language, at whatever point you take hold of it, never results in an 
index finger directly indicating a point of reality; it's the whole of reality that 
is covered by the entire network of language.  You can never say that this is 
what is being designated, for even were you to succeed you would never know 
what I am designating in this table—for example, the color, the thickness, the 
table as object, or whatever else it might be.  (32) 
 
For both Lacan and Wittgenstein, the critique of Augustine's scene of ostensible definition serves 
both to identify a specific fantasy of how language works, and to situate an approach to language 
as it operates outside of this fantasy.    
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 Rather than propose that he, or Augustine, are merely wrong about how language works, 
Wittgenstein suggests that the fantasy of a metaphysical perspective emerges out of the texture of 
language.  In the decimal expansion of Pi, Wittgenstein writes, it seems that “either the group 
“7777” occurs, or it does not—there is no third possibility.”   
But what does that mean? –We use a picture; the picture of a visible series 
which one person sees the whole of and another not.  The law of excluded 
middle says here:  It must either look like this, or like that.  So it really—
and this is a truism—says nothing at all, but gives us a picture.  And the 
problem ought to be, does reality accord with the picture or not?  And this 
picture seems to determine what we have to do, what to look for, and 
how—but it does not do so, just because we do not know how it is to be 
applied.  Here saying “There is no third possibility” or “But there can’t be a 
third possibility!”—expresses our inability to turn our eyes away from this 
picture:  a picture which looks as if it must already contain both the 
problem and its solution, while all the same time we feel that it is not so.  
(Investigations, 352) 
 
The question of whether or not the decimal expansion of Pi exists before it is written out leads 
Wittgenstein to suggest that there exists a metaphysical position—that of transcendental logic, of 
God—from the perspective of which the world exists as a totality.  The seeming fact that the 
decimal expansion of Pi exists is presented as a picture that captures us, that “we cannot turn our 
eyes away from.”   
 Wittgenstein's solution to this problem—to the picture of language that captivates with its 
fantasy of a world viewed—is to return to the “rough ground”(Investigations, §107) of language, 
by listening to how language is actually used.  Wittgenstein considers the feeling of intending to 
say something:  “didn’t I intend the whole construction of the sentence […] at its beginning?  So 
surely it existed in my mind before I said it out loud!”(337).  The only way to escape from this 
captivating picture is to return “intend” to its non-metaphysical use.  As he writes, “here we are 
constructing a misleading picture of ‘intending,’ that is, of the use of this word” (337).   Since, as 
Wittgenstein argues, it is only when the decimal expansion of Pi is granted existence, as pre-
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existing structure (rather than seen as a sequence of numbers produced through a technical 
procedure of comparing the diameter of a circle to its circumference), it is therefore only when 
“intention” is removed from its actual use that metaphysics comes to inhabit language.   “An 
intention is embedded in its situation” (337)—as, for example, when one intends to take out the 
garbage.  The fantasy of a perspective, from which language can be taken as an object of 
intention, emerges, as a “grammatical fiction” when we remove “intending” from its everyday 
use.  While Wittgenstein works to “clarify” how language works, dissolving metaphysical 
problems by returning pregnant metaphysical terms to their “ordinary” use, metaphysics is not 
merely a deluded perspective, that misguided intellectuals use to deform and pervert the normal 
functioning of language. Rather, the “grammatical fiction” of a metaphysical perspective 
imposes itself on us.  Metaphysics, the search for the cristalline structure of logic as a guarantee 
for language, is not “our” dream, but, “as it were, a dream of our language” (358).  It is not that 
Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus, made a mistake about how language worked, imposing some 
structure that is alien to language onto language.  Rather, a certain activity of language fooled 
Wittgenstein.  Both the Tractatus and the Investigations try to listen to how language works—
only, in the Tractatus, Wittgenstein was listening to the wrong thing.   
 Against a reading of Wittgenstein where “ordinary language” is what ordinary people 
speak, while only sickly philosophers are troubled by metaphysics, Stanley Cavell writes, in his 
A Pitch of Philosophy that, while in the Investigations the everyday use of language is the cure 
for metaphysics, “the origin of the quotidian voice is a return from the metaphysical”(Pitch, 66).  
As Cavell continues, the problem of this notion of return is that “there is no ‘back’ to which to 
return” (Pitch, 67)—the ordinary, the everyday, does not become prior to philosophy, but is, 
itself, the product of a discourse.  It is the other side of the thesis that there is no such thing as a 
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metalanguage.  In these terms, the Investigations does not return to, but rather produces, 
“ordinary language.”  For Cavell, that is, not only does metaphysics, as “a dream of our 
language”(Investigations, 358), emerge through a “misuse” of language, but ordinary language, 
the “quotidian voice,” emerges only though a mode of attention to a certain working of language.  
Rather than distinguish between two distinct levels of language, the Investigations explores the 
point at which these two levels of language—on the one hand a desire for the Other as the locus 
of intention, on the other the “quotidian voice” which finds the Other as a “grammatical 
fiction”—fold into each other.  Whereas in the Tractatus Wittgenstein is fooled into thinking that 
the problem of the Ding can be solved, the Investigations listens to language as it is troubled by 
the Ding. 
 
VI.  Ordinary Language and Lalangue 
 
 As Wittgenstein distinguishes between the “grammatical fiction” of a logical 
metalanguage, and the “rough ground” of the ordinary voice, Lacan distinguishes between 
language and lalangue.   Linguistics, which produces language as a law-governed field, is, Lacan 
writes ,“the science that concerns itself with lalangue, which I write as one word, so as to specify 
its object, as is done in every science” (Seminar XXIII, 138).  “Language is what we try to know 
concerning the function of lalangue” (138).  Lalangue, that is, is equally the field of phenomena 
that linguistics works to colonize, to bring under the control of laws and rules, and the 
persistence of linguistic phenomena that cannot be described by the science of linguistics.  Like 
the “rough ground” of Wittgenstein's ordinary language, lalangue appears only as a critique of 
the metaphysical.   
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 In his For the Love of Language, the linguist and philosopher Jean-Claude Milner writes, 
echoing Wittgenstein's mystical argument in the Tractatus, that “whatever might be the 
interpretation or the power of a logical Language,27 there exists at least one entity which escapes 
it, which is this Language itself”(103).  A metalanguage is, in other words, unable to articulate 
itself.  Milner continues that “To force this point of suspension, to want Language to take itself 
for its object is thus necessarily to reinscribe it on the side of the not-all, whose palpable form is 
the paradox”(103).  If a metalanguage can describe itself, then the metalanguage exists within the 
world and is therefore not a metalanguage, but an object described by a metalanguage.  Indeed, it 
is just in order to avoid this paradox that Wittgenstein is forced to exclude logic, itself, from 
language.  Milner continues that “It becomes apparent by contrast that the Lacanian proposition, 
“there is no metalanguage,’ is immediately translatable as ‘there is something in language which 
is inscribed as the not-all,’ and consists in nothing other than an affirmation of the existence in 
Language of lalangue” (103).  Just as, for Wittgenstein, the thesis that there is no metalanguage 
means that metaphysics is something assumed in certain words, when they are taken out of their 
situation, for Lacan, that “there's no such thing as a metalanguage” means that there is no such 
thing as being.  “Being is merely presumed in certain words—‘individual,’ for instance, and 
‘substance.’  In my view, it is but a fact of what is said” (Seminar XX, 107).   
 Like Wittgenstein, who writes that one is captured by a picture of the world viewed—the 
idea that “7777” is either already contained in the decimal expansion of Pi, or already excluded 
from the decimal expansion of Pi suggests that there is a perspective from which this infinite 
expansion can be surveyed —Lacan suggests that the fantasy that the world could be taken as a 
whole imposes itself on thought is an effect of grammar.   
                                                
27  Milner writes “Langage” with a capital “L” in order to signify a scientifically elaborated structure 
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The world conceived of as the whole, with what this word implies 
by way of limitation, regardless of the openness we grant it, remains a 
conception—a serendipitous term here—a view, gaze, or imaginary hold.  
And from that results the following, which remains strange, that some-
one—a part of this world—is at the outset assumed to be able to take 
cognizance of it.  This One finds itself therein in a state that we can call 
existence, for how could it be the basis of the “taking cognizance” if it did 
not exist?  Therein has always lain the impasse, the vacillation resulting 
from the cosmology that consists in the belief in a world.  On the contrary, 
isn’t there something in analytic discourse that can introduce us to the 
following:  that every subsistence or persistence of the world as such must 
be abandoned? 
Language—the language forged by philosophical discourse—is 
such that, as you see, I cannot but constantly slip back into this world into 
this presupposition of substances that is permeated with the function of 
being.  (Seminar XX, 43-44) 
 
Against this belief in a world, in a One that has being, Lacan offers  that “[o]ur recourse, in 
llanguage (lalangue), is to that which shatters it (la brise)” (Seminar XX, 44).   Lalangue frees us 
from captivation by the “picture” of belief in a world, by showing how the One—the basis for 
this belief in a world—emerges out of language, as “a fact of what is said” (Seminar XX, 107).  
Lacan, like Wittgenstein, finds the origin of the fantasy of the world viewed in a fact of grammar 
that imposes itself on thought.  As Lacan writes, “Knowledge of the One turns out not to come 
from the body.  The little we can say about knowledge of the one comes from the signifier 
‘One’”(143).  It is through a deceptively complex theory of knots that Lacan investigates the 
“One.”  When Lacan introduces the borromean knot—where three rings of string are 
interconnected such that if one ring of string is cut, the other rings will separate—he is offering a 
surprisingly simple explanation of grammar.  In the borromean knot, the function of each ring of 
string depends upon its relationship to all the other rings of string.  In a grammatical sentence, 
function of each word depends upon its relationship to all the other words in the sentence.  In 
other words, the “One” for Lacan, is grammatical structure.   
Do you want an example that can show you what purpose can be served by 
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this line of folded knots that become independent once again as soon as 
you cut one of them?  It's not very difficult to find such an example in 
psychosis, and that’s no accident.  Recall what hallucinatorily fills 
Schreber's solitude:  “Nun will Ich mich...,” “Now I shall...,” or again “Sie 
sollen nämlich...,” “You were to...”  These interrupted sentences, which I 
called code messages, leave some sort of abeyance.  We perceive here the 
requirement of a sentence, whatever it may be, which is such that one of 
its links, when missing, sets all the others free, that it, withdraws from 
them the One [leur retire le Un:  takes their One away from them].  
(Seminar XX, 128) 
 
The “One,” in other words, is a grammatical unity of the sentence.  When this grammatical fact 
is taken up by philosophical language, the structure of language imposes itself on the world, such 
that the world viewed becomes a grammatical fiction.  Whereas philosophy is captivated by the 
One, Schreber is captivated by the particularity of linguistic phenomena as it is withdrawn from 
the One.  The psychotic, in Lacan's description of the mirror stage, “is so captivated by the 
image”(Seminar X, 142) that he does not find support for the particularity of his disordered 
experience in his mother's smile, such that “in the face of this phenomenon, his attitude is one of 
perplexity”(Seminar III, 53).  Schreber's auditory hallucinations have the same structure.  He is 
captivated and perplexed by the meaningless particularity of linguistic phenomena.  It is in order 
to interpret these phenomena, in order to explain these fragments, that he produces a delusion.   
 This One, as that which is missing from reality, yet provides reality with its being, 
becomes another name for the Ding, for the beyond-of-the-signified.  The “One,” as grammatical 
form, exists, and is incarnated in lalangue, but is itself but a dream of language as it haunts 
language, gesturing towards the fiction of a being that it itself does not possess.  As 
Wittgenstein's Investigations advocate a mode of listening, a listening to how is that metaphysics 
troubles the subject, Lacan's “jouissance,” as the experience of the Ding, equally describes a kind 
of listening, a listening to the way in which the Ding appears, through the deviations that it 
introduces.  Lacan writes that it is this sense that jouissance might be written as j'ouïs-sens (I 
  240 
hear meaning).  It is the same thing as hearing a meaning” (“C'est la même chose d'ouïr un 
sens”) (Seminar XXIII, 72-3).  Psychoanalysis is not interested in referential language—the 
language of being—but rather works to recover the actual functioning of language.   
For Lacan, the question is not why certain sick people feel that their body is parasitized 
by language—or, in Wittgenstein’s terms, why certain people are afflicted with a philosophical 
illness—“the question is rather that of why a normal man, a man we call normal, does not 
perceive that the word is a parasite [...] that the word is the form of cancer that afflicts the human 
being” (Seminar XXIII, 95).   Psychoanalysis thus works “to render this jouissance”—the 
jouissance that agitates in the parasitic word—“possible”(Seminar XXIII, 97).  A first 
psychoanalytic moment comes as one lets “oneself be invaded by the essentially phonetic 
properties of the word, by the polyphony of the word” (Seminar XXIII, 97).  At the same time 
that psychoanalytic listening works to expose this scene of lalangue, of the parasitic word, Lacan 
proposes that it is through this mode of listening that one can limit the action of lalangue, and 
can “free oneself of the parasitic word”(Seminar XXIII, 97). 
 
VII. The Psychoanalytic Hypothesis 
 
 A certain critical labor of psychoanalysis involves recovering an experience, as a scene of 
disorganized linguistic phenomenon, haunted by the Ding, by the problem of the beyond-of-the-
signified.  Lacan argues that thermodynamic discourse, as a solution to the problem of the Ding, 
covers over this dimension of speech.  In a second logical moment, however, Lacan appeals to 
the language of scientific discourse in order to enter into the field of lalangue, suggesting that 
both the subject and the unconscious are hypothetical.   
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  Lacan writes, in Encore, that “if I have said that language is what the unconscious is 
structured like, that is because language, first of all, doesn’t exist.  Language is what we try to 
know concerning the function of lalangue” (Seminar XX, 138).  The unconscious, in other words, 
is a kind of knowledge about lalangue.  As a language (whether the language of 
thermodynamics, or of linguistics) is a hypothesis about the phenomena that it considers, Lacan 
continues that  “the unconscious, can only be structured like a language, a language that is 
always hypothetical with respect to what supports it, namely, lalangue” (139).  The unconscious, 
like language, does not exist, but is, rather, produced as the effect of a discourse.  From the fact 
of lalangue, Lacan proposes the hypothesis that there is a subject who knows how to use 
lalangue. “Stated otherwise, I reduce the hypothesis, according to the very formulation that lends 
it substance, to the following:  it [the subject] is necessary to the functioning of lalangue.  To say 
that there is a subject is nothing other than to say that there is a hypothesis” (XX, 142).   
In these terms, the hypothesis that the functioning of lalangue implies a subject, is 
Lacan’s inaugural theoretical gesture.  To say that the subject is a hypothesis, is equally to 
propose that there is a knowledge that resides in this use of lalangue, that the parasitic words that 
undermine knowledge are not merely an excess that must be guarded against, but the scene of a 
subject that can be brought into discourse.  Lacan is claiming, in the spirit of Alexander Koyré, 
that a hypothesis does not emerge from evidence, but is, rather, a radical break from evidence.  
As Feyerabend writes, not only is a hypothesis “inconsistent with well established facts” (29), 
but “there is not a single interesting theory that agrees with all the known facts in its domain” 
(31).  Indeed, the imposition of a hypothesis both calls for a radical reinterpretation of evidence, 
and the production of new evidence.  The Copernican hypothesis, for instance, opposes itself to 
all the evidence that we have that the Earth stands still.  Thus, as Paul Feyerabend suggests, 
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Galileo defended his Copernicanism not by introducing evidence, but by showing that one 
cannot trust evidence—to argue that the earth is moving, Galileo notes that when you walk home 
at night, it seems like the moon follows, always in the same place, over your shoulder.  Yet we 
all know that the moon stays still:  rather than dispute the evidence that the Earth is stationary, 
Galileo suggests that to enter into the field of a new hypothesis is to turn away from evidence.  
Not only does a hypothesis not emerge from experience, but it requires, through the production 
of a new experimental discourse, the production of new experience.  Entering into this 
hypothesis, one then constructs experiments.  As Koyré writes, “not only are good experiments 
based on theory, but even the means to perform them are nothing else than theory incarnate” 
(113).  A new discourse appears as the effect of a hypothesis.  Thus it is that within discourse, 
that appear as the effects of hypotheses, that science discovers its constants and laws.   
 For Lacan, a final horizon of the discourse of energetics from which psychoanalysis 
emerges, is the formal procedure through which a hypothesis frees itself from evidence, by 
introducing a new field.  By virtue of the hypothesis that there is a subject of the unconscious, 
psychoanalysis establishes a discourse in which the analysand constructs the hypothetical 
object—the subject of the unconscious.  Thus is it that Jean-Claude Milner can write, “[…] 
finally psychoanalysis only speaks of one thing:  the conversion of each subjective singularity 
into a law as necessary as the laws of nature, as contingent as they are, and as absolute” (153).28   
In these terms psychoanalysis is a subjective science.  It is not, as Lawrence suggests, a science 
that integrates the subject into reality, that solves the problem of the Ding, of the existence and 
coherence of the world, by presupposing that the natural world exists.  Rather, psychoanalysis 
proposes the existence of the subject of the unconscious as a support for the working of lalangue.  
                                                
28 “Car enfin la psychanalyse ne parle que d’une chose:  la conversion de chaque singularité subjective en 
une loi aussi nécessaire que les lois de la nature, aussi contingente qu’elles et aussi absolue. ”   
 
  243 
The unconscious, in these terms, is the minimum theoretical gesture, the minimum hypothesis, 
which allows the person to live in a language, in a world, troubled by the Ding. 
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Coda:  Broken Bodies 
  
 For the authors I have considered here, thermodynamic discourse is the language within 
which bodies are broken apart and reassembled.  The great hope, for both Pater and Lawrence, is 
that the language of transformative energies will provide a recompense for that which is lacking 
in an actual body.  For William James, it is the language of thermodynamic equilibrium that 
preserves the body against excess, while for Lacan, it is only by separating the body from 
energetics that one can live with the fact of the fragmented body.   
Pater begins The Renaissance with the story of Abelard and Heloïse.  Abelard, the 
philosopher in whom “wisdom herself […] seemed to sit enthroned” becomes Heloïse’s tutor.  
As they “refine a little further on the nature of abstract ideas, ‘Love made himself of the party 
with them’”(3).  This “scholar” who “lived in a world of something like shadows …who knew so 
well how to assign its exact value to every abstract thought”(4), wakes to the colors of the world 
when he encounters Heloïse’s “great and energetic nature”(6).  It is only, however, once he is 
castrated by Heloise’s uncle, that Abelard is forced to commit himself to a literary life.  His 
letters to Heloïse, written from his exile in England show a “wonderful outpouring of soul”(6).  
As Pater writes in “Style,” for the true artist, the literary work is not a mere structure, but “a body 
he has informed”(15).  Abelard’s castration becomes the impetus for the construction of a new, 
literary, body.  Pater’s thermodynamic aesthetic, in which the “heat” of the author’s experience 
is communicated to the reader, becomes a scene of transmission without lack, and a recompense 
for Abelard’s castration.   
In Lawrence’s myth of Jesus / Osiris, Jesus arises from the tomb, castrated.  However, 
when he encounters the natural sexual energy at work in the world—in the form of an “escaped 
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cock”—he is able to see that while the human is lacking, nature is not.   Since “the universe 
flows in infinite wild streams, related / in rhythms too big and too small for us to know”(Poems, 
479), it is only by accepting the limits of knowledge that he can fully participate in uncastrated 
nature.  For both Pater and Lawrence, it is through castration that one becomes whole.  However, 
for Pater it is a real castration that allows Abelard to prefigure the Renaissance, while for 
Lawrence castration remains a metaphysical affair, as one realizes that one does not possess 
one’s body, but rather that one’s body belongs to nature.  Pater moves from the natural body to 
the body in the text; Lawrence suggests that one must give up the integrity of ones own body in 
order to become part of the scene of flowing energies that comprises the body of nature.   
For William James it is the hero and moralist who is able to bring equilibrium to the 
impulsivities of the will, and thus to preserve the integrity of the body.  James tells the story of a 
“tippler…put into an almshouse”(1149), and thus deprived of rum.   
Within a few days he had devised various expedients to procure rum, but 
failed. At length, however he hit upon one which was successful.  He went 
into the wood-yard of the establishment, placed one hand upon the block, 
and with an axe in the other, struck it off at a single blow. With the stump 
raised and streaming, he ran into the house and cried, ‘Get some rum! get 
some rum! my hand is off.’ In the confusion and bustle of the occasion a 
bowl of rum was brought, into which he plunged the bleeding member of 
his body; then raising the bowl to his mouth, drank freely, and exultingly 
exclaimed, ‘Now I am satisfied!’(Principles, 1149-50).  
 
It is the “diseased and impulsive will”(Principles, 1148) that would sacrifice the unity of the 
body in order to satisfy itself, whereas the healthy will, ruled by a spiritual force, maintains the 
body in a state of happy equilibrium.  Against James, Wilde, Stein, and Nietzsche suggest that 
the chaos of the impulses, unstable and excessive, can never quite be brought into a state of 
control and balance by the conscious mind.  
 For Lacan, who would agree that the attempt to bring equilibrium and cohesion to the 
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body does not work out, the question is not that of how to avoid castration, by opposing a scene 
of castration to a scene of plenitude and balance, but rather that of how to sustain the fragmented 
body, the body as it resists interpretation.  Lacan argues that the language of energetics assumes 
the existence and coherence of bodies, and thus condemns the problem of the fragmented body to 
silence.  Lacan suggests that it is only by constructing a relationship to this broken body—by 
hypothesizing that the body, possessed by language, is the scene of the unconscious—that one 
can live with the fact that the body moves beyond control and without intention.   
 
  
. 
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